NOTE: It is likely that few Quote of the Day subscribers read this 2007 message on John Nyman’s new theory of moral hazard and welfare gain because it is long and terribly wonkish. It is being reprised here because current trends in health care payment reform violate these important concepts, thereby resulting in further impairment of access to care while creating greater financial hardships for patients. Following are excerpts from Nyman’s 2007 article along with the original and an updated comment by Don McCanne.

PNHP – Quote of the Day
Posted on: Monday, September 24, 2007

Cracks in the moral hazard foundation

American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation

By John A. Nyman
Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law
October 2007

Abstract

Much American health policy over the past thirty-five years has focused on reducing the additional health care that is consumed when a person becomes insured, that is, reducing moral hazard. According to conventional theory, all of moral hazard represents a welfare loss to society because its cost exceeds its value. Empirical support for this theory has been provided by the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, which found that moral hazard — even moral hazard in the form of effective and appropriate hospital procedures — could be reduced substantially using cost-sharing policies with little or no measurable effect on health.

This article critically analyzes these two cornerstones of American health policy. It holds that a large portion of moral hazard actually represents health care that ill consumers would not otherwise have access to without the income that is transferred to them through insurance. This portion of moral hazard is efficient and generates a welfare gain. Further, it holds that the RAND experiment’s finding (that health care could be reduced substantially with little or no effect on health) may actually be caused by the large number of participants who voluntarily dropped out of the cost-sharing arms of the experiment. Indeed, almost all of the reduction in hospital use in the cost-sharing plans could be attributed to this voluntary attrition. If so, the RAND finding that cost sharing could reduce health care utilization, especially utilization in the form of effective and appropriate hospital procedures, with no appreciable effect on health is spurious.

The article concludes by observing that the preoccupation with moral hazard is misplaced and has worked to obscure policies that would better reduce health care expenditures. It has also led us away from policies that would extend insurance coverage to the uninsured.

Introduction

The direction of health policy in the United States over the past thirty-five years is well known: increased cost sharing in the form of higher deductibles and coinsurance rates; the “management” of care by utilization reviews, exclusive contracting with certain providers, capitation, and bundling of services; and most recently health savings accounts (HSAs) and “consumer-driven” health care. Less well understood, however, are the foundations of these policies, especially among those who see such policies as mainly restricting access to care.

Two of these foundational studies are (1) the theoretical analysis of the welfare implications of moral hazard (Pauly 1968; Feldstein 1973) and (2) the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) findings concerning the health consequences of reducing moral hazard (Manning et al. 1987; Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993).

This article presents a critical view of these two foundational studies. First, it suggests that much of the additional health care that consumers purchase when they are insured — that is, much of moral hazard — is actually efficient and welfare increasing: its value to patients exceeds (and often far exceeds, in the case of expensive, life-saving, hospital procedures that patients would not be able to afford without insurance) the cost of providing that care. Second, it suggests that the RAND HIE did not really capture consumers’ willingness to substitute other goods and services for medical care in response to increases in the price of medical care, but instead the study largely captured participants who became ill, dropped out of the experiment, and received the needed medical care under their original insurance policies outside the experiment. Because these participants received treatment outside the RAND experiment, their health care utilization was not recorded. Thus, the finding that moral hazard, especially the portion of moral hazard represented by additional hospital procedures, could be reduced dramatically by cost sharing with only a negligible health effect is spurious.

New Theory

The fundamental error in conventional theory is that it did not recognize that, while the price of medical care might drop to zero for all those who are insured, for most medical care — especially the expensive, hospital-based procedures and associated care that comprise the bulk of medical care expenditures in the United States — it is really only those who are ill who respond to that price reduction. For example, what healthy person would purchase a coronary bypass procedure, a leg amputation, or a liver transplant just because the price has fallen to zero? This means that only those who become ill are responsive to the insurance price reduction. If so, the price reduction becomes the vehicle by which income is transferred from those who purchase insurance and remain healthy to those who purchase insurance and become ill. This is an important distinction because it changes the welfare implications of moral hazard dramatically and implies that much, if not most, of moral hazard is efficient and generates a welfare gain (Nyman 1999, 2003).

New Interpretation

Of the various responses to cost sharing that were observed in the participants of the RAND HIE, by far the strongest and most dramatic was in the relative number of RAND participants who voluntarily dropped out of the study over the course of the experiment. Of the 1,294 adult participants who were randomly assigned to the free plan, 5 participants (0.4 percent) left the experiment voluntarily during the observation period, while of the 2,664 who were assigned to any of the cost-sharing plans, 179 participants (6.7 percent) voluntarily left the experiment. This represented a greater than sixteenfold increase in the percentage of dropouts, a difference that was highly significant and a magnitude of response that was nowhere else duplicated in the experiment.

