« February 2002 | Main | April 2002 »

March 31, 2002

Health Care: We're in grave condition

The Sacramento Bee
March 24, 2002
By Keith Richman

It is time to address the fundamental health care financing problems causing our access and affordability symptoms. The Band-Aid approach can no longer cover the deep wound. California needs a master plan for health care -- a practical, cost-effective blueprint for the facilities, human resources and financing needed to provide quality health care to the estimated 45 million people who will call California home in 2020.

It will take strong leadership to develop the consensus needed to make significant changes. A system that spends more than $100 billion a year on vital tasks such as improving and saving lives will not easily change. The vested interests will be strong and the emotions will be high.

Yet if we want to forestall the impending collapse of California's health care system, we must look at the big picture and make some difficult decisions about our future.

Keith Richman, M.D. is a Republican member of the California Assembly.

http://www.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story/1936339p-2080975c.html

Comment: The California Health Care Options Project is a study of various models of health care reform that was requested by the state legislature. The study has now been completed and will soon be available for the members of the legislature. Dr. Richman will find the ideal master plan in this report when he reviews it.

One of the models studied, "Cal-Health," is based on Dr. Richman's own legislative proposal, Assembly Bill 32. The Lewin Group analysis of his proposal demonstrates that it would still leave five million California residents without insurance coverage, but would increase costs by about $1 billion. On the other hand, three of the proposals would provide comprehensive benefits for everyone while decreasing costs by billions of dollars.

When Dr. Richman reviews his copy of the report, we hope that he will heed his own advice and demonstrate strong leadership. We hope that he will not be deterred by strong vested interests and high emotions from doing the right thing. We hope that he will recognize the deficiencies of his own proposal and join with those that support the single payer approach. Comprehensive care for everyone at a lower cost is clearly the moral imperative.

Sumner Rosen, Professor Emeritus of Social Welfare Policy at Columbia University, responds on the problems of linking insurance to employment and the misplaced efforts of foundations. Donald Light expands on the issue and then comments on the Bush administration's unusual approach to health policy. And Beth Capell comments on factors other than price that influence employers.

Sumner M. Rosen, Ph.D.:

It's been clear for a long time that the employer base for health coverage will shrink irreversibly. Cost data like this tell part of the story; the more important part is the erosion of the employer-employee linkage as job tenure shortens and multiple jobs over one's working life become the dominant pattern. Employers will continue to shrink the core and expand the periphery of the work force through downsizing, contracting out and a host of other moves amply documented in the business press. That RWJ persists in this futile effort is discouraging evidence of failure to learn from substantial and growing evidence that new initiatives are needed. The right wing virus of ideological resistance to a federal program appears to have infected people and institutions that should know better.

Donald Light, Ph.D.:

Besides trying to get free-riding employers to offer affordable health insurance, the other great white hope of foundation board members is CHIP and its extensions. They have poured tens of millions of private money into trying to make this new public patch, in the patchwork quilt of public health insurance programs, work. It would be instructive to hear from Ted Marmor and others why they think CHIP and other patches have low uptake and costly problems, while Medicare did not and does not.

Closely related to this question is another approach: just do it. Today's NYTimes article announces that President Bush simply decided that Medicare would cover the wide-ranging, messy and costly care that patients with Alzheimer's disease need. It's a rather major advance for a tragic group that are an insurer's nightmare. It's "incremental reform" but without even the trappings of "reform." No debate. No bill. He just did it. What are the implications of this for participants and readers of this listserve?

Beth Capell, Ph.D.:

It would be terrific if one of our academic colleagues did a state-by-state comparison on this topic.

Such a comparison would show that in California, where premiums are lower than almost anywhere else in the country, employers are substantially less likely to offer coverage, particularly to low-income workers, than elsewhere in the country where premiums are higher. This is also true within California: Bay Area employers facing higher premiums are more likely to offer coverage than Los Angeles employers whose relatively low premiums reflect a ferociously competitive market for both plans and providers.

Similarly, in California, in the early-mid 1990s when premiums were level or declining, employers shifted cost to workers and the number of uninsured remained stubbornly the same or increased--while in the late 90's as premiums in California increased, the number of uninsured declined and employers ceased shifting costs to workers---because of the tight labor market. Again, price of premiums was not directly and simply related to levels of uninsurance or worker share of premium.

While employers may claim that price is a major factor, experience suggests otherwise. Other factors, such as the nature of the labor market and the rate of unionization, are better explanatory factors for underlying trends.

Price is merely the polite term for employer freedom to ignore the need of working people for affordable health care.

March 30, 2002

To Offer or Not to Offer: The Role of Price in Employers' Health Insurance Decisions

Health Services Research

Authors: M. Susan Marquis and Stephen H. Long

Principal Findings:

Changes in price affect decisions to offer insurance: however, even a 40 percent reduction in premiums would lead only to a 2 to 3 percentage point increase in the share of employers offering insurance. Employers of low-wage workers are substantially less likely to offer health insurance than other employers.

Conclusions:

Policies to reduce the number of uninsured that focus on increasing the supply of employment-based insurance are unlikely to have the intended effect unless coupled with policies to help low-wage workers afford insurance.

http://www.hsr.org/ArticleAbstracts/Marquis365.cfm

Comment provided by Prof. Donald W. Light:

In a detailed study of private employers, Marquis and Long found that 51.5% of small employers offer health insurance (many with high co-premiums that workers feel they cannot afford), but they also found that only 58.1% of all other employers offered health insurance. This is a strikingly low number for a system based on employers in a large, affluent nation.

The authors also found once again that the continued efforts by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and others to increase the number of employers offering coverage by supporting lower premiums does not work. Even if offered a 40 percent reduction in premiums, only a few percent more employers said they would offer health insurance. These efforts to shore up an inherently partial system, which provides limited and variable coverage at very high prices to employers as well as to employees, have been tried for over 15 years. It seems time for the boards of Kaiser Family Foundation, RWJF, and others to face the data and turn to more equitable and efficient approaches.

Source: "To offer or not to offer." Health Services Research 2001;36:937-958.

March 29, 2002

U.S. Government Should Implement Single-Payer Insurance System, Ivins Says

Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report
March 28, 2002


The United States should replace the nation's "broken" health care system with a single-payer system that would provide universal health coverage, syndicated columnist Molly Ivins writes in... (a syndicated) opinion piece. Ivins writes that although the U.S. health care system "works" for individuals with health insurance, for the uninsured, the "system is an insane nightmare." Since the failure of former President Clinton's national health care plan in 1994, lawmakers "have been trying to move the ball incrementally" on legislation to help the uninsured, Ivins writes. However, she says that the U.S. health care "system is moving faster than they can move to fix it. A patients' bill of rights is not the answer. It won't provide health insurance for a single additional individual." Ivins recommends that the United States should move to a not-for-profit health care system. She backs a plan proposed by Dr. Rudolph Mueller in his new book, "As Sick As It Gets: The Shocking Reality of America's HealthCare," which would allow the federal government to conduct a "one-time fair buyout" of "all for-profit or investor-owned provider and insurance organizations." Ivins concludes, "Every time we start to get serious about reform, the right wing starts screaming, 'Socialized medicine, socialized medicine.' And then we're all supposed to run, screaming with horror. But if you want to see horror in action, try the emergency room of any large public hospital in this country" (Ivins, Tallahassee Democrat, 3/27).

http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=10318

The full article, released on March 26, is available at the Creators Syndicate: http://www.creators.com/opinion_show.cfm?columnsName=miv

March 26, 2002

The Rise of For Profit Medicine


By Uwe E. Reinhardt

FROM THE perspective of someone whose social ethic was forged first in Europe and then in Canada, the current brouhaha over ''boutique medicine'' in the United States is amusing.

The critics of boutique medicine deem it un-American to let the individual's health care experience vary by ability to pay. Yet it seems only natural in a country that countenances boutique education and the enduring tradition of rationing by income the health care of some 7 million uninsured children and 12 million elderly Medicare beneficiaries without coverage for prescription drugs.

The boutique physicians protest that they merely seek to restore the overall quality of health care to the allegedly high level it had before the onset of managed care - which is in itself a hypothesis, not a fact. If they sincerely believe in their theory, they must be arithmetically challenged.

There are, in the Boston area, only so many physicians and so many patients. Suppose half of those physicians switched to boutique medicine and reduced their patient loads to spend more time with patients who can afford their fees. Former patients now price-rationed out of these physicians' practices would then either have to go without care or be loaded onto the 50 percent of physicians not yet engaged in boutique medicine.

Either way, the quality of these patients' health care would deteriorate. In effect, boutique physicians do not enhance the overall quality of care. Wittingly or not, they merely redistribute superior quality toward patients thought to deserve it, because they can and will pay for it.

Boutique physicians are perfectly in keeping with certain sacred tenets of normative economic theory. For decades economics professors have drummed into students the ''marginal productivity theory of income,'' according to which a person's position in our nation's income distribution largely reflects that person's marginal contribution to society. From that theory it is but a small step to the ethical doctrine that wealthy persons ''deserve'' better housing, education, justice, and, yes, health care than do persons of lesser means. It is their reward for their superior social contribution.

This doctrine extends even to a person's financial wealth, whether inherited or however else begotten. To illustrate, if a person possesses $100 million and invests it in the economy, his or her marginal social contribution is said by economists to exceed by many multiples that of, say, a soldier in the 101st US Airborne Division fighting for America in the mountains of Afghanistan or of a firefighter standing ready daily to risk his or her life for fellow citizens. It is so, say economists, because the marginal social contribution made by the millionaire's capital is judged by ''the American people'' (i.e., the market) to be far above the soldier's or firefighter's, whose modest salaries represent the valuations put upon their marginal contributions to society. Consequently, according to economic doctrine, the financier's family deserves higher quality of the basic things in life.

Nobel Laureate economist Milton Friedman has articulated the implication of this doctrine for health care more clearly than anyone else. During the health reform debate of the 1990s, Friedman proposed the complete abolition of the federal Medicare program for the elderly and the state-federal Medicaid program for the poor. A better approach, in his view, would be for families to have only catastrophic health insurance, with an up-front, out-of-pocket deductible of $20,000 per year or 30 percent of the family's income during the last two years, whichever is lower. At the time of his writing, the median pretax family income in the United States was $35,000, which means that he had in mind a $10,500 deductible for such a family.

Friedman's vision for American health care has made substantial inroads into the medical profession - perhaps even to Boston's boutique physicians. For example, when I questioned in the Journal of the American Medical Association whether, as a matter of national policy, children of low-income families in this country should be offered the same health care experience as that enjoyed by children of well-to-do parents, this was decried as ''socialism'' by a good number of irate physicians. Physicians inclined to answer my question in the affirmative remained silent. Friedman's disciple, Richard A. Epstein, distinguished law professor of the University of Chicago, answered my question with a crisp ''No!'' and went so far as to call the very idea of equality ''perverse.''

Recent health insurance reforms embraced by the American Medical Association are in line with Friedman's vision for health care, as are many of the novel health insurance products now on the drawing boards of the private health insurance sector. Boutique medicine is merely a natural and rather innocent expression of that ethic.

Some folks in Boston may as yet feel uncomfortable with that approach to medicine. Their children and grandchildren will view it as American as apple pie - as we now do boutique education.

Uwe E. Reinhardt is a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University.

This story ran on page A15 of the Boston Globe on 3/26/2002. (C)Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.

http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/085/oped/The_rise_of_for_profit_medicineP.shtmlÊ -- Boston Globe Online

Health Care for All - Oregon


Folk,Ê

Here in Oregon, Health Care for All - Oregon had collected 74,748 signatures as of May 30, 67,000 signatures of voters eligible to vote are required for the initiative to appear on the ballot in Nov. 2002. Signature collection is going to go on until July 1 to be sure that there will be about 80,000 signatures so that when the state removes the ineligibles that more than 67,000 will be left. History has shown that we can count on the initiative being on the Nov. 2002 ballot with such a surplus of signatures collected. Here is a chance to have the people in our state vote into law and install into law a single payer universal health care system which our legislators can't prevent. HCAO now has to complete the education of the voters and get out the vote in Nov. 2002. We need help and you can do that by sending money to "Health Care for All Oregon." Please help us with as much as you can. Please include your address - no PO boxes - and what work you do with your check. NO ONE will solicit you by phone.

Our address is: HCAO, P.O. Box 51422, Eugene. OR, 97405.

You know that this only has to happen in one state and then it will leapfrog from one state to another, to another, and so on, until we have universal health care in America.

March 23, 2002

Health insurance bill's makeover turns the tide

St. Petersburg Times
March 20, 2002
By Anita Kumar

Rep. Frank Farkas scored a victory Tuesday when the House passed his controversial health insurance bill.

Farkas agreed to... increase coverage to $25,000 annually...

Farkas... said other aspects of the insurance plan would lower the cost, such as flexible deductibles, co-pays and other treatments and procedures not mandated by law but often covered by insurance companies.

The amended bill passed 113-2.

Rep. Eleanor Sobel, D-Hollywood:

"A bare-bones policy has been given meat. It is a great step forward."

http://www.sptimes.com/2002/03/20/State/Health_insurance_bill.shtml

Comment: One technical criticism of the movie, "John Q," was that a $20,000 cap on John Q's coverage was almost non-existent; virtually all policies have much higher levels of coverage. Now we have a bipartisan, 113 to 2 vote that says that John Q's fictional bare-bones policy is "a great step forward."

What has happened to the soul of America?

March 22, 2002

CalPERS cuts losses on self-funded health plans Despite improvement over last year, the pension trustees are considering a single statewide program.

