The âpublic optionâ and the wheelbarrow parable: Part 2
By Kip Sullivan JD
It is way past time for âpublic optionâ advocates to take a stand either for or against an insurance industry bailout.
Do âoptionâ advocates support the individual mandate in the Democratsâ legislation (a requirement that all uninsured Americans buy health insurance from the bloated insurance industry) and the subsidies that will allegedly make the mandate affordable, even if these provisions are enacted without an âoptionâ? Or do they oppose the mandate and the subsidies if there is no âoptionâ in the final legislation? Does the ârobustnessâ of the âoptionâ have any bearing on their decision, or will any provision with the title âpublic optionâ in it suffice to win their support for an insurance industry bailout?
For the last two years, the leaders of the âoptionâ campaign have been extraordinarily vague about what sort of âoptionâ they stand for and whether the âoptionâ is more important to them than an insurance industry bailout. They have refused to adopt minimum criteria that would guarantee that the “option” would be large and they have refused to make the âoption,â even the tiny âoptionâ unveiled by congressional Democrats last June, a precondition for their support of the Democratsâ âreformâ bills. On the other hand, they have urged their followers to support the Democratsâ bills and, in the case of the Senate bill, they have even urged their followers to support the bill after the âoptionâ was stripped from it.
These tactics â creating a hullabaloo over a vaguely defined âoptionâ but then supporting bailout legislation that contains no âoptionâ â remind me of an old parable about an employee of a factory who, night after night for many years, left the factory pushing a wheelbarrow filled with straw. At the factory gate, the security guard carefully lifted the straw to see what if anything the employee might be stealing and, finding nothing, waved the guy on. On his last day of work, the employee approached the factory gates without his usual wheelbarrow filled with straw and said goodbye to the guard. âWhat were you stealing all those years?â the guard asked. âIâm sure you were stealing something but I never figured it out.â
âWheelbarrows!â replied the employee.
Like the wheelbarrow thief who induced the guard to focus on the straw, leaders of the âoptionâ campaign have been promoting a bailout of the health insurance industry â the centerpiece of a plan proposed by the insurance industry â right under the noses of progressives and the media. They have done so by focusing all their rhetoric on the âoption.â The public has been inundated by a blizzard of news stories, blog comments and email appeals about the politics of the âoptionâ and how it will work. Will this or that party or politician support it? Will it be open to large employers? Will the co-op version work as well as the more abstract version in the House bill? Will the âoptionâ have the authority to use Medicareâs rates plus 5 percent? Will it attract more than its share of sick enrollees? Should it be in place prior to 2013? And so on.
On the other hand, the “option” campaign has been utterly silent on the most fundamental question one could ask about the bailout: Should Congress enact a requirement that most non-elderly Americans become compulsory customers of the insurance industry and should the taxpayer finance massive subsidies for the insurance industry, with or without an âoptionâ?
Health Care for America Now (HCAN), the most prominent advocate of the âoption,â and its allies both inside and outside Congress have been silent on virtually every issue raised by this question: Is it ethical to force Americans to purchase the product of a particular industry? Could the individual mandate backfire on Democrats, especially when the news media starts publishing stories about the IRS enforcing fines against middle-income Americans who donât or canât obey the mandate? Will the bailout strengthen the insurance industry and thereby postpone the day America enacts a Medicare-for-all system? Will federal courts decide that the individual mandate, the subsidies and the exchanges pre-empt state single-payer legislation and thereby snuff out the state-level single-payer movement? (See discussion of this issue in my opening statement for a recent live blog and the discussion that followed.) How, if at all, are the answers to any of these questions altered by the enactment of the tiny âoptionâ contained in the House bill?
On these and other critical questions about the bailout â the mandate that Americans buy insurance plus the tax-financed subsidies for the insurance industry in the amount of a half-trillion dollars per decade â the âoptionâ leadership has been silent. Their silence on these issues coupled with (a) their refusal to endorse criteria for the âoptionâ that would guarantee the âoptionâ would be large, (b) their hype about the âoptionâ and (c) their support for the Democratsâ bills even if they contain only a tiny âoptionâ or no âoptionâ at all indicates their true priorities. Like the wheelbarrows in the parable, the âoptionâ leadershipâs true priority â the enactment of an insurance industry bailout â has been in plain sight for a long time.