The explanation that makes the most sense is that the dropouts were participants who had just been diagnosed with an illness that would require a costly hospital procedure. If they dropped out, their coverage would automatically revert to their original insurance policies, which were likely to cover major medical expenses (such as hospitalizations) with no co-payments. This is because HIE participants had agreed to relinquish their existing policies to RAND as a condition of participation, but they could revert back to their existing policies whenever they wanted if they dropped out of the experiment. Thus, when faced with a large hospital expense, the participants could have simply dropped out of the experiment but received the inpatient care outside the experiment.

As a result of dropping out, these participants’ inpatient stays (and associated health care spending) did not register in the experiment, and it appeared as if participants in the cost-sharing group had a lower rate of inpatient use. In reality, however, this finding would have been because participants who remained in the cost-sharing group simply had fewer diagnoses that required hospitalization.

Conclusion

The conventional theory of the moral-hazard welfare loss and the conventional interpretation of the RAND HIE results have created a policy environment in which health insurance is viewed as more of a problem than a solution (Gladwell 2005). We must recognize, however, that much of moral hazard generates a welfare gain that society should encourage rather than discourage. Because of this reevaluation of moral hazard, we must also realize that health insurance is much more valuable than has been recognized. Indeed, there is probably no other investment that we can make as a society that would generate as great a net return on welfare as finding a politically acceptable mechanism for insuring the large portion of U.S. citizens who are currently uninsured.

Abstract:
http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/32/5/759

Full article (25 pages):
http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/32/5/759

Comment (September 24, 2007):

By Don McCanne, MD

This landmark report turns upside down the policy basis of moral hazard. The entire article should be downloaded so that it can be used to refute those who insist that patients who decline health care when they have to pay for it out-of-pocket will not adversely affect their own health because they will decline only that care that has no measurable benefit on their health outcomes.

These two cornerstones of American health policy, the moral hazard theory and the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, have crumbled, taking down with them the rationale of the cost-sharing basis of the consumer-directed health care movement.

Professor Nyman has shown us that the new interpretation of the moral hazard of insurance insulation against health care costs does not produce a welfare loss, but, in fact, produces a welfare gain. That is why we need a national health program that covers all of us and that eliminates financial barriers to beneficial services.

We really don’t have to worry, after all, about unleashing a stampede for free leg amputations or free liver transplants.

https://pnhp.org/news/2007/september/cracks-in-the-moral-hazard-foundation

Current trends demonstrate an escalation in the use of the tools of cost sharing to control health care spending. High deductibles are becoming the standard. Co-payments (a dollar amount per service) are being transitioned to coinsurance (a percentage of the fees) which shifts even more of the costs to patients. Standard or basic plans are now being assigned lower actuarial values, leaving a greater percentage of the costs to be paid out-of-pocket by the patient.

Allegedly the theory behind these trends is to reduce health care spending by empowering patients to become better health care shoppers, choosing only the care that they believe is worth paying for directly. This concept is so thoroughly entrenched within the health policy and political communities that it has become standard to include policies that ensure that patients feel the pain by having “skin in the game” (repulsive rhetoric that unfortunately has been effective in helping to perpetuate this concept).

Our health care system is very unstable. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will not stabilize health care because 1) it leaves too many uninsured, 2) it creates inadequate low-actuarial value plans as the new standard, leaving too many potentially exposed to medical debt should they need care, and 3) it is the most expensive model of reform, destined to drive total health care costs ever upward.

According to Herbert Stein, if something can’t go on forever, it won’t. So a single payer system or social insurance system very similar to single payer is inevitable. Many nations with such systems provide first dollar coverage, and do so with a much lower level of total health care spending. They have proven that deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance are not only unnecessary to control costs, but they, in themselves, also create financial barriers to health care and add to the already-excessive administrative burden.

So can we assume that once we adopt a single payer system we will be able to remove these financial barriers to care? The answer is an emphatic NO! This is why John Nyman’s work must be reprised and disseminated widely.

THE CONCEPT THAT COSTS MUST BE CONTROLLED BY HIGH DEDUCTIBLES AND OTHER FORMS OF COST SHARING IS SO THOROUGHLY ENTRENCHED IN THE POLICY AND POLITICAL COMMUNITIES THAT THEY WILL INEVITABLY BE INCLUDED IN ANY SINGLE PAYER LEGISLATION THAT STANDS EVEN A REMOTE CHANCE OF CLEARING THE LEGISLATIVE HURDLES. That is, unless we do something about it.

We have a gigantic education task before us. Experts cite the health policy literature for their support of the concept that cost sharing reduces spending. They have greatly overstated the savings and extrapolated it into spending that is not sensitive to consumer price decisions (most health care spending).  More importantly, they have marginalized or even ignored the significant negative impact that this can have on health care access and on personal financial security.

How can we convert the majority of Americans into health policy wonks? It’s going to be tough.