The Sacramento Bee
March 21, 2002
By Lisa Rapaport

Some of the biggest changes could come in CalPERS' two self-insured plans, which provide benefits to 20 percent of its 1.2 million members. The pension plan has seen financial risk grow in its self-insured plans as sicker, costlier patients flock to them as HMOs abandon outlying counties and some unions with healthier members shop for coverage outside CalPERS.

In response, the pension fund might drop all of its HMO contacts in favor of a single, statewide self-insured plan.

Larry Levitt of the Kaiser Family Foundation:

"You have to be very big to even contemplate fully self-funding and taking the HMOs out of the equation completely. It's hard to imagine many employers besides CalPERS pulling this off."

http://www.sacbee.com/content/business/story/1913356p-2025433c.html

Comment: If CalPERS, the nation's second largest provider of health benefit services (next to FEHBP), recognizes the wisdom of excluding middlemen health plans and establishing a single, statewide program for California state employees and retirees, then when will the rest of us finally recognize that a single, statewide, publicly-administered program will better serve the health care needs for all of us? Would CalPERS consider letting us join in on the initial discussions to consider whether it might be wise to establish a single payer system for the entire state? The California Health Care Options Project has established the credibility of this approach. It is time to look at all options, especially those with credibility.

March 21, 2002

Workers Feel Like Suckers

Los Angeles Times
March 20, 2002
By Ralph Frammolino

The memories will endure, but the factory that turns out 46 billion Life Savers each year won't. Kraft Foods Inc. is closing the plant and moving its operations to Canada.

Life Savers will pay nonunion workers in Mount Royal about $12.50 an hour--$3 less than their counterparts in Holland (Michigan). With the Canadian government picking up the tab for health coverage, the savings come to about $6.5 million a year.

John Boyd, president of a Princeton, N.J., consulting firm that helps companies select plant locations:

"Labor costs dominate the equation. They account for at least 70% of all operating costs. . . . That's the real driver in the site selection process."

http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-000020325mar20.story

Comment: When will businesses in the United States be ready for the government to assist in making American products more competitive by picking up the tab for health coverage? And when will the politicians tire of watching jobs and businesses with their tax revenues move to Canada? The lack of publicly funded health insurance in the United States may not be the only factor in this shift, but it's a big one.

Jon Oberlander, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Social Medicine, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, responds to Uwe Reinhardt's comments on Medicare:

I agree with Uwe that single payer is thrown around far too often as a catch phrase. And I strongly believe that too many health reformers are "fundamentalists," fixated on Canadian style single payer when other international models perform just as well--and may be a better political fit for the U.S. That is a large topic that I leave for another day.

But I do want to take up what Uwe has said about Medicare. He tells us of Medicare (along with Medicaid): "neither program is known for its ability to assure the quality of health care, and both can control costs in only the crudest ways--with a sledgehammer." He then goes on to criticize Medicare's regional discrepancies in payment and notes that low cost physicians in Minnesota could be punished under Medicare's Volume Performance Standard system if physicians in Miami push up their own utilization. Is that a way to run a health system, Uwe wonders?

Judging by international experience, the answer is yes. Medicare's tools of cost control are indeed crude but so are those in Canada, Germany, and just about any other country you look. Medicare uses the sledgehammer of setting fee schedules (or price controls, depending on your taste) but that, along with global budgets and controlling technological diffusion (which Medicare is not positioned to do) is precisely how other countries have controlled costs. Crude? Yes. Effective? Yes. So exactly what, Uwe, is the point in labeling Medicare as having crude cost control? Is there another system that works in practice rather than theory (judging by the flops at CalPERS and FEHBP, it is surely not managed competition, as much as Alain Enthoven would have us believe otherwise).

As for regional inequities in Medicare payment, I agree these are truly irrational. But it is worth pointing out that other nations such as Canada, also have collective punishment in budgets that "claw back" excess payments across all doctors. Medicare perhaps is worse--at least the Canadians are smart enough to do it on the provincial level--but collective payment reductions is not exactly an original sin. And Medicare doesn't guarantee quality outcomes, as Uwe says. But who does? Not managed care. For all the talk of disease management and coordinated care, there is no evidence on average that HMOs improve care for Medicare beneficiaries. Too often, this is the stuff of advertising slogans, not real change in health care delivery. And the one group that fares badly under managed care over the years in Hal Luft's review is chronically ill seniors.

At the end of the day, I'm sure we're not far apart in agreeing that Medicare has lots of limitations and could stand for major improvement in benefit coverage etc. But I'm not sure what the point of Medicare bashing is, Uwe, if you leave out its similarities in cost control (with its limited capabilities) to other nations and in quality to the private experience here.

Best, Jon

March 20, 2002

Uwe Reinhardt responds to Rev. Tom Mainor on single payer reform, with an additional comment by Don McCanne:

Uwe Reinhardt, Ph.D., James Madison Professor of Political Economy, Princeton University:

Dear Rev. Mainor:

I am not sure that we are on the same page. We all do agree, I think, (1) that every American should be protected through insurance of some kind from the financial inroads associated with serious illness and (2) that every American, when he or she believes to be in need of health care, should have access to "adequate" health care, where what is "adequate," however, may be defined by someone other than that person or his or her physician (e.g., it may be defined by the government). I am not sure we all agree even on point (2).

I have gained the impression that, in this e-mail circle, the word "single payer system" stands as a code word for these two guarantees: "adequate" financial protection and "adequate" access to "adequate" health care. What an odd use of the English language that is!

To me, the words "single-payer" evokes the image of an economic arrangement. It is a payment system under which there is only one payer who operates a common payment system, whatever its precise form may be. In lectures I had given in Taiwan some years ago, I called it "single-pipe" systems, to stress that good cost control requires that, at some points, all monies going to providers should flow through a single pipe segment whose throughput could be controlled by government. (Taiwan actually adopted such a system and still calls it "single pipe system.")

But "single payer" system does not necessarily imply "comprehensive, universal insurance coverage," nor even payment of providers on a piece-rate basis (fee-for-service). Many students of health care have concluded long ago that piece-rate compensation systems are inimical to good health care, especially to prospective health maintenance.

Medicare is a single payer system. It is almost universal among the elderly, but it is not comprehensive. It has its strength, but also its weaknesses. We now read that it pays physicians fees that do not cover costs (which may or may not be true). Medicaid also is a single payer system in each state. We know that often its fees do not cover a doctor's costs. Neither program is known for its ability to assure the quality of health care, and both can control costs in only the crudest ways--with a sledgehammer.

To illustrate, Medicare payments per elderly in Miami are over twice the amount Medicare pays for identical elderly in Minnesota (see Wennberg's famous, Dartmouth Atlas.) Yet, under Medicare's approach to cost control, if Miami physicians and those in other high cost areas pushed utilization to the point of busting the federal Volume Performance Standard (a global, national budget cap), then physicians in Minnesota will see their fees cut as a punishment for that budget busting. Is that a way to run a health system?

It baffles me that the group on this e-mail circuit holds out "single payer system" almost as a religious mantra, without ever specifying exactly what the term means to them and why they see in a "single payer system" the solution to all our problems.

I believe I challenged the group last summer to come out of the closet on this one. The challenge remains on the table.

Best

Uwe

Don McCanne, M.D., President, Physicians for a National Health Program, responds:

In simple terms, a single payer program would replace the current multipayer system of private insurance companies and HMOs with a single government fund within each state. But the problem with descriptive labels such as "single payer" is that our concept of reform is much more than simply a single pipe or conduit for the flow of funds. So, regardless of whether or not the single payer label is used, we should ask just what form of health care reform do we envision?

Health care coverage and access would be universal, including everyone, even undocumented residents.

Health care benefits would be comprehensive, including all beneficial health care services except those services that should not be funded with public funds such as vanity cosmetic surgery or penthouse hospital suites.

Funding of the system would be equitable, with each individual contributing his or her fair share but with no person suffering a financial hardship. True equity is possible only with a progressive system of public funding. Cost sharing has been used to reduce utilization by erecting financial barriers to care (and is used more now to inappropriately shift risk to patients) and has impaired access for the more vulnerable members of our society. In an equitable system, cost sharing would be eliminated and excess utilization would be controlled instead by mechanisms mentioned below.

Allocation of our health care resources would be equitable. Separate budgeting of capital improvements would be established to assure access for everyone with adequate but not excessive capacity, which would be as close to equitable as logistic and demographic considerations would permit.

Administrative simplification would be achieved by eliminating the fragmented and duplicative system of large, inefficient, private health plan bureaucracies and the administrative burden that this places on the providers of care. This would be replaced with a simplified, single, publicly administered program. If we continue to spend at our current level, this does free up enough resources to pay for the voids in current care, including the uninsured, under-insured, and the deficiencies in Medicare and the private health plans (programs which would be eliminated).

Costs would be controlled by global budgeting. State or regional authorities would allocate the funding, establishing global rates for hospitals and integrated health systems, and negotiated rates for providers. Negotiated rates in a public system would prevent excessive compensation but would be adequate to assure that qualified individuals would continue to be attracted to the health professions. The various health providers would be competing with each other for those finite funds, but would no longer have to compete with passive investors. (Although the draw of passive investors is a small percentage of our system, and would not have much impact, the corporate mentality that creates excess capacity and consequent waste would be removed, thereby allowing the funds to be directed to the public good. The public interest is served better by assuring adequate compensation for providers.) As mentioned, capital improvements would be budgeted separately to optimize capacity.

Quality of care is impaired whenever services are under-utilized or over-utilized. Capacity planning by controlling capital expenditures is an essential measure in quality improvement efforts.

Integrated information systems would identify outliers, which then would initiate an education process to improve resource utilization, or sanctioning for those that remain non-compliant. Information integration would also reduce error, also improving quality.

A stable professional relationship with either individual providers or integrated health systems would be established for each individual. Choice of providers would be returned to the individual. When individuals have choice, providers are motivated to provide quality services, or at least services that have the appearance of quality, usually a move in the right direction.

Many flawed health policies would be reduced or eliminated. Inequitable cost shifting that permeates our system, inadequate funding of welfare programs such as Medicaid, adverse or virtuous selection, financial barriers to access, tiering of services, price gouging, and endless other defective mechanisms would be significantly reduced or even eliminated.

A single payer system would provide a structural framework that would promote the application of the ethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice.

Many single payer supporters would remove all for-profit corporate boards and passive investors from the medical equation. A publicly administered program would automatically replace the private health plans and their investors. (The removal of passive investors from the health care delivery system is a much more complex topic and should be reserved here as a separate topic rather than using it as a diversionary ploy to try to discredit the single payer approach.)

Are there any problems with the single payer approach? Living within a budget is always a problem. But a budget based on our current generous expenditures would be a very comfortable budget indeed. Reducing excess capacity and allowing access to everyone might be perceived as rationing of services and may actually be so if we fail to design into the system surge capacity for epidemics. Those that are able to buy their way to the front of the line in our current system may perceive, somewhat ironically, an equitable system as being "unfair." If the public at large wanted even more services, those services could be funded by electing legislatures that would support expansion. If a legislature and administration decided to reduce funding for ideological reasons and against the will of the people, then they could be replaced at the next election. (We can let the political scientists and the economists debate just how effective that process would be.)

Of course, I haven't begun to touch on all of the implications of single payer reform, but that "single pipe" opens up all sorts of possibilities for establishing health care equity and justice that are simply not possible in our fragmented, inefficient system of private plans, public plans, and no plans. The economists may call the system of Taiwan the "single pipe" system, but the more common designation is "NHI" or "National Health Insurance." Maybe that relatively generic term would be more appropriate than "single payer," which is a conceptual term that in some minds limits the expansive thinking that we now need, but thinking that cannot allow compromise on universality, comprehensiveness, access, and equity.

Have we found our way out of the closet yet?

Note: The original proposal of Physicians for a National Health Program did not use the term, "single payer." Single payer was later unofficially adopted as a label for simplicity in communication. It may not be the proper label because of common misconceptions about the single payer model. The original proposal published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1989, "A National Health Program for the United States: A Physicians' Proposal" is available at:

http://www.pnhp.org/publications/NEJM1_12_89.htm

With this information in hand, you can return to Professor Reinhardt's comments and address each one of his concerns. You might try it as an academic exercise.

Don

March 19, 2002

Bad Medicine

The New York Times
March 19, 2002
By Paul Krugman

Sunday's front-page story in The Times on doctors who shun patients with Medicare may have been alarming enough; it seems that recent cuts in Medicare payments are inducing many doctors to avoid treating Medicare recipients at all. But this is just the beginning of a struggle that will soon dominate American politics.

Think of it as the collision between an irresistible force (the growing cost of health care) and an immovable object (the determination of America's conservative movement to downsize government).

Why don't we just leave medical care up to individuals? Basically, even in the United States there are limits to how much inequality the public is prepared to tolerate. It's one thing if the rich can afford bigger houses or fancier vacations than ordinary families; Americans accept such differences cheerfully. But a society in which rich people get their medical problems solved, while ordinary people die from them, is too harsh even for us.

But meeting the public's expectations for medical care - that is, ensuring that every American, and in particular every retired American, gets essential care - will require a lot of government spending. And the conservative movement in general, and the Bush administration in particular, are not prepared to make the money available; after all, government spending must ultimately be paid for with taxes.

Yet they dare not say openly that they are prepared to deny essential health care to those who cannot afford it.

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/19/opinion/19KRUG.html

Paul Krugman, Ph.D., is Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Comment: "A lot of government spending" does not have to mean more spending. The administrative efficiencies enabled by establishing a publicly administered program of universal insurance would provide enough savings to fund the deficiencies in our current system. The only hurdle has been our reluctance to accept the fact that "public administration" means that the government would collect the "premiums" and distribute those funds equitably and efficiently. That is not a bad thing. We have to get over thinking that it is.