In the remainder of this article I review the evidence indicating the âoptionâ campaign failed to promote to the public or to members of Congress criteria that would have guaranteed the âoptionâ would be large enough not only to survive but to take on the gigantic insurance companies that dominate every market in America today. In the last part of this three-part series, I review evidence indicating the âoptionâ campaign never informed congressional Democrats that an âoptionâ of any sort (large or small) was a precondition for their support of the Democratsâ âreformâ legislation.
No minimum criteria for the âoptionâ
The first sign that the âoptionâ campaign would give higher priority to the bailout than the âoptionâ was HCANâs refusal to adopt any criteria at all for the âoptionâ until long after the Democrats began writing their âreformâ bills. Although the bill-writing process began no later than late 2008, HCAN waited until June 2009 to release four vague criteria, and then promptly ignored them.
The bill-writing process began formally in January 2009 in the Senate Finance and Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) committees when the new Congress convened, and informally as early as 2008 when Senator Ted Kennedy (chairman of the HELP Committee) convened secret meetings of the âworkhorse group.â (According to the Wall Street Journal, this group began meeting in early 2008. According to the New York Times, it began meeting in the fall of 2008.) The process began in the House in March 2009 when the chairmen of the three committees with jurisdiction over health care reform agreed to write a single House âtri-committeeâ bill. The bill-writing process was completed by the Senate HELP committee on June 9, 2009 and by the House âtri-committeeâ on June 19, 2009. On those dates those committees published draft versions of their bills. Nearly identical versions of these bills were formally introduced a few weeks later.
HCAN was well connected in Congress and must have known long before the public did that the HELP Committee and the tri-committee would recommend tiny, ineffective versions of the âoption.â (The AFL-CIO, an HCAN steering committee member, was a member of the âworkhorse group.â) Nevertheless, HCAN waited until June 12, 2009 to post four vague âoptionâ criteria. Of these, only two related to size, and both of these (ânational and available everywhereâ and âbargaining cloutâ) were merely expressions of a desired goal, not descriptions of criteria that had to be met to achieve the goal. Merely expressing the wish that the âoptionâ be âavailable everywhere,â for example, does nothing to ensure that the âoptionâ is big everywhere.
HCAN could have endorsed Hackerâs original criteria
If HCAN had been serious about promoting a large âoption,â it would have endorsed the five criteria proposed by Jacob Hacker, the godfather of the modern âoption,â and it would have done so early in the bill-writing process, not after the bills were written.
In papers published in 2001 and 2007 Hacker set forth five criteria that would have guaranteed massive size in the âoption:
(1) The program had to be pre-populated (he proposed that states âshiftâ current Medicaid and SCHIP enrollees and the uninsured into the program prior to the start of operations);
(2) People who enrolled in the public program would get tax-financed subsidies to pay the the public programâs premiums while people who signed up with insurance companies would not;
(3) All non-elderly Americans would be eligible to enroll in the public program;
(4) The public program would have the authority to use Medicareâs reimbursement rates; and
(5) The insurance industry would have to offer the same coverage required of the public program.
According to Hacker as well as the Lewin Group (which published analyses of Hackerâs proposal in 2003 and 2008), a public health insurance company that met these five criteria would be able to insure half the nonelderly population â in 2007, 129 million people â and charge premiums far below those of the insurance industry.
But because the HELP committee and the three House committee chairmen who wrote the House âtri-committeeâ bill were far more interested in being able to say the âoptionâ would âcompete with the insurance companies on a level playing fieldâ than they were in creating a huge âoption,â they incorporated only the fifth criterion (insurance companies had to offer comparable coverage) and abandoned the other four. The abandonment of the other four, especially the criteria calling for pre-population and subsidies only for the âoption,â resulted in a much weaker and smaller âoptionâ program than the one envisioned by Hacker. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the HELP committee âoptionâ would insure no one and that the House bill would insure only 6 million people. (I have written elsewhere about why even this dismal estimate of the House âoptionâsâ size by the CBO was excessively rosy.)
