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Health Affairs
Web Exclusive
28 May 2003
Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?
A strategy, based on managed competition, to free employers from the health
care cost spiral and produce effective managed care.
By Alain C. Enthoven

There are two types of HMOs existing today. “Carrier HMOs” are insurance companies that offer a comprehensive benefit package, characteristic of HMOs, but deliver the services by contracting with independent doctors or medical groups whose main mode of payment remains fee-for-service (FFS). This is in contradistinction to “delivery system HMOs” that are based on their own dedicated medical groups and working mainly under per capita prepayment. The latter are a much more powerful lever for reshaping health care.

“Managed competition” is an alternative to… (current) employer policies. The idea is for the employer to increase competition by offering employees a wide choice of carriers and plan designs, a responsible choice (employees are fully responsible for premium differences), individual choice, informed choice, and multiple choices of delivery systems. If a critical mass of employers were to do this in a market, they could create conditions in which efficient delivery systems could enter, market their superior value for money, and achieve economies of scale. In managed competition, insurers need to be linked with specific, geographically overlapping delivery systems. (Six carrier HMOs, each offering practically every provider in town, would not be “competition” in this sense. The point is competition among delivery systems, not just carriers.)

http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Enthoven_Web_Excl_052803.htm

Comment: In this article, Professor Enthoven identifies many of the problems inherent in the current employment-sponsored, managed care system. He continues to support his model of managed competition as the solution to our wasteful, dysfunctional system. But his model is dependent on the voluntary initiative of a “critical mass” of employers to create a market in which “geographically overlapping” delivery systems, with “economies of scale,” would compete.

Although perhaps an oversimplification, his model suggests that almost all physicians, hospitals, and other providers be placed in several Kaiser-type HMOs within the same community, without significant provider overlap. Even densely-populated urban regions would find difficulties supporting multiple, large, integrated delivery systems. And experience has shown that many suburban and almost all rural areas cannot support even a single integrated delivery system. This does not mean that integrated delivery systems should be excluded as a form of health care delivery, but they can never be relied on as the dominant model in all communities, unless as a universal, public health service model.

There are critical issues that must be addressed during our efforts to reform the funding of health care. Ensuring affordable access to comprehensive services for everyone must be our primary mission. A mission of establishing an artificial business model designed specifically to enhance marketplace competition, regardless of the negative impact on patients, misses our priorities for reform, and should be discarded as the inadequate and highly flawed concept that it is.

Health Affairs
May/June 2003
Taiwan’s New National Health Insurance Program: Genesis And Experience So
Far
by Tsung-Mei Cheng

Taiwan’s NHI is a government-run, single-payer national health insurance scheme, financed through a mix of premiums and taxes, that compensates a mixed public and private delivery system predominantly on a fee-for-service basis. NHI enrollment is mandatory, to ensure adequate risk pooling and the broad-based collection of funds to finance the NHI.

Taiwan’s health care providers obtain their revenues from three sources: (1) payments by the NHI, (2) patient user fees and copayments, and (3) proceeds from the sale of products and services not covered by the NHI.

Experts in Taiwan appear to believe that the absolute level of fees paid by the NHI is too low and that many fees are considered to be below cost. In the absence of effective volume controls, providers’ simplest response to low fees is to expand the volume of services they provide while reducing the resources going into each unit of service (for example, shortened visit length). The BNHI’s chief executive officer, Hong-Jen Chang, remarked that “Taiwan’s doctors are well paid. But they work very, very hard to use volume to make up for the low fees.” Ta-Fu Huang, chairman of the DoH’s Quality Commission, has written extensively about Taiwan’s medical culture of the “three-minute patient visit” with physicians that is typical of doctors in Taiwan. That fee-driven practice style may lead to misdiagnosis, improper treatment, or delays in proper treatment.

A feature that Taiwan’s health system shares with other health systems in Asia is that hospitals are allowed to sell patients drugs at prices far above their acquisition cost, which they negotiate with the drug companies. In the Taiwan vernacular, the resulting profit margins are known as the “drug price black hole.” The U.S. analogue of this practice is the profits oncologists serving Medicare patients can earn on drugs they use in outpatient chemotherapy. Coupled with the PF system of rewarding hospital-based doctors, permitting hospitals to profit from the sale of drugs leads to a serious conflicts of interest, as it invites the overmedication of patients, including a perilous overmedication with antibiotics. According to a December 2002 study report by the DoH, close to half of the doctors in Taiwan prescribe four to five drugs per visit for upper respiratory infections, and 10 percent prescribe more than eight drugs; in only fourteen of 103,024 outpatient visits did the doctor not prescribe any drugs. The CEO of a large private hospital told me that 44 percent of his hospital’s income is derived from the prescription and sale of drugs to patients.