March 17, 2002

Rev. Tom Mainor Comments on the debate and priorities:

The American public, the Congress and the News Media do not have before them accessible, sense-making comparative costs, figures. Nor do they see/hear/receive/have explained in common sense fashion the elements and considerable benefits to be derived via single payer, regional global budgeting, or the multiple payers that exchange mountains of bills each day, back and forth. Most of the proposals forthcoming are merely the rearrangement of desk chairs on the SS. US HEALTH COSTS DEBACLE.

Health care is too important to be left to the market place. Hopefully not medical and public health academia too.

It is hard enough to find out what one's insurance pays, how much of the co-payment has or has not been factored in, and whether or not one needs yet another supplementary policy to make certain bankruptcy is not just around the corner.

The ego and energy going into this particular conversation would better be spent on informing the public.

Come on, gentlemen. We are on the same side aren't we?

Tom Mainor

Uwe Reinhardt again responds to Theodore Marmor:

Ted:

I'm off on a trip over break and have only a few moments to reply, but let me try.

You took a few nice swings at me, which was fair enough, I suppose, but I do not think that you have answered my two fundamental questions I raised in my earlier e-mail, more sincerely than you may surmise:

1. How does democracy work in America? If your life depended on it, Ted, and someone asked you to compress your knowledge on this subject into, say, one written page that might be roughly right, what would you write down?

2. What do the American people, other than the providers or financial intermediaries of health care, want from their health system, and what kind of system would they really like to have?

Do I understand you to say that the people do not have a coherent, logically consistent view on what they want from their health system?

Is it the case that, whatever people may think in this regard at a moment, it takes very little to disinform and confuse them, and to shift their views (as, say, in California)?

Are you saying that, even if people had logically consistent and stable views on health policy, these views would be irrelevant under our system of government in any event, or are relevant only occasionally, in ways that can be predicted only ex post--e.g. by Shields and Brooks?

Having spoken at length on several occasions with Humphrey Taylor of Lou Harris, and having read on the matter, too, I do appreciate that it is very difficult to fathom through surveys what people really think about any issue, if only because the responses given are easily influenced by the way questions are framed. I am not really thinking about that problem. I am after what people actually might be thinking.

Best regards,

Uwe

Victor Sidel, M.D., Co-Founder and Past President, Physicians for Social Responsibility/USA and Co-Founder and Past Co-President, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (1985 recipient of the Nobel Prize for Peace), comments on the debate and on our priorities:

Don:

As you know, I'm off to Moscow to try to make a contribution to lessening the threat of use of nuclear weapons. That may be the reason I have little patience with this kind of argument. It's clear why economics is called "the dismal science." In a time when untold billions of additional dollars are being allocated to the US military and to "bioterrorism preparedness" while the DoD makes plans to use nuclear weapons (or threaten to use them), policy arguments about the exact percentage of GDP devoted to medical care (or the false predictions that were made about its rise) are dilatory or worse. Let's devote our time and energy to discussion of the political action needed for the achievement in our lifetimes of an equitable high-quality universal cost-effective medical care system for the United States.

Cordially, Vic

Dr. Sidel will be in Moscow March 24-26, and will deliver the paper, "Instead of Nuclear Weapons: An IPPNW Perspective on Nuclear Security, Human Security, and Global Security." The concept of human security is very directly related to our efforts on behalf of health care justice. Dr. Sidel has kindly consented to make this paper available to members of this list. Since it is four pages, it is too long to send it out to everyone with this message, but merely reply to this message and it will be forwarded to you as a Word attachment.

March 16, 2002

Theodore Marmor responds to Uwe Reinhardt:


(The previous remarks are reproduced, and Dr. Marmor's additional comments are in caps, whereas his original comments are in lower case. Dr. Reinhardt's comments were made after Dr. Marmor's lower case comments, but before his caps. Please note that, although messages in all caps are considered to be the e-mail version of shouting, that is not true here.)

Dr. Marmor:

Uwe--I want to start a trend towards brevity in these exchanges, so will have in caps my responses below.

Theodore R. Marmor Professor of Public Policy & Management Professor of Political Science Yale University School of Management

Dr. Marmor:

Uwe--your arithmetic was helpful to see what is at work with projections of future national income and what one scenario forecasts for health expenditures as a proportion of that national income. But arithmetic neither produces plausible predictions (as against conditional forecasts) and, more important, does not provide the grounds for analysis of that future. (Were CBO forecasts in 1993 l8% of GNP for health by 2000? That was their forecast!)

Dr. Reinhardt:

It was projected to be 19.7%, Ted (October, 1993--I still have the paper). How could you err by so much!

Dr. Marmor:

THE POINT DOES NOT DEPEND ON WHETHER IT WAS 18%, WHICH I PULLED FROM MEMORY OR 19.7% RATHER IT IS THAT THE CBO FORECAST WAS VASTLY OFF THE MARK AS A POINT PREDICTION. WE CALL YOUR RESPONSE IN PHILOSOPHY 'FALSE SPECIFICITY.' I REGARD IT AS A HUMOROUS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE POINT.

Dr. Marmor:

I particularly want to contest your claim (repeated often by you) that "Americans have signaled that they don't want any cost control at all...." Kip challenges your claims about the effects of what is called managed care.

Dr. Reinhardt:

I attach a chart on real health spending per capita (not included in this message). Either you or Kip must explain to us all what caused the trend line to bend. We know it was not Medicare, because that kept right on its growth path until the BBA '97. So I shall temporarily concede--against superior authority--that managed care had nothing to do with it and await yours or Kip's explanation.

Dr. Marmor:

I AM NOT IN THAT FIGHT. I LEFT THE DISPUTE UP TO YOU AND KIP AND THINK MANAGED CARE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE DAMPENED INFLATION (I SUSPECT IT DID), BUT THAT THE MORE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT IT DID SO IN WAYS THAT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BY MOST THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE.

Dr. Marmor:

I want to challenge your interpretation of the connection between what mass American wants and both public and private policy. It is decades too late to continue to repeat the fallacy of revealed preference in politics. It does not follow that because outcome A takes place, the citizens of that jurisdiction 'wanted' A. It might be, but the use of the effect to specify the cause is a logical fallacy. Until and unless you can find reason to believe mass opinion shaped events decisively, stop blaming the victim.

Dr. Reinhardt:

Again, I must defer here to superior authority. I am not a political scientist. What I await from you, Ted--perhaps all of us do--is a concise, short explanation of how democracy works in America. As an example, explain to me why the election of 1994 had nothing to do with voter preferences--among others about government's role in health care.

Dr. Marmor:

THIS IS, I AM AFRAID, A NAIVE READING OF ELECTORAL OUTCOMES. YOU CAN NOT LEGITIMATELY GO FROM THE OUTCOME--THE REJECTION OF CLINTON--TO A READING OF WHAT VOTER VALUES AND PREFERENCES WERE FOR PARTICULAR POLICIES. WHAT YOU CAN SAY IS THAT CLINTON'S FAILURE TO GET A HEALTH CARE REFORM THROUGH--OR TO FRAME AN ALTERNATIVE THAT CLEARLY MOBILIZED AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS IN CONGRESS (AS THE DEMOCRATS DID FROM 1961-64 WITH MEDICARE) MEANT THAT VOTERS WERE TURNED OFF BY WHAT SEEMED LIKE A FAILED DOMESTIC PRESIDENT IN SOCIAL POLICY. HE WAS LUCKY THAT THE REPUBLICANS OVER-REACHED IN 1995 AND THEN HE TURNED INTO A DEFENDER OF TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC PROGRAMS IN 1996

Dr. Reinhardt continues:

Throw in a convincing--but concise--explanation of why the referendum in California on a single-payer plan did not work.

Dr. Marmor:

I SUSPECT, BUT DO NOT KNOW, THAT CALIFORNIA VOTERS WERE BAMBOOZLED BY SUPERIOR PROPAGANDA ON THE OTHER SIDE AND MOST HAD ONLY THE VAGUEST IDEA OF WHAT THE POLICY WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE. THIS IS WHY, BY THE WAY, THAT DEMOCRATIC THEORISTS LARGELY REJECT REFERENDA AS USEFUL MEASURES OF WHAT VOTERS WOULD WANT IF THEY UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS AT ISSUE. IT IS CALLED PLEBISCITARIAN DEMOCRACY.

Dr. Reinhardt continues:

Always eager to learn.

Dr. Marmor:

START WITH A REVIEW OF THE WORK OF PAGE AND SHAPIRO ON PUBLIC OPINION. TAKE A LOOK AT LARRY JACOB'S BOOK WITH SHAPIRO ENTITLED 'CRAFTED TALK', WHICH SHOWS JUST HOW MUCH POLITICAL LEADERS USE POLLS TO CRAFT THEIR MESSAGES RATHER THAN RESPOND TO POPULAR PREFERENCES.

Dr. Marmor:

I don't for a moment believe the American mass public has any clear idea about the extent to which cost control arguments are true, false, or misleading.

Dr. Reinhardt:

And how do you know that?

Dr. Marmor:

FROM A CAREER OF READING THE WORKS IN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY THAT I URGE YOU TO CONSIDER. GO BACK TO THE MICHIGAN VOTING STUDIES AND THE WORK BY CONVERSE ET.AL. IT WILL STUN YOU, I BELIEVE.

Dr. Marmor:

Our political system is far too structured against mass majority rule to explain health policy outcomes as the result of their 'wishes.' Sure, a different distribution of wants and attitudes might make some policies more likely, but the locomotive conception you use is genuinely misleading and unsupported, as I have mentioned before, by the public opinion literature.

Dr. Reinhardt:

Too vague, Ted. Too vague.

Dr, Marmor:

BALONEY. PICK UP ANY TEXTBOOK ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND YOU WILL SEE THIS VIEW SUPPORTED. I REGRET THIS KIND OF KNOW-NOTHINGISM

Dr. Reinhardt continues:

This is you in your old mode.

Dr. Marmor:

AN IRRELEVANT IN LOGICAL TERMS. WHETHER I AM UP TO SOMETHING NOW OR EARLIER HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ITS VALIDITY.

Dr. Reinhardt:

As you know, I don't groove on it. For example, I could simply assert that your statement here is genuinely misleading and unsupported, and leave it at that.

Dr. Marmor:

THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ARGUMENT; IT IS BLATHER.

Dr. Reinhardt:

No, Ted, I would like you to explain to me why voters' attitudes about the role of government in health care has nothing to do with the demise of the Clinton plan and the ascendancy of Republican rule in the House.

Dr. Marmor:

YOU AGAIN SEEM TO THINK THAT THE DEFENSE OF A BAD ARGUMENT IS AN ASSAULT ON ANOTHER. THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES WITH THOSE WHO WOULD CHALLENGE WITH EVIDENCE ABOUT VOTER KNOWLEDGE AND OTHER DATA WHAT ARE WIDELY ACCEPTED JUDGMENTS ABOUT HOW AMERICAN DEMOCRACY WORKS. MOST ECONOMISTS DO NOT STUDY SUCH MATTERS AND HENCE THEY SIMPLY EXPRESS CONVICTIONS.

Dr. Reinhardt:

Finally, Ted, since you infer that you may know, please tell me once and for all what the American people really want in health care. I suggest a concise list. In return I shall compose what I think they want.

Dr. Marmor:

THIS IS A LARGE TASK AND ONE THAT IS WELL WORTH TAKING SERIOUSLY. THEY WANT CONTRADICTORY THINGS, HAVE CONFLICTING VALUES ON THESE MATTERS, AND THE FOCUS GROUPS NOT ONLY REVEAL THIS, BUT SHOW HOW THOSE VIEWS CHANGE AS THEY ACQUIRE INFORMATION. I THINK THIS IS A USEFUL CHALLENGE. MUCH OF THE OTHER STUFF IS NOT UP TO YOUR STANDARD.

TED MARMOR

Dr. Ellen Shaffer and Dr. Kip Sullivan follow up on Kip Sullivan's March 4 comments on oligopolies:

Dr Shaffer, in a March 5 response to Dr. Sullivan's comments:

Just for the record, a slight wrinkle to Kip's comments, which are always wonderful: HMOs, and the 1973 Act promoting them, were not destined to become large or competitive. Group practices flourished for over 50 years, including Kaiser, without having this effect. The reason consolidation occurred in the mid-1980s, and not the mid-1970s, was because of laws permitting selective contracting: for the first time purchasers (employers and others) were encouraged and permitted to choose providers based on price, and health plans and other providers were compelled to compete based on price. Hence consolidation, for-profit conversions, the whole ball of wax. HMOs aren't necessarily a bad idea. and group practice still makes sense. Managed competition, on the other hand, turns out not to work if you leave out the "managed" part. - ES

In the following comments, Dr. Sullivan is responding to Dr. Shaffers' comments above, and Dr. Shaffer, in turn, is responding to Dr. Sullivan's comments:

Dr. Sullivan:

I appreciate your comment. I'd like to pursue it with you for an email or two.

What laws permitting selective contracting are you referring to? I'm not aware of any such laws in Minnesota, for example. I am aware that there was a great to do about such a law in California. But did any state other than California pass such a law?

Dr. Shaffer:

Good question. CA's law was 1982; the turn to selective contracting by MediCal in particular, as well as by private purchasers, greatly accelerated HMO enrollment in the 1980s, and shifted leverage to purchasers. Would have to look back at related legislative history to see if other states or the feds followed, or if the snowball just rolled.