âOptionâ proponents cave
June 2009, then, would have been an obvious time for HCAN, Hacker and other âoptionâ proponents to rise up on their hind legs and demand that if Democrats wanted their support for an insurance industry bailout the Democrats would have to take their sick little âoptionâ back to the drawing board and draft an âoptionâ based on Hackerâs original criteria. That didnât happen. As I have reported earlier, in June 2009 the âoptionâ campaign entered the âswitchâ phase of what was turning out to be a âbait and switchâ campaign. Even though they had to have known by June 2009 that the âoptionâ in the HELP and tri-committee bills were travesties of Hackerâs original proposal, the âoptionâ campaign pretended otherwise. They called the Democratsâ microscopic âoptionsâ ârobustâ and âstrong,â and lavished praise on the bills â bills which contained the bailout provisions so coveted by the insurance industry.
Neither HCAN, Hacker nor any other leading individual or group within the âoptionâ campaign made an effort to restore the pre-population and subsidy criteria, and apparently none made any effort to restore the criterion calling for the âoptionâ to be universally available. When Richard Kirsch, HCANâs campaign director, testified in favor of the House âreformâ bill before a subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on June 23, 2009, Kirsch knew or should have known that the âoptionâ in that bill did not meet Hackerâs pre-population, subsidy, or universally available criterion. Kirsch, however, made no effort to call his listenersâ attention to that fact. To the contrary, he concealed the small size of the âoptionâ by telling the committee it would be available to everyone.
The only criterion of the four abandoned by Democrats that âoptionâ leaders went to bat for was the one authorizing the âoptionâ to use Medicareâs rates to reimburse clinics and hospitals, and even here they could not bring themselves to fight for Hackerâs original criterion. They pushed not for Medicareâs rates (which are about 20 percent below the rates insurance companies pay), but Medicareâs rates plus 5 percent.
But without Hackerâs first three criteria â the pre-population, subsidy, and available-to-all criteria, which were essential to guaranteeing the âoptionâ would start out large and stay large â the demand that the âoptionâ be given the authority to use Medicareâs rates plus 5 percent was meaningless. Giving a microscopic âoptionâ the authority to use low rates is like giving first-graders the authority to bench press 400 pounds. They canât do it, and giving them permission to do it doesnât change that fact. Similarly, an âoptionâ program that represents zero to 6 million people cannot expect clinics and hospitals to agree to be paid below-industry rates (see my discussion of âthe chicken and eggâ problem here). No dispensation or blessing from Congress is going to change that. What the âoptionâ needed from its supporters was an uncompromising insistence upon large size on the day it opened for business. But the âoptionâ campaign made no effort to fight for the criteria that would guarantee large size. (As âoptionâ proponent Jon Walker recently explained, âoptionâ proponents did, however, adopt the ludicrous label ârobustâ to distinguish a tiny âoptionâ with the authority to use Medicare rates plus 5 percent from a tiny âoptionâ that does not have that authority. The label was extremely misleading.)
âOptionâ proponents in Congress equally incompetent
Members of Congress who supported the âoptionâ adopted tactics virtually identical to those of the âoptionâ campaign, and thereby revealed that they too cared more about the bailout than the âoption.â They refused to adopt criteria that would guarantee large size in the “option,” they refused to alert the public that the Democratsâ âoptionâ was a mere shadow of Hackerâs original version, and they insisted on calling the Democratsâ scrawny âoptionâ ârobustâ if it included the Medicare-rates-plus-5-percent provision.