To the detached observer, Taiwan’s current health system conveys a confusing picture. The nation spends only 5.44 percent of its GDP on health care from all sources (or about 6 percent on a more inclusive measure). By the benchmark of the OECD countries, a nation with Taiwan’s current GDP per capita (US $14,188) would be expected to spend somewhere around 7.3 percent of its GDP on health care, give or take half a percentage point. This estimate could be taken to mean that Taiwan’s health system is underfunded. Not surprisingly, there have been calls for increased spending to improve equity and quality.

On the other hand, however, the accusation of widespread supply side-driven, provider-induced use of health care suggests a surplus of capacity, even at the relatively low spending level of only 5.44 percent of GDP. It leads critics of Taiwan’s provider community to argue that allocating a higher percentage of GDP to health care might make the problem of excess capacity even worse and merely increase the profits of providers.

A reconciliation of these contradictory perspectives may be to argue that what is actually in surplus is relatively low-quality care, whose expansion should not be encouraged with added funds. At the same time, it probably is true that a high quality, state-of-the art health system with longer patient visits, more accurate diagnoses, better-equipped hospitals, timely introduction of new drugs and technology, a better information infrastructure, and superior quality all around probably would require more than the current 5.44 percent of GDP. If that interpretation is valid, any move to a higher level of spending should be carefully targeted.

… additional funding should be directed to the development of an IT infrastructure capable of identifying waste, fraud, and abuse and, at the same time, inducing the delivery system to practice high-quality, evidence-based medicine.

http://www.healthaffairs.org/readeragent.php?ID=/usr/local/apache/sites/healthaffairs.org/htdocs/Library/v22n3/s14.pdf

Comment: As we advocate for reform, it is important to understand both the problems that can arise with single payer systems and the solutions to those problems. We need to be able to counter the criticisms of the opponents of reform, and then we will need to be certain that mechanisms will be in place to ensure efficient utilization of our health care resources.

Health Affairs
Web Exclusive
28 May 2003
Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?
A strategy, based on managed competition, to free employers from the health
care cost spiral and produce effective managed care.
By Alain C. Enthoven

There are two types of HMOs existing today. “Carrier HMOs” are insurance companies that offer a comprehensive benefit package, characteristic of HMOs, but deliver the services by contracting with independent doctors or medical groups whose main mode of payment remains fee-for-service (FFS). This is in contradistinction to “delivery system HMOs” that are based on their own dedicated medical groups and working mainly under per capita prepayment. The latter are a much more powerful lever for reshaping health care.

“Managed competition” is an alternative to… (current) employer policies. The idea is for the employer to increase competition by offering employees a wide choice of carriers and plan designs, a responsible choice (employees are fully responsible for premium differences), individual choice, informed choice, and multiple choices of delivery systems. If a critical mass of employers were to do this in a market, they could create conditions in which efficient delivery systems could enter, market their superior value for money, and achieve economies of scale. In managed competition, insurers need to be linked with specific, geographically overlapping delivery systems. (Six carrier HMOs, each offering practically every provider in town, would not be “competition” in this sense. The point is competition among delivery systems, not just carriers.)

http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Enthoven_Web_Excl_052803.htm

Comment: In this article, Professor Enthoven identifies many of the problems inherent in the current employment-sponsored, managed care system. He continues to support his model of managed competition as the solution to our wasteful, dysfunctional system. But his model is dependent on the voluntary initiative of a “critical mass” of employers to create a market in which “geographically overlapping” delivery systems, with “economies of scale,” would compete.

Although perhaps an oversimplification, his model suggests that almost all physicians, hospitals, and other providers be placed in several Kaiser-type HMOs within the same community, without significant provider overlap. Even densely-populated urban regions would find difficulties supporting multiple, large, integrated delivery systems. And experience has shown that many suburban and almost all rural areas cannot support even a single integrated delivery system. This does not mean that integrated delivery systems should be excluded as a form of health care delivery, but they can never be relied on as the dominant model in all communities, unless as a universal, public health service model.

There are critical issues that must be addressed during our efforts to reform the funding of health care. Ensuring affordable access to comprehensive services for everyone must be our primary mission. A mission of establishing an artificial business model designed specifically to enhance marketplace competition, regardless of the negative impact on patients, misses our priorities for reform, and should be discarded as the inadequate and highly flawed concept that it is.