Dr. Sullivan:

A second issue I'd like to raise with you is the question of whether prepaid group practices were any better at providing medical care than fee-for-service docs were. I don't know of any evidence to indicate they were. I do know the founders of some of the early prepaid practice groups were very altruistic people, and they insisted that their docs emphasize prevention. But that's evidence only of what a founder, or an altruistic board, can achieve. It's not evidence that capitation and other managed care tools inevitably lead to better medicine.

Dr. Shaffer:

I don't think that any reimbursement method leads inevitably to better care, nor would I suggest that managed care has grown because it offers better quality. I think financial incentives have totally distorted clinical practice, and propose in a recent paper that we switch to salaries for all clinicians, and work back to adding in whichever financial as well as organizational incentives seem to make sense. Again, wd. have to go back and see what kind of outcomes research was done on Group Health of Seattle, MN and DC, Mayo Clinic, and Harvard Health Plan (research tools weren't as good then) before they were corporatized. (I do not include Kaiser in this group, though some would; it was never controlled by patients, as the Group Healths were, nor were the MDs driven by any particular mission). Seem to recall a fair amount of favorable analysis in the 1970s. I think energized professionals practicing in teams, who are accountable to patients, do provide better medicine, and research into QI efforts that rely on this model show promising results (see icsi.com, e.g.). Since early FFS medicine was driven by reimbursement for acute care, in order specifically to finance hospitals and later drug companies, it did make a difference that group models covered prevention. The same thing could be accomplished under FFS or salaried systems, but was not for historical reasons.

Dr. Sullivan:

If I'm right, and the pioneering HMOs were no better at taking care of patients than FFS docs, then, regardless of how widespread selective contracting laws were, I'm back to my original argument, which is, HMOs were destined to "compete" with size rather than "health maintenance" because HMOs couldn't do health maintenance any better than traditional docs could. And since they couldn't, they had no way to cut premiums other than to ration and extract discounts, and both of those tactics are much easier to execute for huge HMOs than for little ones.

Dr. Shaffer:

I agree with your central argument that HMOs have grown due to muscle and financial clout, not quality. I was just trying to raise a few historical points of analysis re: how and when that concentration and growth came about. It was not inevitable, nor the result primarily of the 1973 Act, since most growth and consolidation occurred in some areas in the 1980s (CA and MN in particular) and in most of the US after 1994. The intentional shift by purchasers, particularly by employers, was decisive in events after 1994. I agree that larger MCOs have prevailed due to their ability to extract discounts from providers. As premiums rise once again, employers will rely on defined contribution plans to control their costs. Our argument is, however, that this financial finagling is not a long term solution, and that in fact universal coverage is possible and affordable; we may need to reconsider both organizational factors and methods of financial reimbursement, to suggest what will produce good quality of care, as well as affordable care.

March 15, 2002

Uwe Reinhardt responds to Kip Sullivan's last comments:


Kip:

I think we can put this baby to bed as follows:

1. It is agreed that, relative to keeping the elderly in the traditional Medicare (enhanced by a drug benefit), funneling the same tax dollars through private health plans will either not buy the elderly the same health care services or the elderly have to put extra money on top. Thus, for the health plans or anyone else to sell that idea, they would have to convince us that for the same money, we will get different services that will represent higher quality care (e.g., through disease management). That is a hope but not a reality.

2. On the role of managed care during the 1990s, I agree that there is something to all of your arguments--the insurance cycle, the Hillary effect, and so on--but I am struck that when I plot real health spending per capita from 1965 to 2000, how smooth that line basically has been, in spite of insurance cycles and preemptive lying-low in the face of cost-containment talk in the past several decades. There has never been such a dramatic bending down of that curve as occurred during 1922-1997-8. Furthermore, I find it hard to believe that the discounts the plans wrung out of providers and the reduction in ALOS did not yield at least some savings.

Thus, I conclude that this argument is not settled and that the data allows us each to our maintain hypotheses.

3. As to Luft and Miller, they presented a truly detailed revisit of their earlier study last year at a conference. Once again, the results were inconclusive. I will not accept it as a working hypothesis that managed care lowered the quality of the patient's health care, although it did probably lower the quality of some providers' life.

Best regards,

Uwe

Sullivan responds to Reinhardt Kip Sullivan responds to Uwe Reinhardt:

From Uwe Reinhardt's last message:

<< As to Luft and Miller, they presented a truly detailed revisit of their earlier study last year at a conference. Once again, the results were inconclusive. >>

Kip Sullivan:

Uwe, Do you know if Luft and Miller's new review excluded studies that didn't control for coverage differences? If it did not, why do you give its conclusions any credability

The most galling of the studies cited by Miller-Luft in their 1994 and 1997 reviews were studies that compared doctors treating Medicare patients in HMOs with doctors treating patients in FFS Medicare without controlling for coverage differences. The complete scam works as follows:

(1) Taxpayers overpay Medicare HMOs,
(2) Medicare HMOs use the subsidy to pay for better coverage (e.g., cancer screens),
(3) researchers with a fondness for HMOs come along and examine whether Medicare HMO docs are better than Medicare FFS docs on process measures (e.g., use of cancer screens) and outcome measures (e.g., stage of cancer at diagnosis) likely to be affected by the coverage difference and,
(4) lo and behold, the HMO docs come out looking better.

I think the scholars who wrote these studies, the editors who accepted them for publication, and others like Miller and Luft who describe them as unusually good studies, are guilty of thought processes so flabby their behavior rises to the level of malpractice.

Evidence-based medicine is now the new religion within the American health policy community. But the health policy community has yet to apply the same standard to itself. If a group of doctors conducted a study comparing the effectiveness of Drug A to Drug B, and they deliberately set it up so that the group getting Drug A took drug A on schedule because they had excellent drug coverage, while the group getting Drug B took Drug B erratically because they had no health insurance, they would be laughed out of the profession. Not so in the health policy community. Health policy analysts who design such shabby experiments are held up as scientists par excellence.

Do you agree with my statement that studies that compare docs treating un- or under-insured FFS patients with HMO docs treating fully insured patients are studies so flawed they shouldn't be published, much less held up by Miller-Luft as among the 44 best studies published between 1980 and 1997? Can you tell me if Miller-Luft's new review examined only those studies that controlled for coverage differences?

Thanks.

Kip

March 14, 2002

HMOs embrace tiered benefits

The San Diego Union-Tribune
March 10, 2002
By Tony Fong

A handful of HMOs in California have begun offering plans that steer patients into selected hospitals where no co-payments are required. Patients who use nonpreferred hospitals are charged hefty co-payments, sometimes as much as hundreds of dollars a day.

And, starting next year, the PacifiCare HMO plans to divide medical groups and doctors into similar categories. Members who use "preferred" doctors will have lower co-payments and deductibles than members who don't.

The new plans are similar to other managed-care models such as preferred-provider organizations plans, or PPOs, and point-of-service plans, or POS, except that they are part of HMOs. In effect, the plans are creating networks within existing networks.

Such a tiering of benefits is designed to funnel more patients to those providers that charge the health plans less, while forcing patients who use the more expensive networks to pay more of the cost themselves.

Health-care analysts say that such plans are here to stay.

Dr. Sam Ho, corporate medical director for PacifiCare, said tiering is viable now because there are more effective ways of measuring the quality of care and consumers are seeking greater choice in their health care.

"Our hospital costs were rising dramatically, and we had several options: We could raise prices to the hospitals, cut hospitals from our networks or cut benefits," Epstein said (Tom Epstein, a spokesman for Blue Shield). "Or we could raise prices to our members."

Health-care economists say that shifting costs onto consumers, however, leads to an inequitable health system in which the sickest patients and low-wage earners are most adversely affected financially.

Thomas Rice, a professor at the UCLA School of Public Health, said health insurance has historically operated on the principle that the healthy population should subsidize coverage for the sicker population, making it possible for low-wage earners to get care.

Shifting costs to consumers undermines that, experts said.

Larry Levitt, an analyst at the Kaiser Family Foundation:

"The more you charge patients at the point of service, the more you move away from insurance. It's a matter of people getting different levels of care. You may get better care at the cheaper hospital than the more expensive one, but you don't know because it's based solely on costs."

http://www.uniontrib.com/news/uniontrib/sun/business/news_1b10tiers.html

Comment: The prevailing rhetoric is that, in this age of consumerism, choice is being delegated to the patient-consumer who will control health care costs by becoming an empowered consumer. Let's look at how this works.

Let's begin with the first step, and that is choosing your health plan. What questions does the informed shopper need to ask?

What menu of health plans does my employer offer? Only one plan? So much for shopping!

But let's assume that there is a menu of plans. Now what questions need to be asked?

Is my physician contracted with the plan? How do I find out? Those lists are difficult to locate and are frequently outdated as contracts continually change.

If my physician is contracted, is he or she in the less expensive tier? If I can't even find out whether my physician is contracted, how can I find out which tier?

If not contracted in the right tier, are there other physicians in the less expensive tier that I can accept, even though it means leaving my current physician?

Which hospital does my physician use? Is it a contracted hospital? If so, which tier is it? But if we have only one hospital in our community and it is in the wrong tier, doesn't that mean that I really don't have any choice? Assuming there are a few hospitals, why do I have to go across town to that hospital with the bad reputation to qualify for the lower tier? But my physician isn't on the staff of that hospital anyway? Do I really have any choice here?

And my employer has just announced that they are changing the health insurance contract in January? I have to start all over again!?

And those that do not have access to coverage through their employers and are dependent on the private market in health plans? Premiums are 30% higher than those for the employers. And the plans are rapidly shifting more costs to the beneficiary. Is an unaffordable policy with inadequate coverage really a choice?

Informed shoppers? Choice? When looking at what should be the simple process of merely choosing a health plan, we see that consumers in reality have very little choice. And now the health plans are shifting more costs to the consumers when they "choose" the more expensive tier when they often had no other option.

The health plans are not only nailing the patient-beneficiaries, but they are also going after the providers. One of the successes of managed care was to ratchet down the rates of the providers. The effectiveness of this strategy was so great that it drove many physician groups into bankruptcy. That left fewer groups that were now able to negotiate rates which would assure solvency. This is one of the reasons that we are seeing large premium increases again. Now the health plans are back with their ratchets to extort agreements selectively within their own list of cooperating, contracted providers. Ratchets are designed to move in one direction only. We can anticipate that health plans will only expand application of these policies that will further shift costs and risks to patients and their providers, making them useless as "insurers." The health plans have literally become cut-throat organizations.

Choice is a good thing when it means that you can choose your physician and your hospital. But as long as we leave control in the hands of the health plans, we will not have choice, and we will be subjected to the extorting, cut-throat business practices of this worthless industry of middleman leeches.

All efforts at reform today continue to build on this nefarious industry. Enough! Let's throw them out! Let's adopt an equitable, publicly-administered program of universal health insurance. Then patients will have true choice within an industry of health care providers that are motivated to please patients rather than health plan executives.

Kip Sullivan responds to Uwe Reinhardt's comments on Medicare HMOs, then Reinhardt responds to Sullivan, and then one more response by Sullivan:

Kip Sullivan:

Since we seem to agree on this question of whether managed care saved money for Medicare, let's dispose of that issue first. When I said Medicare HMOs have driven up Medicare's costs, I meant that Medicare HMOs are less efficient than the traditional Medicare program -- that a dollar invested in Medicare HMOs buys less health care than a dollar invested in classical FFS Medicare. Are we in agreement about that? Your first sentence suggests you agree with me, but your second sentence citing the additional coverage most Medicare HMOs provide suggests you disagree or are unsure.

Uwe Reinhardt:

It is known from studies by Mathematica, MedPAC and others, that during the 1990s the HMOs did benefit from a favorable risk selection-whether it was deliberate cherry picking or accidental matters not. The benefits of favorable risk selection helped fund extra benefits--such as vision care, prescription drugs or the elimination of the Part B premium--that was bestowed on Medicare beneficiaries. Add support for these benefits may have come from some utilization control and, in California, from fees sometimes at 90% or so of Medicare's own fee schedule. Aside from PacifiCare, most HMOs did not flow much added benefit to their bottom line. In general, having Medicare patients hurts an HMO's stock--now even PacifiCare.

That was then. At this time, the mounting cost of these added benefits has outstripped whatever benefits HMOs may receive from favorable risk selection. Furthermore, whatever economies or price discounts the HMOs may have reaped in the 1990s have been harvested. It is the reason why so many HMOs are pulling out of Medicare+Choice.

I agree though that, as we look to the future, the cost of serving a given set of elderly patients through Medicare, enhanced by a drug benefit, is likely to be lower than giving the same elderly the same benefits through Medicare+Choice. Why? Because Medicare can probably do this at a loss ratio of 97%-98%, while HMOs are lucky to make any profit at a loss ratio of 90%. They will burn an extra 8-10 cents per dollar just on their higher SG&A and the profits they need to offer investors.

Consequently, if the HMOs want to play in this market, they must be able to look society in the eye and say: yes, going with us will raise somewhat the total annual health care cost per risk-adjusted elderly, but we will be able to offer a superior health care experience to the elderly for it. I have challenged many HMO executives to tell me what those added quality dimensions might be. Sadly, many of them still run on the cliché that anything the private sector does is, ipso facto, more efficient than anything government does, and therefore have not thought beyond it to rationalize a move towards Breaux-Frist.

I have found it as frustrating as you probably find it unsurprising.

Kip Sullivan:

When I suggested we debate your assumption that managed care has saved money and maintained or improved health, I was thinking we'd exchange perhaps a half dozen emails on these complex issues. But Don tells me that that much discussion is more than many members on this list are going to want to read, and has asked me to limit my rejoinder to just this email. To do that in one email, I'm going to have to cite two articles I wrote and leave it to you and other readers either to accept my conclusions or dig up the articles. That was not my original intention, though.