In one of their first letters to the Democratic leadership in the House expressing support for the âoption,â the Democratic Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC) failed to say a word about Hackerâs original criteria. In fact, they made things worse. Two criteria the CPC did endorse in that letter â that subsidies should go to the insurance industry as well as the âoption,â and that the âoptionâ pay providers âcompetitive ratesâ â nullified two of Hackerâs original criteria (the subsidy and Medicare-rates criteria). The nullification of these criteria would have greatly reduced the power of the âoptionâ vis a vis Hackerâs original version.
Like HCAN, the CPC waited till long after the bill-writing process had begun to develop a list of criteria for the âoption.â On June 8, 2009 (four days before HCAN released its four vague âoptionâ criteria), the CPC released the contents of a June 5 letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi which contained a one-page mish-mash of âprinciplesâ they said the âoptionâ had to meet. The mish-mash included, for example, a call for dental coverage and âtransparencyâ in the âoption.â On the other hand, it mentioned only one of Hackerâs original principles (the one requiring that all non-elderly Americans be allowed to join the âoptionâ). To make matters worse, the mish-mash included the same two criteria the CPC had adopted earlier which nullified Hackerâs subsidy and Medicare-rate criteria. Unlike HCAN, which never summoned the courage to say it would oppose legislation that did not meet its criteria, the CPC did say in this letter to Pelosi that it would âopposeâ the final House bill if it did not include an âoptionâ that met its âprinciples.â As we shall see in Part 3, this threat turned out to be a bluff.
âOptionâ proponents in the Senate were even less assertive about spelling out criteria for the âoptionâ and demanding that they be met than the CPC was. A May 29, 2009 letter from 16 Senators to Senators Baucus and Kennedy (chairs, respectively, of the Finance and HELP committees) urging them to include an âoptionâ in their committeesâ bills mentioned no criteria. Over the next nine months, nothing changed. On February 16, 2010, Senator Michael Bennet (D-Utah) and three of his colleagues sent a letter to Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) urging him to restore âa strong public optionâ to the Senate bill. (This letter was subsequently endorsed by two dozen other Senators.) Although this one-page letter used the phrase âpublic optionâ 15 times, and although half the time the word âstrongâ preceded the phrase, the letter made no attempt to define what âstrongâ meant.
Senator Ron Wyden made an effort late in the 2009 session to make the âoptionâ available to all non-elderly. He received very little support from âoptionâ proponents and his effort failed.
These isolated and, in the case of the CPC, confused efforts by members of Congress to reinvigorate the moribund âoptionâ are further evidence that HCAN and other advocates of the âoptionâ were doing nothing to create pressure on Congress to adopt minimum criteria that would guarantee that the âoptionâ would start out large and stay large.
Compromising on the large “option” had consequences
The small size of the âoptionâ endorsed by Democrats, and the disinterest among âoptionâ proponents both inside and outside Congress in strengthening the âoption,â meant the Democratsâ âoptionâ would pose virtually no threat to the insurance industry. It meant the âoptionâ would not be available to the vast majority of Americans (according to the Congressional Budget Office it would be available to about 10 percent of us), and would have very little impact on health care costs in the US.
The small size of the âoptionâ meant, furthermore, that the âoptionâ campaignâs slogans, which arguably had some integrity prior to the introduction of the Democratsâ mouse version of the âoptionâ in June 2009, became false advertising thereafter. No longer could the campaign say they were promoting âquality affordable health care for all.â They were only promoting coverage for some. No longer could they say, âIf you like your health insurance you can keep it.â The reality was that the individual mandate plus the tiny âoptionâ meant, âIf you donât like your health insurance, you must keep it (because unless youâre among the 10 percent of Americans with access to the exchange, you wonât have access to the âoptionââ). No longer could the âoptionâ campaign claim the âoptionâ would cut the cost of health care in the US.
As health policy, the âpublic optionâ was worthless. But as a political tool it was priceless. As the straw distracted attention from the wheelbarrow, so the âoptionâ distracted attention from the fact that the health care âreformâ promoted by the âoptionâ campaign will criminalize the uninsured and transfer hundreds of billions of dollars of public funds to private insurance companies.
Kip Sullivan is a member of the steering committee of the Minnesota chapter of Physicians for a National Health Program.