The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Program Design, Recent
Performance, and Implications for Medicare Reform
May 2003
Prepared by Mark Merlis

Conclusions

FEHBP (Federal Employees Health Benefits Program) has often been an attractive model for policymakers who wish to increase the roles of competition and private plans in the Medicare program. FEHBP has succeeded in offering varying degrees of health plan choice to a large and diverse population of employees and annuitants, at costs comparable to those for other large employer plans. The program is more flexible and less bureaucratic than Medicare and relies chiefly on the market, rather than regulation, to control costs and assure quality.

Still, the program is not without its shortcomings, some of which have been notable for many years. FEHBP has faced many of the same problems as the Medicare+Choice program:

* FEHBP per capita costs have risen faster than Medicare costs in recent years, though somewhat less rapidly than spending by other employer plans. Only part of the FEHBP spending growth is attributable to rising drug expenditures, and costs would have risen even faster if plans had not reduced benefits. As the OPM Director has acknowledged: “Despite its size, the FEHB Program is not immune to the inflationary pressures that have driven up costs in the health-care industry in recent years.”

* Competition under FEHBP, as under the Medicare+Choice program, has been distorted by pricing problems. Because government contributions to FEHBP plans are not adjusted for demographic factors, health risk, or geography, the net prices offered to participants may reflect enrollee characteristics or plan location, rather than the value of benefits or plan efficiency.

* While many Medicare beneficiaries have no access to Medicare+Choice plans, FEHBP nominally offers enrollees multiple health plan choices everywhere in the country. However, participants in less populous areas may have access only to the national PPO plans, and some of these plans may not always provide meaningful choices among providers. PPOs generally achieve savings by negotiating discounted rates with providers; providers in isolated areas who face limited competition may have little incentive to grant these discounts.

* FEHBP administrative costs, including OPM, agency, and plan costs, can only be estimated, but are probably in the range of 7 to 15 percent of claims, depending on the type of plan. Medicare administrative costs for the fee-for-service program are only about 2 percent of claims. Costs for the Medicare+Choice program are probably comparable to those for similar FEHBP plans.

FEHBP is a model that policymakers are examining as they consider ways of introducing more choice under Medicare or of developing new mechanisms for extending coverage to the uninsured. The FEHBP experience highlights the difficulties in developing a competitive system that operates efficiently and equitably for a nationwide program. And FEHBP’s recent performance suggests that competition alone may not resolve the ongoing dilemma of maintaining comprehensive benefits while controlling spending growth.

http://www.kff.org/content/2003/6081/6081v1.pdf

Comment: Although this report discusses the FEHBP program as a model for Medicare reform, FEHBP is also being proposed by many politicians and other advocates as a model for expanding health care coverage through employer or individual mandates.

FEHBP, “the health care coverage that members of Congress have,” has been touted by many as the ideal model of reform. Although it is the largest and most effective of existing programs that use private insurers, it is also a program with wasteful administrative excesses and with inequities that are inevitable when depending on a variety of plans with variable benefits, pricing and availability. In contrast, an equitable program of social insurance would significantly reduce administrative costs thereby making affordable truly comprehensive benefits for everyone.

Why do we continue to support extreme models of reform, such as the FEHBP proposals, when our own simple program of social insurance would provide affordable, equitable and comprehensive coverage for everyone?

The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
The Synthesis Project
May 2003
Tax subsidies for private health insurance: who currently benefits and what
are the implications for new policies?

Policy-makers are considering a variety of new tax credit proposals to expand health insurance coverage. Understanding how current tax subsidies work and their role in supporting employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) is important when designing such policies.

Higher-income workers benefit far more from the current ESI tax subsidy than lower-income workers.

First of all, they are in higher tax brackets. A worker in the 28 percent tax bracket saves 28 percent of the premium cost, while a worker in the 15 percent bracket saves only 15 percent.

They also are more likely to have ESI. Almost 90 percent of workers with income three times the poverty level or higher have ESI, compared to less than one-third of workers with income below the poverty level.

In addition, employers of higher income workers pay a larger percentage of the premium on average, translating into a larger tax exemption for those employees.

Finally, higher-income workers tend to have more coverage-multiple policies, richer benefits, and family rather than individual coverage- increasing premiums and the value of the tax exemption.

Lower-income workers benefit only slightly from the income tax exemption and the Medicare payroll tax exemption. They benefit in the short run from the Social Security payroll tax exemption, but it hurts them in the long run by reducing their retirement income.

The overall impact of the upside down subsidy is striking.