Does managed care save Medicare money?

We agree that managed care plans (MCPs) have not saved Medicare any money, and, because they have overheads that are extremely high compared to FFS Medicare's, they are utterly incapable of ever saving Medicare any money. The only change I would make to your comments is that the overheads of MCPs probably average closer to 20 to 30 percent, not 10 percent.

Does managed care save the private sector money?

In your previous email, you based your claim that "managed care" saves money for the private sector solely on the lull in health care inflation that America enjoyed between 1992 and 1996. This strikes me as a very thin reed upon which to base the assertion that "managed care" saves money. If this is all you have to rely on, then I believe you should adopt my position, which is that the evidence on whether managed care saves money is inconclusive.

As you recall, I wrote an article for Health Affairs in which I reviewed the literature on whether managed care saves money (the literature doesn't support that conclusion, not even for HMOs as opposed to PPOs), and then I presented an explanation for the 1992-96 inflation lull that did not rely on the never-documented assumption that managed care saves money ("On the 'efficiency' of managed care plans," Health Affairs 2000; 19(4):139-148). I presented evidence that the inflation lull was caused by three factors: (1) a huge, record-breaking decline in the general inflation rate that began in 1991; (2) the predictable downturn in the three-year underwriting cycle that began in 1992; (3) merger fever that began late in 1992, triggered by a rush of endorsements of managed competition by state and federal politicians between the fall of 1992 and the spring of 1993, and the resulting low-balling of prices by players throughout the health-care industry; and (4) the delayed effects of the 1990-91 recession.

The rapid return of torrid premium and total-expenditure inflation in the late 1990s, despite the persistence of a low underlying inflation rate, adds weight to my conclusion that managed care had little or nothing to do with the mid-90s inflation lull. I predict we will see a slight reduction in the inflation rate in the next year or so, but this reduction will not be anything like the unusually long 1992-96 lull (precisely because three of the four factors I listed above will not be operative), and this decline will be temporary because it will merely reflect one of the four causes I listed above -- a downturn in the underwriting cycle.

Does managed care improve quality of care?

Your claim that managed care improved the quality of health care in America (you made that statement to this list a year ago, and your recent emails imply you still adhere to) is not supported by any of the three big categories of evidence -- anecdotal, polling and focus group data, and good research. Here I'll just focus on the last category.

In 1994 and 1997, Robert Miller and Harold Luft published literature reviews claiming to find that medical care offered by FFS and MCP docs was equivalent. The 1997 Miller-Luft literature review was financed by the American Association of Health Plans, no less, and still Miller and Luft couldn't bring themselves to conclude that quality of MCP care was superior, as you have argued. These reviews were, as of 2000, the most thorough literature reviews ever done on this question. (I haven't been doing my homework as assiduously as I should have over the last 18 months, so I would appreciate being notified of any reviews published recently that members of this list believe are thorough and well done.)

I located and read every one of the 44 studies Miller-Luft cited in their two reviews to see for myself if I thought the studies used reasonable methodologies. To my surprise, I discovered that the great majority of these studies failed to control for differences in coverage between FFS and MCP patients. In all the studies, MCP patients had coverage for the type of treatment under consideration, but in many studies some or all of the FFS patients had inferior coverage (e.g., coverage for doctor visits but no drug coverage) or lacked any insurance at all.

Can you imagine my astonishment? How the heck does one draw any conclusions about the quality of care given to arthritis patients, for example, by HMO and FFS doctors if the FFS doctors are seeing large numbers of patients with no prescription drug coverage and $250 deductibles while the HMO docs are seeing patients with no copays for office visits and no drug coverage? But that's what one of the studies cited by Miller-Luft did.

So, I weeded out all studies cited by Miller-Luft that failed to control for coverage differences (in doing this, I used a criterion favorable to MCPs). This reduced the number of comparisons from 57 to 44 (and the number of studies from 44 to 34). The outcomes of these 44 comparisons are shown below: __________________________________ MCP care was better than FFS care 4 MCP and FFS care were equivalent 19 MCP care was worse than FFS care 21 Total number of comparisons 44

Source: Kip Sullivan, "Managed care plan performance since 1980: Another look at two literature reviews," American Journal of Public Health 1999;89:1003-1008. ____________________________________

You can see that MCP care was rarely superior to FFS care and often inferior to FFS care. I concluded, "the quality of care provided by MCPs tends to be equal or inferior to that provided by FFS plans."

I sent Miller and Luft a copy of my article before I submitted it and asked for their thoughts. They never replied. But after my article was published, they asked the Am J Pub Health to publish an incoherent, rambling rejoinder, filled with euphemisms and cryptic phrases (e.g., "prototypical choices," and "inherent aspect of the [FFS] 'package'"), in which they defended studies that compared uninsured FFS patients with insured MCP patients. I tore their funny little letter to shreds with language my editor described as "caustic" (Miller and Luft, "A reply to Sullivan's reanalysis of managed care plan performance since 1980;" Sullivan, "Sullivan responds," Am J Pub Health 2000;90:984-986).

I believe the two Miller-Luft articles and my review of them constitute the most thorough reviews of the scientific literature on the question of quality of MCP and FFS care as of 2000. If you or anyone on this list would like to suggest literature reviews that you think were more thorough than the Miller-Luft reviews, and used more rigorous criteria than I did, I'd love to know about them.

You may wish to argue that 44 studies is not a lot to go on, and I would agree with you. But that's not the issue before us. The issue is whether you or anyone else is justified in claiming that evidence indicates MCP care is superior. That evidence, slim though it is, supports the opposite conclusion.

Conclusions

So that's my case in a nut shell. You claim Americans "trashed managed care." I say, Bravo, they had every reason to trash managed care. Managed care has not demonstrated an ability to save money, and it has demonstrated an ability to damage quality of care and destroy patient privacy. If I had more time, I would argue that common sense tells us all three of these bad outcomes had to happen. But I'll save that line of argument for your next email praising managed care.

Uwe Reinhardt responds to the comments of Theodore Marmor:

(The original comments of Dr. Marmor are reproduced, with the comments of Dr. Reinhardt added.)

Dr. Marmor:

Uwe--your arithmetic was helpful to see what is at work with projections of future national income and what one scenario forecasts for health expenditures as a proportion of that national income. But arithmetic neither produces plausible predictions (as against conditional forecasts) and, more important, does not provide the grounds for analysis of that future. (Were CBO forecasts in 1993 l8% of GNP for health by 2000? That was their forecast!)

Dr. Reinhardt:

It was projected to be 19.7%, Ted (October, 1993--I still have the paper). How could you err by so much!

Dr. Marmor:

I particularly want to contest your claim (repeated often by you) that "Americans have signaled that they don't want any cost control at all...." Kip challenges your claims about the effects of what is called managed care.

Dr. Reinhardt:

I attach a chart on real health spending per capita (not included in this message). Either you or Kip must explain to us all what caused the trend line to bend. We know it was not Medicare, because that kept right on its growth path until the BBA '97. So I shall temporarily concede--against superior authority--that managed care had nothing to do with it and await yours or Kip's explanation.

Dr. Marmor:

I want to challenge your interpretation of the connection between what mass American wants and both public and private policy. It is decades too late to continue to repeat the fallacy of revealed preference in politics. It does not follow that because outcome A takes place, the citizens of that jurisdiction 'wanted' A. It might be, but the use of the effect to specify the cause is a logical fallacy. Until and unless you can find reason to believe mass opinion shaped events decisively, stop blaming the victim.

Dr. Reinhardt:

Again, I must defer here to superior authority. I am not a political scientist. What I await from you, Ted--perhaps all of us do--is a concise, short explanation of how democracy works in America. As an example, explain to me why the election of 1994 had nothing to do with voter preferences--among others about government's role in health care. Throw in a convincing--but concise--explanation of why the referendum in California on a single-payer plan did not work. Always eager to learn.

Dr. Marmor:

I don't for a moment believe the American mass public has any clear idea about the extent to which cost control arguments are true, false, or misleading.

Dr. Reinhardt:

And how do you know that?

Dr. Marmor:

Our political system is far too structured against mass majority rule to explain health policy outcomes as the result of their 'wishes.' Sure, a different distribution of wants and attitudes might make some policies more likely, but the locomotive conception you use is genuinely misleading and unsupported, as I have mentioned before, by the public opinion literature.

Dr. Reinhardt:

Too vague, Ted. Too vague. This is you in your old mode. As you know, I don't groove on it. For example, I could simply assert that your statement here is genuinely misleading and unsupported, and leave it at that.

No, Ted, I would like you to explain to me why voters' attitudes about the role of government in health care has nothing to do with the demise of the Clinton plan and the ascendancy of Republican rule in the House.

Finally, Ted, since you infer that you may know, please tell me once and for all what the American people really want in health care. I suggest a concise list. In return I shall compose what I think they want.

March 13, 2002

Remarks by Mrs. Laura Bush U.N. Commission on the Status of Women

March 8, 2002

"Human dignity, private property, free speech, equal justice, education, and health care - these rights must be guaranteed throughout the world."

http://www.whitehouse.gov/firstlady/news-speeches/speeches/fl20020308.html

Yesterday, Dr. Reinhardt commented on the projections of health care expenditures made by the Office of the Actuary at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. That report is now available online at:

http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/nhe-proj/proj2001/Proj2001.pdf

The abstract of the Health Affairs article is also now available (the full article is available only to subscribers or by purchase):

http://130.94.25.113/1130_abstract_c.php?ID=http://130.94.25.113/Library/v21n2/s25.pdf

One quote from the Health Affairs article is noteworthy:

"After 2002, growth is projected to gradually slow to 5.9 percent by 2011. This deceleration can be primarily attributed to slower projected per capita real income growth, a move toward more restrictive forms of managed care, a rise in the uninsured population, and an increase in the use of consumer cost sharing."

Comment: We don't have much control over per capita income growth, but the other three factors are cruel and inhumane mechanisms of slowing the growth of health care costs. Instead of continuing to erect more financial barriers to care, we could replace those mechanisms with a globally-budgeted, publicly administered program of universal health insurance. Excess growth would be constrained, but in an equitable and humane manner.

Theodore Marmor responds to Uwe Reinhardt:

Uwe--your arithmetic was helpful to see what is at work with projections of future national income and what one scenario forecasts for health expenditures as a proportion of that national income. But arithmetic neither produces plausible predictions (as against conditional forecasts) and, more important, does not provide the grounds for analysis of that future. (Were CBO forecasts in 1993 l8% of GNP for health by 2000? That was their forecast!)

I particularly want to contest your claim (repeated often by you) that "Americans have signaled that they don't want any cost control at all...." Kip challenges your claims about the effects of what is called managed care. I want to challenge your interpretation of the connection between mass American wants and both public and private policy. It is decades too late to continue to repeat the fallacy of revealed preference in politics. It does not follow that because outcome A takes place, the citizens of that jurisdiction 'wanted' A. It might be, but the use of the effect to specify the cause is a logical fallacy. Until and unless you can find reason to believe mass opinion shaped events decisively, stop blaming the victim. I don't for a moment believe the American mass public has any clear idea about the extent to which cost control arguments are true, false, or misleading. Our political system is far too structured against mass majority rule to explain health policy outcomes as the result of their 'wishes.' Sure, a different distribution of wants and attitudes might make some policies more likely, but the locomotive conception you use is genuinely misleading and unsupported, as I have mentioned before, by the public opinion literature.

Ted Marmor

Theodore R. Marmor Professor of Public Policy & Management Professor of Political Science Yale University School of Management

Beth Capell, Ph.D., responds to the Reinhardt and Sullivan comments:

As one of the prime architects of the California HMO Patient Bill of Rights (with much guidance from our CaPA leaders), one key observation:

The HMOs had promised to deliver all medically necessary and appropriate care--and were required by California law to do so. Every dime of cost they attributed to the Patient Bill of Rights was proof that they were denying necessary and appropriate care.

Time and again in the negotiations over the Patient Bill of Rights the HMOs were caught in this trap: if HMOs were giving people the care they needed, what was the problem with requiring them to do so? Contraceptives, diabetes management, independent medical review, second opinion, you name it: if consumers were getting the care they should, the reform cost nothing. If the reform cost money, it demonstrated a denial of care. An analysis by a Senate Insurance Committee skeptical about so-called mandates found little if any cost associated with most of them.

The one exception to this case was mental health parity where plainly consumers were not getting care they should have. This provision unquestionably cost purchasers money---because by failing to provide decent mental health coverage, the purchasers and the HMOs had shifted costs to the public sector and simply failed to provide needed care.

And costs in California were rising well before HMO reform was fully enacted in late 1999.

Beth Capell, on behalf of the California Physicians Alliance.

Theodore Marmor on the predictions of the Office of the Actuary:

Watch out for the idea that projections are anything but forecasts whose validity is utterly dependent on the accuracy of the premises. They can be useful for sensitivity analysis. But anyone who thinks you can predict economic and medical life 10 years hence needs medical care.

Theodore R. Marmor Professor of Public Policy & Management Professor of Political Science Yale University School of Management

March 12, 2002

Medicare Report

The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, in new projections released today in Health Affairs, estimates that health spending will more than double to $2.8 trillion by 2011 and climb to more than 17 percent of the GDP over the next decade, up from 13.2 percent currently.

Uwe Reinhardt, Ph.D., James Madison Professor of Political Economy, Princeton University, comments:

$2.8 trillion sounds like an awesome lot; but Americans better get used to the idea. Several factors drive that spending figure:

1. There's expensive new technology on the horizon, and not all of it is money saving. Much of it enhances the quality of care and life, at greater expense.