Many economists argue that employers pass on the costs of their contributions for health insurance to workers in the form of lower wages. Under that assumption, the tax subsidy is worth one-third of the premium for families with income above $200,000. These families pay only two percent of their income for health coverage.

In contrast, the subsidy is worth about 10 percent of the premium for families with ESI making less than $10,000. These families pay about 40 percent of their income (including what their employers pay in premiums) for health coverage.

http://www.rwjf.org/publications/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no3_policyprimer.pdf

Comment: This report demonstrates that current tax policies designed to support our existing system of employer-sponsored insurance result in profound inequities, disproportionately benefiting the wealthy.

Can modifying tax policy alone correct these inequities? Each adjustment can have an impact on employer participation, employee participation, shifting between individual and employer-sponsored coverage, comprehensiveness of benefit packages, variations in the level of public funding, extent of patient cost-sharing, and endless other potential policies. As each adjustment is made to improve equity, the model will move closer to universal, comprehensive coverage with progressive public funding, and elimination of the link to employment.

Try manipulating the single payer model to include private health plans while preserving the same level of equity that a single payer system would provide. Bet you can’t do it. So why do we keep insisting that we begin with private health plans as we reform health care?

The Journal of the American Board of Family Practice
May-June 2003
Health Policy

Why Incremental Reforms Will Not Solve the Health Care Crisis

By Don McCanne, MD

Incremental models of reform perpetuate our flawed, fragmented system of funding health care. They perpetuate inequities both in the funding of health care and in the allocation of our health care resources. They limit choice of health care providers. None assures continuity of coverage and care. Many incremental proposals barely have an effect on the numbers of uninsured, and none of them ensure truly universal coverage. All incremental approaches substantially increase health care costs, and most current proposals assure neither financial security nor health security.

In contrast, a single payer program would provide affordable, equitable, comprehensive care for everyone.

Whether through tax policy, public programs, regulatory oversight, mandated coverage, or a combination of these and other interventions, the government will be intimately involved in our health care funding. We can no longer afford to dismiss any valid option because it is a government solution, especially in that all proposals are government solutions. We must decide how we can best use our government resources to be sure that we are receiving the greatest value for our health care investment. Limiting our consideration to various incremental solutions closes the door on the health care reform goals of equity, affordability, and efficiency, and it threatens the goals of universality, provider choice, access, and comprehensiveness. When all are readily achievable, why accept less?

For the full article: http://www.jabfp.org/cgi/content/full/16/3/257

California Senate Office of Research
May 2003
Growing Gaps in California’s Emergency Room Backup System
Prepared by Peter Hansel

In October 1998, a patient was brought by ambulance to a California hospital emergency room with symptoms of abdominal distress and shortness of breath. The ER physician suspected an abdominal condition requiring surgery. As the patient continued to deteriorate, the physician twice phoned an on-call surgeon asking that he come in immediately to examine the patient. The surgeon repeatedly refused to come in, advising that the patient be admitted for him to see in the morning. As the patient’s blood pressure and pulse rate dropped to life-threatening levels, the ER physician contacted hospital administrators in an apparent effort to compel the surgeon to come in. The patient suffered a cardiac arrhythmia and died despite a resuscitation attempt. The surgeon arrived during the resuscitation attempt.

On a Saturday night in January 2000, a middle-age man came into a California hospital emergency room with an upper gastrointestinal bleed. The ER physician on duty treated the patient, but did not have the expertise to stop the bleeding. A gastroenterologist was asked to come in and perform an emergency endoscopy. Then another, and another, and another, and another. After three hours and six refusals, no GI specialist would come to the ER and the patient was at risk of bleeding to death. Finally, the ER medical director called a GI specialist he personally knew and told him he would pay him $500 in cash if he came in. The specialist accepted, came to the ER, performed the procedure, and stopped the bleeding.

These cases, while isolated, illustrate the growing problems that are occurring with the state’s system of ensuring “on-call” emergency services – backup services provided by specialists to hospital emergency departments.

Problems with access to on-call services are primarily the result of problems with reimbursement of physician specialists who provide on-call services.

http://www.sen.ca.gov/sor/reports/REPORTS_BY_SUBJ/HEALTH/Ab2611.pdf

Comment: With all of the negative news about the deterioration of our health care system, we finally have a report that indicates that health care access improved (in this one instance). And it seems fitting that the policy implication is consistent with other current private solutions to our health care crisis. Without government intervention, emergency services can be obtained through the simple intervention of payment of a bribe. Ah, the magic of the marketplace!

Single payer insurance, anyone?