2. We are facing a growing labor shortage in health care, and not only in nursing. There is likely to be even a renewed physician shortage. We must get used to paying health workers more.

3. By trashing managed care as they did, Americans have signaled that they do not want to have any cost control at all in health care. They seem willing to spend (more correctly: to have someone else spend) whatever it takes, even on care that is known to be only marginally useful or even useless. Yes, Americans do sincerely believe that, if insured, they have a Constitutional right even to useless care. It's the American way.

All of these factors spell increased health spending, and I see nothing on the horizon to slow it down, short of seriously rationing health care by ability to pay even for insured Americans (e.g., through MSAs). And even that may not work, because with MSAs the piece of health spending called "catastrophic" would be likely to increase more rapidly.

Even so, there's a brighter side. We have no cause to jump off a bridge.

According to the CBO, GDP in 2001 was $10.193 trillion. It is projected to be $16.676 trillion in 2011. According to the most recent CMS data, total national health spending in 2001 was $1.378 trillion. It is projected to be $2.8 trillion by 2011. Thus, in 2001 we had (10.193 - 1.378) = $8.815 trillion of non-health GDP left over after the health sector took its slice of 31.2% of the GDP pie. In 2011 we are projected to have (16.676-2.8) = $13.876 trillion of non-health GDP left over. This is an increase of (13.876-8.815) = $5.061 trillion in non-health GDP, or a percentage increase of (5.061/8.815) = 57.4%. It is equivalent to an average annual compound growth rate of 4.6% over the period 2001-2011. That ain't bad, is it? We can live with it.

I see it in your eyes: you are asking me, "But what about inflation?" Ok, here are the numbers. The CBO projects an average annual increase in the GDP deflator of about 2% over the period 2001-2011. If we deflate the non-health GDP projected for 2011 by that inflation factor, the $13.876 in 2001 dollars projected above becomes $11.383 in constant year-2001 dollars. Thus, in terms of real purchasing power, non-health GDP in 2011 is projected to be (11.383-8.815) = $2.568 trillion more than it was in 2001. This represents an increase in real non-health GDP of 2.568/8.815 = 29%. It is equivalent to an average annual compound increase of 2.589% over the period 2001-2011. Still ain't bad, is it?

I sense that you are still not happy. You wonder about population growth. "Aren't there more people to claim all that extra non-health GDP? May there be less per capita, then?" you wonder. Ok--here it goes. Our population is projected to grow at an average annual compound rate of slightly less than 1% (0.9% really). Therefore, we can say that real (constant dollar) non-health spending per capita in the US is projected by the CBO to increase by about 2.589% - 1% = 1.589% per year between 2001 and 2011 (1.6% between friends). That ain't bad either, is it?

Can we really look up to God and cry over it? Can we tell God that, in view of the looming $2.8 trillion in health spending in 2001, we cannot possibly give the elderly prescription drug coverage or extend health insurance coverage to all uninsured Americans, because that would spend us into the poorhouse?

My conjecture is that God won't be impressed, nor will President Bush's most highly regarded philosopher: Jesus Christ. I think we had better do the Judeo-Christian thing vis a vis the uninsured, lest there be locusts and frogs and stuff all over the country, as once it was in Egypt.

Kip Sullivan responds to Uwe Reinhardt:

Uwe Reinhardt's previous statement:

<< By trashing managed care as they did, Americans have signaled that they do not want to have any cost control at all in health care. They seem willing to spend (more correctly: to have someone else spend) whatever it takes, even on care that is known to be only marginally useful or even useless. Yes, Americans do sincerely believe that, if insured, they have a Constitutional right even to useless care. It's the American way. >>

Kip Sullivan's response:

Uwe,

I agree with your demand that Congress insure the uninsured. But I disagree with the remarks above about Americans' attitudes toward managed care. These remarks rest on two assumptions: (1) That managed care has been demonstrated to cut national health care expenditures or, at minimum, total health spending by the private sector, and (2) that managed care cuts out only "useless care," not necessary care, and, therefore, has not damaged quality of care.

You didn't articulate these assumptions, so I'm asking you if you endorse those assumptions. Do you? If you say yes, I will challenge you on both of them. I believe the evidence supports the following conclusions:

(1)(a) the evidence that managed care saved money for the private sector is inconclusive; (b) the evidence indicates permitting managed care companies to enroll Medicare beneficiaries has added to, rather than reduced, Medicare's costs; and

(2) the evidence supports the conclusion that the spread of managed care damaged quality of care.

These are complex issues, and I'm pressed for time these days, so I might take awhile responding to you. But I think these issues are too important, and your view too incorrect, to let your comment go by unquestioned.

Thanks much.

Kip Sullivan

Uwe Reinhardt responds to Kip Sullivan:

The original remarks are reproduced, and Dr. Reinhardt's additional comments are marked ***

Kip Sullivan responds to Uwe Reinhardt:

Uwe Reinhardt's previous statement:

<< By trashing managed care as they did, Americans have signaled that they do not want to have any cost control at all in health care. They seem willing to spend (more correctly: to have someone else spend) whatever it takes, even on care that is known to be only marginally useful or even useless. Yes, Americans do sincerely believe that, if insured, they have a Constitutional right even to useless care. It's the American way. >>

Kip Sullivan's response:

Uwe,

I agree with your demand that Congress insure the uninsured. But I disagree with the remarks above about Americans' attitudes toward managed care. These remarks rest on two assumptions: (1) That managed care has been demonstrated to cut national health care expenditures or, at minimum, total health spending by the private sector, and (2) that managed care cuts out only "useless care," not necessary care, and, therefore, has not damaged quality of care.

You didn't articulate these assumptions, so I'm asking you if you endorse those assumptions. Do you? If you say yes, I will challenge you on both of them. I believe the evidence supports the following conclusions:

(1)(a) the evidence that managed care saved money for the private sector is inconclusive;

*** What, then, is your explanation for the deceleration of the growth in health spending during the 1990s?

(b) the evidence indicates permitting managed care companies to enroll Medicare beneficiaries has added to, rather than reduced, Medicare's costs; and

*** I can buy that. it also, of course, has added benefits. If you don't believe me, ask the elderly. Why else would they whine when they have to go back to Medicare?

(2) the evidence supports the conclusion that the spread of managed care damaged quality of care.

*** I don't buy that one.

These are complex issues, and I'm pressed for time these days, so I might take awhile responding to you. But I think these issues are too important, and your view too incorrect, to let your comment go by unquestioned.

Thanks much.

Kip Sullivan

March 11, 2002

Health costs could become leading cause of bankruptcy

North County Times
3/10/02
By Bruce Kauffman

OCEANSIDE ---- An advocate for reform of the nation's health care system said Saturday that medical bills will become the number one cause of bankruptcy in America if administrative costs are not curbed and insurance coverage is not made more available.

Speaking at a conference presented by the North Coast chapter of the League of Women Voters, Don McCanne, a retired Orange County physician who is active in Physicians for Social Responsibility, criticized insurers and the health-care industry for spending up to roughly one of every four dollars in resources on administration.

"Just handling the money burns up a lot of funds," McCanne said.

McCanne said bringing administrative overhead down to 10 percent would save a quarter of a trillion dollars, money that could pay the health care needs of a "rapidly expanding group" of people with inadequate or no insurance. That group may include some 85 million Americans, he said.

Said another speaker, Gregory Knoll, director of the consumer center for health education and advocacy of the Legal Aid Society of San Diego: "Here's the deal ---- access to quality health care ought to be a constitutional right. If we don't look at how we're going to change this system and delve into it and make it work for everybody, we've got a problem."

http://www.nctimes.net/news/2002/20020310/53941.html

Comment: At the conference the point was made that employers and insurers were shifting more costs and risks to employee-beneficiaries. For individuals with significant medical problems, the out-of-pocket expenses are beginning to exceed disposable income. An continuation of this trend may result in insolvency for enough individuals such that unpaid medical bills could move into first place as a cause of bankruptcy.

Also, the shifting of costs from administration to patient care was shown to be achievable based on the preliminary results of the California Health Care Options Study. Replacing the fragmented, inefficient system of private and public plans and no health plans at all, with a single, publicly administered insurance program, would save enough to pay for comprehensive health care benefits for everyone.

March 10, 2002

In Their Own Right: Addressing the Sexual And Reproductive Health Needs of American Men

The Alan Guttmacher Institute
March, 2002


"From adolescence on, most men need information and counseling about sexual and reproductive matters, and they need somewhere reliable to go for related education and health care."

"Obstacles to care include the tendency of many men not to seek regular, routine checkups; the fact that health insurance often does not cover the services men need; and the high proportions of men--particularly poor men--who do not have health insurance."

http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/exs_men.html

Comment: The impact of lacking adequate health insurance coverage is ever pervasive.

COMMONWEAL
February 22, 2002

"HEALTH CARE FOR ALL"
"A conservative case" By Donald W. Light

"Now that South Africa has legislated universal access to medical services, the United States remains the only industrialized or second-tier country in the world that fails to guarantee its citizens access to medical services. This is a curious omission for a country based on rights and liberty. It is equally strange from an economic and business point of view. For while foreign competitors get full medical benefits at one-third the cost, American employers are weighed down by ever-growing expense for health care."

"Universal access to needed medical services is essential to achieve the four traditional conservative moral principles: the anti-free-riding principle, the principle of personal integrity, the principle of equal opportunity, and the principle of just sharing."

"For too long, we have ignored or opposed efforts to simplify the American health-care system, at a cost of ill-spent billions. Today's system not only fails hospitals, physicians, patients, and families, but is collapsing under the burden of its own complexity and inefficiency. It is possible to design a low-cost universal plan that maximizes choice. The time to do it is now."

http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/ and click on the image of the magazine, and then click on "HEALTH CARE FOR ALL."

Comment: Most proponents of capitalism believe that human capital is one of our most important investments and a key to the success of capitalistic economies. Dr. Light states well the conservative case for universal access to needed medical services which can only enhance an individual's opportunity and productivity. Everyone concerned about health care reform should read this article.

March 08, 2002

Health care not a right, Koop says

The Deseret News
March 7, 2002
By Twila Van Leer

"Americans have no constitutional right to health care, but the perception is so strong that such care should be a basic right that the country is likely to have a socialized system sometime in the near future, Dr. C. Everett Koop said Thursday."

"Answering the question raised in the title of his talk, 'The Right to Health Care: Has the Time Come?' Koop had an emphatic 'no. The time never will come when health care is a right.'"

"Regardless, public polls have shown increasingly large numbers of Americans who believe health care should be a basic right, he said. 'And they think they should get health care as good as a millionaire gets.'"

"Koop urged those in the medical ranks to 'take the high road of professionalism,' to adopt the higher ethic of self-sacrifice... 'Do the right thing for those for whom health care is not yet a right.'"

http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,375014476,00.html?textfield=Koop

Comment: Is Koop campaigning to get his old job back?

Senate Finance Committee
March 7, 2002
"The Administration's FY 2003 Budget Proposals for Prescription Drugs"

Excerpts of testimony of Bob Kerrey, representing the Concord Coalition:

You have invited me to testify on the question of adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare. My simple advice is don't do it. Not unless you are prepared to make fundamental reforms in the way Americans finance the cost of their health care.

Members of the Finance Committee, I do not think that doing nothing is an option. Americans can afford a prescription drug benefit but I do not believe we can afford to add it to Medicare as it is currently structured. More challenging I do not believe we can solve this problem by focusing on benefit changes or reductions in reimbursements to providers. Instead I believe we need to focus our attention on fundamental reform of the way Americans become eligible under Federal law for health insurance.

Though intuition is often a good guide when making decisions sometimes it fails us. In this case intuition signals that we should narrow the scope of our Federal health care entitlement programs in order to save money. However, I believe the counter-intuitive choice, namely to expand the entitlement, is the least costly choice.

I urge you to consider that for budgetary, economic and moral reasons we cannot get from where we are now to where we want to go by adding a new and expensive benefit to an entitlement program. Nor can we get there by just reforming existing programs. We can only get there by fundamentally altering the way we become eligible for insurance in the first place.

Beginning with a universal entitlement does not mean higher spending or more governmental interference with the choices made by patients or providers. In truth it could mean a lot less of both. It would mean that we would start thinking about ourselves as a single group of 280 million Americans who are all part of the same health system and who all need to face the challenge of matching our appetite for quality with our capacity to pay.

http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/030702bktest.pdf

Comment: Raise the flags and fire the flares!

The Concord Coalition has been the leading voice for responsible restraint in the funding of our programs of social insurance, Medicare and Social Security. Former Sen. Kerrey, in representing the Coalition, has clearly stated that a universal health insurance program is probably the most fiscally responsible approach to "matching our appetite for quality with our capacity to pay."

To the towers and ring the bells! All of America must hear this great news!

March 07, 2002

GOP Economic Package Wins Support

The Associated Press
March 7, 2002
By Curt Anderson

"The decision to go with a consensus approach (on an economic stimulus plan) came after House GOP leaders ran into criticism at a Wednesday meeting of the rank-and-file, when some lawmakers questioned an earlier, tentative decision to vote on a bill combining a controversial health care tax credit with an extension of jobless aid."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53875-2002Mar7.html

Comment: The extension of jobless aid had strong bipartisan support, but it was being held hostage to health care tax credits that were supported by special interests. These credits would have expanded and compounded the problems with our flawed policies in health care coverage. It is reassuring to know that enough of our elected representatives understood the problems with these seemingly benign but very treacherous tax credits so that they were able to take a strong stand in preventing this "compromise" in the name of political expediency. This skirmish was won, but the battle continues.

March 06, 2002

Oxymorons: The Myth of the U.S. Health Care System

Medscape
February 26, 2002

Book Reviews
By J.D. Kleinke

Quotes from the review by Peter Frishauf:

"Noted health economist J.D. Kleinke once saw managed care as the solution to America's healthcare problems... In 1998, he declared victory for the managed care solution in a controversial book, Bleeding Edge: The Business of Health Care in the New Century. Kleinke was wrong, as he acknowledges in his interesting new book, Oxymorons: The Myth of the U.S. Health Care System."

One reason cited in Frishauf's review:

"Parasitic middlemen, pointless regulation, and waste suck billions of dollars from premiums that could be redeployed to pay for care. Kleinke identifies 2 intertwined constituencies as prime culprits: the 5000 state insurance bureaucrats who preside over a 'mess of state-based benefit mandate laws,' and 50,000 health insurance brokers 'in bed with them.' The brokers, I was astounded to learn, collect commissions ranging from 3% to as much as 20% of the total cost of plans -- a 'shadow tax' of some $300 billion per year on premiums, more than twice what the nation spends on all prescription drugs! Insurance companies, it seems, have been unable to break the stranglehold of brokers, and those that attempt to offer plans without brokers face massive retaliation."

http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/423369?srcmp=pc-030102&WebLogicSession=PIY1zyJbzgG1V0H6WXcC53TCwQTRlAlT1hVP7PHJ8sBGl6Ql58rh|-1144767244009827815/-1408233355/6/7001/7001/7002/7002/7001/-1

March 05, 2002

Health Care Has a Relapse

Time.com
March 2, 2002

"Costs are soaring. States are struggling. People are losing their coverage. Has Washington even noticed?" By Karen Tumulty

"For most children, a hug is all it takes to treat the bruise from a playground fall. But when Dalton Dawes collided with a classmate on his first day of preschool three years ago, the bleeding inside his shoulder would not stop. Dalton, an 8-year-old with fine blond hair and intelligent blue eyes who lives in North Carolina's Blue Ridge Mountains, is a hemophiliac. What prevents the mishaps of childhood from killing him is $2,000-a-week injections of a medication called Mononine. But no private insurer will cover Dalton, so his parents, Leonard Poe and Heather Dawes, held their income to $22,900--33% over the poverty line--to qualify for Medicaid.

"That worked until March 2001, when Dalton turned 7 and his Medicaid eligibility ran out. (For him to stay in the program, his parents would have had to earn no more than $15,492 a year.) Heather, a paralegal, tried to enroll him in the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), a state-federal initiative that provides coverage to children of working families. But North Carolina had burned through all the money allocated to CHIP that year, so Dalton joined 23,000 other kids on a waiting list. By the time legislators found the $8 million needed to resume enrollment last September, Dalton was down to his last three weeks' supply of Mononine. After months of seeing her son's survival in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats, Heather could not stop thinking about 'how flimsy it all is.' She notes, 'They could decide to set it aside tomorrow again if they wanted.'"

"There's not much evidence, however, that anyone in Washington is paying attention."

John Engler, Michigan's Republican Governor:

"While there's conversation going on, it doesn't appear to us to be a very focused conversation or a very clear strategy to get something done."

http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,214063,00.html

Comment: This Time article reviews some of the ample evidence that the health care crises is growing much worse. It ends on an unfortunate political note, suggesting that the Texas CHIP program is a "model' thanks to the efforts of a "compassionate conservative who was thinking about running for President." Well, that gentleman is now President, and he has already laid out his health care agenda. Sadly, it is clearly a regressive agenda that will further compound our health care deficiencies.

Washington does need to hear from us. Let's end our inaudible grumbling and speak up!

Kip Sullivan responds to Uwe Reinhardt:

Uwe Reinhardt (excerpt):

<< When the demand side started to force real price competition on the hospitals sector, it initially was driven into price wars that pushed many hospitals into the red. The only way to react to this threat is what the airlines did earlier: consolidate or slice up the market. >>

Kip Sullivan:

Uwe's comments are not inconsistent with mine. Uwe describes in more detail than I did the mechanism that the burgeoning HMOs used to provoke consolidation among hospitals. But that description does not contradict my argument, which is:

(1) it was HMO size -- not HMO brilliance at teaching doctors how to be better doctors -- that allowed HMOs to cut costs and take market share from the traditional insurers, and

(2) once the race to get big was unleashed in the insurance industry, it had to spread to the rest of the health care industry.

Uwe is correct that our choice in the 1980s was oligopoly versus regulation, not, as HMO advocates put it, competition versus regulation. My point was that the HMO gurus should have told us that. They didn't. They told us HMOs would compete on their ability to turn doctors into better doctors. They never warned us gigantism would become the Holy Grail of the entire health care industry.

Kip

Uwe Reinhardt:

Yes, Kip and I do not disagree. We just looked at the same elephant from slightly different angles. But it's the same elephant alright. I should dig out of my files and distribute to you all a remarkable document that emerged about a year ago from a one year soul searching effort by the California health care elite--virtually anyone there making over $200,000 a year off health care on one way or another. They concluded ruefully that the experiment with price competition a la Jackson Hole had failed in California and that a "new paradigm" (I love the term!) was needed to set things right. They called the new paradigm "cooperation." Kip and I would call it, less politely, "cozy oligopoly all around."

Germany uses that approach, but with one significant twist: the goverment hovers above the cozy deals hashed out by the private oligopolists in an Apache helicopter and swoops down with compulsory arbitration or sectoral budget caps whenever the cozy deals among members of the ologopolistic club bust preterdermined overall global spending budgets (a la Clinton health plan).

Eventually we will get there, too. In the meantime, we shall continue to march to Churchill's well-kown dictum: "In the long run Americans will always do the right thing--after exploring all other alternatives." It is our enthusiasm for the perpetual exploration of known things that makes us appear so cute in the eyes of the rest of the world. Of course, we proudly call it "research" and "entrepreneurship." That is cute as well.

Uwe

March 04, 2002

Medicine's Middlemen

The New York Times
March 4, 2002


"2 Powerful Groups Hold Sway Over Buying at Many Hospitals" By Walt Bogdanich

"These two private groups (Premier and Novation) act as middlemen for about half the nation's nonprofit hospitals, negotiating contracts last year for some $34 billion in supplies, from pharmaceuticals to pacemakers, bandages to beds.

"Each group has the same basic mission: to use the market power of its more than 1,500 hospitals to find the best medical products at the lowest prices.

"But many in the medical world - Mr. Kiani among them - question whether that mission is being compromised by financial ties that the groups, Premier and Novation, have to medical supply companies, ties that, according to an investigation by The New York Times (news/quote), are both extensive and highly unusual.

"The problem begins with this simple fact: The buying groups are financed not by the hospitals that buy products but by the companies that sell them. In other words, the groups take money from the very companies they are supposed to evaluate objectively. Each year, companies pay Premier and Novation hundreds of millions of dollars in fees that represent a percentage of hospital purchases. The more hospitals spend on medical supplies, the more dollars Premier and Novation get from the suppliers.

"In a few cases, Premier or some of its officials have also received stock or options from companies with which Premier contracts.

"Critics say such conflicts of interest can mean that the buying groups do not always choose the products that are best for patients, hospitals or the taxpayers and insurers that pay their bills."

"Larry Dickson oversees purchasing through Novation for Providence Health System in Seattle.. He says he cannot get specific information on fees, despite the critical role he plays in supplying his hospitals."

Larry Dickson, purchaser for Providence Health System:

"Why is this so secret? There is an accountability question that is very much concerning a lot of people in health care. And if you ask, and the response you get is, 'That's none of your business,' that raises more questions than it answers."

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/04/business/04BUY.html

Comment: This is yet one more example of marketplace dynamics in our health care system. Theoretically, these middlemen organizations negotiate discounts with the manufacturers of the medical supplies. Bulk purchasing and negotiated pricing are very legitimate methods to help control health care costs. But, because of this business model, most of the benefit passes to the shareholders and executives, with only enough savings passed on to the hospital-providers to create some semblance of lower pricing. With only two major middlemen, this oligopolistic market borders on a monopoly, preventing the realization of the full potential benefit for the hospitals and ultimately the patients.

Another concern about oligopolistic middlemen medical suppliers, which would apply to the oligopolistic pharmacy benefit managers as well, is that competitive bidding will negatively impact the manufacturers that do not receive the contracts, and some of them could actually fail. Those that would remain might defensively increase merger activity and would thereby create an oligopoly of manufacturers. With the oligopolistic middlemen already in place, prices would be driven up sharply.

Consider the following:

National Bureau of Economic Research NBER Working Paper No. 8802 "Health Care and the Public Sector" By David M. Cutler, Ph.D., Professor of Economics, Harvard University

"The make or buy decision in health care has been a subject of debate for decades. The traditional debate pitted arguments of monopoly and monopsony on the one side, and innovation on the other. Government intervention was justified because of monopoly power of physicians and the information problems noted above (in his paper). By controlling medical provision, it was believed that the government could use its monopsony power to purchase such services at a low price. The counter-argument focused on incentives for efficiency. Without market incentives, it was feared that government production would be technologically inefficient and innovation would be stifled.

"Empirically countries where the public sector runs the medical system spend less on medical care than countries with private providers. In OECD countries, for example, the correlation between the public sector share of financing and the share of GDP devoted to medical care is -0.41. More formal analysis controlling for additional variables also finds this conclusion (Globerman and Vining, 1998). There is also evidence for the inefficiency view. People in many European countries are disenchanted with the quality of medical care, and these countries have struggled to increase the efficiency of the medical care system in recent years (Cutler, 2001).

"A recent literature emphasizing the role of public sector contracting has expanded the dimension of this analysis, considering issues of allocational as well as technical efficiency (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Shleifer, 1998). Consider the question of whether a government should provide hospital services itself or contract with a for-profit hospital company to provide the services. For-profit companies will respond to financial incentives more rapidly than government-run companies, since for-profit managers receive more of the payoff from responding to these incentives. Thus, contracting to a for-profit provider will be preferred IF the incentives that the firm faces are the correct ones. If the incentives are not correct, however, having more responsive for-profit firms may lead to poor outcomes, and providing the service in house might be preferred."

http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8802

Further comment: Although Dr. Cutler is referring to health care services, his comments can apply to the narrower topic of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. "Contracting to a for-profit provider (e.g., middlemen firms) will be preferred IF the incentives... are the correct ones." But we now have more than ample evidence that the incentives of for-profit firms derive from maximizing profit. This can only result in compromise of the public interest to negotiate the maximum benefit for the patient. So the middleman function should be provided "in house," that is, by a public negotiator.

In the single payer model of reform, the system becomes the single, monopsonistic purchaser of services and goods (supplies, pharmaceuticals, etc.). The negotiations are made with all manufacturers. By shifting emphasis from an oligopoly of manufacturers to a monopsonistic purchaser, the public single payer negotiator will gain control of the negotiating process. Because the negotiator is representing the public good, negotiations will be in the interests of the patients. That means fair prices, not only for the benefit of patients, but also for the manufacturers since it is in the public interest to assure the financial viability of the producers of the products.

Dr. Cutler's comments about the European disenchantment with quality as representing the inefficiency view of public sector health care must be viewed from the perspective that European health care budgets are significantly smaller than the amount that is already dedicated to health care in the United States. A system of public funding in this country could avoid patient disenchantment by locking into the budget our current high level of funding.

Since the incentives of the for-profit firms can never provide the motivation to place the interests of patients over the interests of investors, let's finally quit trying to make that model work. Instead, let's go ahead and use an in-house negotiator that places the interests of patients above all else, avoiding disenchantment by targeting our abundant resources for health care. Let's adopt a publicly administered, single payer health care system.

Kip Sullivan responds on health care oligopolies:

If I were the New York Times reporter who wrote this sentence, I would have written it this way: "The problem is two-fold: (1) The buying groups are financed by companies that stand to gain from the buying groups' decisions, and (2) the buying groups are the natural outgrowth of a health-care system which has forced all players into a race to get big." The article discusses the problem of oligopoly, but it doesn't call the reader's attention to the basic cause of rampant consolidation in the hospital industry.

The most fundamental problem is that the introduction of HMOs into the US health care system by the HMO Act of 1973 eventually made size the highest priority for all participants in the health care system. That was not, of course, the stated goal of HMO proponents. HMO proponents argued that HMOs would save money because they would improve medical practice -- ignorant and greedy doctors would be induced or forced to cut out unnecessary services and beef up the provision of preventive services. In fact, HMOs saved money by rationing and extracting large discounts from providers. Both tactics were executed most successfully by the largest HMOs and, eventually, the largest traditional insurers which morphed into managed-care plans. HMO advocates most definitely did not argue that the creation of an HMO industry would confer oligopsony power upon the nation's dominant health insurers, and that this power would be used to force doctors to cut medical services and to extract discounts from providers. But they might as well have, because that's what we got.

It didn't take long for the rest of the health care system to respond in kind. By the mid-1980s, the pace of consolidation had picked up throughout the entire health care industry, and by 1993, when politicians everywhere endorsed managed competition, the pace became just plain frantic. With the possible exception of the federal and state enforcers of anti-trust laws, there is no force capable of stopping this rush to feudalism. But even if anti-trust authorities wake up, it's unlikely anti-trust suits will ever force a significant deconsolidation of the system. Anti-trust suits are just too slow and too expensive.

My off-the-cuff opinion is that deconsolidation is only possible under a single-payer system, and even then it won't be easy to accomplish. My on-the-cuff opinion is that it'll never happen under the current system.

Uwe Reinhardt responds to Kip Sullivan's comments on health care oligopolies:

One can put a somewhat different spin than Kip's on the consolidation in the hospital industry.

Like the airline industry, the hospital industry is characterized by high operating leverage--that is, high fixed costs relative to variable costs. When such an industry slides into a state of excess capacity--as it had by the mid 1980s--it would engage in price wars under competition. Until 1990s, the hospitals weathered this condition, because the private insurance industry paid them 130% of average cost, which was enough to finance an average occupancy ratio of 60% or so. (Medicare probably paid full cost calculated at full occupancy).

When the demand side started to force real price competition on the hospitals sector, it initially was driven into price wars that pushed many hospitals into the red. The only way to react to this threat is what the airlines did earlier: consolidate or slice up the market. The airlines did both--and used frequent flyer miles to cement a clientele in place. Hospitals simply aggregated into larger oligopolies.

Under a single payer system you would ultimately need capacity planning. No single payer would sit by idly, covering the full costs of half empty hospitals.

Thus, the choice in the 1980s was never competition vs. regulation, but oligopoly vs. regulation.

Uwe R.

March 03, 2002

Medicaid

The New England Journal of Medicine
February 21, 2002
Volume 346:635-640
By Sara Rosenbaum, J.D.

"Medicaid, codified under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, provides federal financial assistance to states operating approved medical-assistance plans. Unlike eligibility for Medicare, eligibility for Medicaid is means-tested (i.e., there are financial criteria for enrollment); like Medicare, however, Medicaid is an individual legal entitlement."

"In August 2001, apparently in response to recommendations by the National Governors Association, the Bush administration announced a section-1115 demonstration initiative known as Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA)."

"The initial purpose of HIFA may have been to permit reductions in coverage as a trade-off for a limited expansion of eligibility."

"HIFA appears to be an attempt to restructure Medicaid as a program that provides "premium support," with the states subsidizing the enrollment of low-income persons in private insurance plans that offer more limited coverage than the traditional Medicaid program. Were most or all states to apply for participation in the HIFA program (section 1115 does not impose an upper limit on the number of participating states), then eventually the principles of Medicaid coverage would parallel those of private insurance coverage. In 1997, Congress took a step in this direction when it enacted the State Children's Health Insurance Program. This program gives states the option of buying private insurance for uninsured children in families near the federal poverty level, rather than expanding Medicaid to cover them.

"The long-term consequences of such changes for the millions of beneficiaries with chronic illness or disability are unclear. As of the end of 2001, Congress had held no oversight hearings on HIFA. Nor has there been congressional scrutiny of the program's emphasis on demonstration projects that help low-income workers buy coverage through their employers when it is available - despite concern about 'health insurance crowd-out.' This phenomenon occurs when public funds are substituted for employers' contributions to health insurance coverage.

"In view of the fundamental disagreement over which features of Medicaid are problematic, much less how to change them, broad congressional action is unlikely in the near future. It remains to be seen whether Congress will permit the Bush administration to transform Medicaid into a premium-support program and to do so with a minimum of oversight."

http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/346/8/635 (Available for subscribers or by purchase only.)

Comment: Recent attempts to reform health care coverage have been left primarily to the employers and health plans interacting in the health care marketplace. Health security for average-income individuals and families is being threatened by the market's response in shifting risk to the patient-employee-beneficiary.

In the meantime, in Washington, less attention has been given to low-income health care disparities because of the "success" of Medicaid and S-CHIP in meeting those needs (though there have been notable attempts on the state level to expand S-CHIP to the parents of the covered children). But what is happening to these programs designed to assure that the most vulnerable do have health care coverage? They are falling victim to the administration's favored policy principles of "accountability and flexibility," using the model of "premium support." What this means is that these chronically under-funded programs will not only face further budget limitations, but they will also provide fewer benefits. This will be disastrous for low-income individuals in America because of unaffordable out-of-pocket expenses and fewer providers willing to accept patients on these programs.

More than ever, the moral imperative is quite clear. Since we already have the resources to provide comprehensive care for everyone, we must accelerate our efforts to reform the way in which we pay for health care since that has been the primary cause of misallocation of our resources. In the meantime, it is absolutely essential that we protect the programs that we do have until we can enact an equitable system of funding comprehensive coverage for everyone.

Professor Donald Light, responding on premium support and HIFA (Health Insurance Flexibilty and Accountability):

A major consequence of any premium support approach that depends on individuals neogtiating in the individual market and with providers is that purchasing power will plummet for the same amount of money. Hospitals, clinics, labs and physicians charge individuals about 4-5 times as much as their regular negotiated rates with plans and insurers. Insurance companies charge much higher premiums for less coverage on the argument that they are at serious risk when they insure one patient at a time. This argument, to my knowledge, is completely false from the perspective of the overall risk pool that an insurer subscribes. In short, a HIFA approach saddles the poorest citizens with the highest bills for the least care.

March 02, 2002

The Detroit News


March 1, 2002
Letters

Should state hospital rules be eliminated?

(1) Program reduces care costs

The Feb. 24 article, "State rules pinch patient care," stated that some state legislators and Engler administration officials want to eliminate the certificate-of-need program, though many experts believe that rash action would be a mistake.

Michigan's nonprofit hospitals support the CON program and its independent commission because it's a useful tool and rational method to distribute costly health care technology.

Hospitals agree that improvements to CON should be made, particularly to streamline the application process, hire adequate numbers of staff for prompt review and assessment of pending issues, and make the program more responsive to demographic changes. But these changes can be accomplished within the current structure and without dismantling a program that has helped moderate cost increases and assure access to high-quality care throughout Michigan for the last 30 years.

There's a reason so many of the state's largest employers and unions, insurers, business groups, trade associations and health care providers strongly support retention of the CON program: It works.

Spencer Johnson President, Michigan Health & Hospital Association

(2) Let market control costs

The headline of Feb. 24 article "State rules pinch patient care," regarding the antiquated and arcane certificate-of-need (CON) laws, could not be more accurate.

It's not called CON just because it's a handy three-letter acronym. This system "cons" people into believing it is a just and rational process of health care cost containment when, in fact, it simply perpetuates the status quo. Patient care does suffer when de facto franchises are rationed out to entities with the most money, influence, lobbyists and lawyers. Patients often wait weeks for services or are forced to schedule a procedure in the middle of the night.

CON is a cumbersome, costly and anti-competitive process. Our economic system is based on the principle that innovation in the marketplace will lead to a better, more cost-effective product for the consumer. CON restricts innovation by eliminating competition. Without competition, there is no incentive to cut costs. It would be worthwhile to review the cost of a procedure at a free-standing surgical center compared to a CON-protected surgical center.

The health care marketplace has changed dramatically since CON first went into effect 30 years ago. Every health care dollar is squeezed by health maintenance organizations, insurers, businesses and government. If CON laws are repealed, no one will offer a service unless it can be proved to investors that it provides convenient, high-quality care for the patient and is cost effective for the payer. It's time to reform CON.

Kenneth H. Musson, M.D. President, Michigan State Medical Society

http://detnews.com/2002/editorial/0203/01/a08-429352.htm

For the original article: http://detnews.com/2002/health/0202/24/a01-425376.htm

Comment: Convenient? High quality? Cost effective? Does the certificate-of-need program improve allocation of our health care dollars, improving efficiency and access, or does it interfere with the market's allocation of dollars which would otherwise provide convenience, quality and cost effectiveness? Let's look at the issues.

Facts:

** All payers recognize that increases in health care costs must be brought under control. It is essential that our limited resources must be utilized efficiently.

** Regional expenditures in capital improvements increase the local capacity of the health care system.

** Increased capacity does result in increased utilization of services and increases in health care spending.

** Increases in spending associated with greater capacity have not been demonstrated to improve health care outcomes for the community compared to communities with average capacity.

** Impaired access due to lack of capacity in poor communities does impair health outcomes.

The debate over whether or not to utilize a certificate-of-need program is a debate over whether regulatory oversight is more effective or less effective than encouraging free investment under market conditions as a means to improve access and efficiency of our health care resources. It is an issue over how we can best balance the need to spend adequate dollars to assure access to needed services against the need to limit expenditures to assure adequate return for the public or private investors. (The correlation between lower quality and private investment has been noted in many studies, but this discussion is limited to the policies behind the certificate-of-need process.)

Mission controls behavior. The mission of the agency administering the certificate-of-need program is to assure that health care dollars are used optimally to obtain the greatest benefit for the most patients considering that there are limits to our resources. The mission of the facility providers in the market is to maximize the return on investment. Since these are different missions, it can be anticipated that the behavior will be different.

Investors in facilities such as private hospitals, imaging centers, and diagnostic and therapeutic cardiac laboratories will direct their investments to locations that marketing surveys indicate will bring the greatest return on their investment. This means that new or expanded facilities are directed to affluent areas with incomes and insurance coverage that will support these facilities. In many instances, this creates excess capacity for needs, but that capacity will be utilized at the will of physicians who profit and patients who want more care but who do not realize that excessive care is wasteful and may even be harmful. Thus the market inherently wastes health care resources for the affluent while neglecting areas with real need but with limited funding resources.

The certificate-of-need process is designed specifically to prevent the creation of excess capacity which increases utilization and costs but does not improve outcomes. Although sometimes difficult, the process does attempt to assure that an adequate level of services is accessible to everyone and that technological advances that improve outcomes are made available as appropriate.

So what about Dr. Musson's claim that eliminating the certificate-of-need allows the market to provide convenience, high quality, and cost effectiveness? By creating excess capacity, the market provides convenience, but only for affluent localities. Since funds are held back from poorer regions, convenience is further impaired, in fact, to the extent that access is frequently significantly impaired. Quality in health care is achieved by getting the right amount of care to those with medical needs. Providing excessive services or inadequate services, which are characteristics of the market model, impairs quality of care for everyone. An exception is that beneficial elective services for the affluent may have a shorter queue in a system of excess capacity, but is that small perquisite for the affluent really worth the tradeoff? And, finally, as demonstrated, cost effectiveness is dramatically diminished in a market system with excess capacity.

A single payer system of reform has a goal of providing high quality, comprehensive care for everyone while controlling excess health care inflation. An important mechanism is to establish a global budget for the entire system. Within that budget, a separate budget is established for capital improvements. The funds for capital improvements are allocated in a manner to achieve, as close as possible, a proper level of capacity for everyone. This is the mission of a publicly administered program but can never be the mission of an entrepreneurial medical marketplace.

March 01, 2002

The Uninsured and Affordable Health Care Coverage

Subcommittee on Health
Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives
February 28, 2002

Mary R. Grealy, President, Healthcare Leadership Council:

"The members of the HLC also support the President's inclusion of more than $90 billion in his recent budget to begin mapping the way to coverage for a significant number of the uninsured. The majority of this funding would provide a refundable health tax credit that could be advanced to families to help them purchase insurance plans in the non-group insurance market. The HLC believes this is an important step toward providing easier access to health care coverage for the millions of working Americans who are without it."

Judith Feder, Ph.D., Dean of Public Policy, Georgetown University:

"Although seemingly addressing the same problem, two different policy mechanisms can have very different impacts. Tax credits reach a large number of people, but most of them are not uninsured. Indeed, only a small proportion of the uninsured population-disproportionately young and healthy-are likely to participate in the new program and those who do will receive only modest benefits. And, at the same time it expands coverage, the pursuit of tax equity actually undermines coverage already in existence. As a result some of its coverage gains are offset by coverage offsets. In large part, this outcome reflects the fact that tax credits are not simply aimed at expanding coverage; they also aim at greater tax equity-that is, equalizing tax preferences wherever health insurance is purchased.

"The sole purpose of a public program is to expand coverage. It concentrates a comprehensive benefit on a narrowly defined population, the vast majority of whom are uninsured. If the nation's primary goal is to expand meaningful coverage for those who need it the most, the public program is by far the more effective mechanism."

http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02282002Hearing499/hearing.htm

Comment: This hearing was significant because it heard testimony from several individuals on one of the most important subjects in health care today: providing coverage for the uninsured.

Much of the testimony on behalf of tax credits was based on political ideology as is exemplified by Mary Grealy's comment that, "HLC believes this is an important step."

Other testimony objectively defined the problem of the uninsured and provided solid evidence of the potential impact of various policy approaches on expanding coverage. Judith Feder's testimony reveals that tax proposals are poorly targeted, whereas public programs such as Medicaid and S-CHIP are much more effective in expanding coverage for the uninsured.

In approaching health care reform through incremental steps, there is no question as to the proper approach. By defining the problem and analyzing the impact of various health policy approaches, it is clear that expanding public programs would work, and using tax credits wouldn't. Ideology for the sake of ideology must be dismissed.

But the most disconcerting feature of the hearings is that testimony was limited to incrementalisim. The consensus, if you believe it, is that any single program of universal health care coverage must be left off of the agenda. All parties have entered an implied agreement that we will meet in the center through incrementalisim. But this is absolutely untrue. The Robert Wood Johnson coalition on the uninsured demonstrates this. The dozen organizations involved are spending $10 million to publicize the plight of the uninsured, but they are in agreement that they are not in agreement on what we should do about it. The only agreement that they have reached is that they will keep single payer advocates out of the process.

The preliminary results of the California Health Care Options Project demonstrate that single payer proposals would provide comprehensive care to everyone and reduce health care costs. The other proposals that build on our current, flawed system are not universal, nor comprehensive, and they would all increase health care costs.

It's long past time to open the door and allow single payer advocates to place their models on the table. We should be looking at all policy approaches. And the only precondition to the process that we should insist on is that everyone would agree to place the interests of the patient above that of their own special interests.