The Effects of Medicaid Coverage — Learning from the Oregon Experiment

By Katherine Baicker, Ph.D., and Amy Finkelstein, Ph.D.
The New England Journal of Medicine, July 20, 2011

Working with a team of researchers, we have taken advantage of an unprecedented opportunity to gauge the effects of Medicaid coverage on low-income, previously uninsured adults, using the gold standard of medical and scientific research: a randomized, controlled trial. In 2008, Oregon used a lottery to allocate a limited number of Medicaid spots for low-income adults (19 to 64 years of age) to people on a waiting list for Medicaid. Those selected by random lottery draw won the opportunity to apply for Medicaid. In total, about 30,000 people were selected from the 90,000 on the waiting list. Approximately 10,000 of those selected ended up being enrolled in Medicaid; not everyone who was selected successfully filled out the required application and met the eligibility criteria.

The lottery provides an opportunity to estimate the causal effects of being allowed to apply for Medicaid (intention to treat). It also allows us to estimate the causal effects of being enrolled in Medicaid relative to being uninsured (the effects of “treatment on the treated,” which we focus on below), under the assumption that selection by the lottery to be able to apply for Medicaid affects the outcomes we studied only through its role in increasing insurance coverage.

We now have evidence of the effects of the first year of Medicaid coverage after the lottery. These results are based on administrative data from hospital discharges, credit reports, and death records, in addition to mail surveys we conducted. We found that Medicaid coverage increases the use of health care.

Responses by Johnathon Ross and Don McCanne, former presidents of Physicians for a National Health Program:

Johnathon Ross MD, MPH
Toledo Ohio, USA
August 25, 2011

This is interesting “experiment” and useful policy data but it reminds me of Tuskegee. What a sad commentary on our country that we question whether access to care is good for patients and that it might cost us something to provide it. We need a national health insurance program that is nondiscriminatory, fairly financed, effective, and efficient. An improved and expanded Medicare for all would be the easiest to implement since the administrative savings would be adequate to cover all the uninsured and improve coverage and financial security for everyone. Instead we will muddle along with the half baked reforms that have been passed and continue to waste hundreds of billions of dollars on the billing and insurance bureaucracy. Cost control will be the natural outcome of setting a national budget for health care. This will lead to better emphasis on those services which are most beneficial and reduce future costs and disability. ACO’s, bundled payments, managed care will never accomplish what a budget will. What are we doing? Caring citizens should protect and empower each other.

and…

Don McCanne MD
San Juan Capistrano California, USA
August 25, 2011

With our current level of knowledge about the favorable impact of insurance coverage, obviously it would have been unethical to design a study in which the control group – the uninsured – was exposed to both the financial hardship and impaired health outcomes of being uninsured. It is ironic that this would represent an intolerable violation in ethics within the health policy community, yet at the same time represents an acceptable standard for politicians.

The Affordable Care Act, as a political document, includes policies that seem to violate fundamental health policy ethics. It was enacted knowing that tens of millions will remain uninsured, under-insurance will become the new standard (60 to 70 percent actuarial values), and that it is the most expensive model of reform, providing little relief from the financial burden placed upon all of us.

Ethical policies and sterile politics could have been melded into a process that would have brought us truly universal coverage, with comprehensive benefits, financial security for everyone, and cost containment through the power of an efficient public monopsony. That, of course, would describe a single payer national health program – an improved and expanded Medicare for all.

Instead, the policy community compromised their ethics by cooperating with politicians who were catering to interests much more powerful than patients. But the greater ethical transgression was committed by the politicians themselves who ruled out in advance of the reform process the single payer model. They knew that if it were seriously considered, the superiority would have been obvious when compared to the fragmented, dysfunctional, inequitable, administratively overburdened, overpriced system that the politicians dumped on us.

We can still go back to the drawing boards and do it right.

http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=14971

Copays Break Law

By Mary K. Reinhart
The Arizona Republic, August 25, 2011

The three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said federal health officials failed to show how the copays, imposed in November after a seven-year court battle, served any purpose besides cutting the state’s Medicaid budget.

Raising copayments for more than 200,000 of Arizona’s poorest residents and making them mandatory, the judges said, helped balance the state budget but didn’t meet that federal standard.

“The administrative record reveals that the purpose of Arizona’s waiver application was to save money,” wrote Judge Richard Paez. “There is little, if any, evidence that the secretary considered the factors (federal law) requires her to consider before granting Arizona’s waiver. Thus, the secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.”

The copays, which range from $4 to $30, were first approved by lawmakers in 2003 and were in place for about four months before a class-action suit was filed and a federal judge put them on hold. That stay was lifted in November by a separate appeals-court panel, which upheld a March 2010 ruling by U.S. District Judge Earl Carroll.

Since November, childless adults covered under the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, the state’s Medicaid program, and those who spend down their savings to become AHCCCS eligible can be turned down for medical care and medications if they can’t afford the copayment.

http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2011/08/25/20110825ahcccs-copays-break-law-ruling.html

These are patients with incomes below the federal poverty level. Requiring a co-payment before access to care is permitted causes many of these individuals to go without medical care. It is appropriate that the Court of Appeals panel ruled that the HHS Secretary was “arbitrary and capricious” in approving the waiver that authorized the imposition of co-payments.

What is the purpose of co-payments? Some say that it is to prevent people from obtaining medical care that they don’t really need. Really? If a person has decided that she should see a physician, and she can afford the co-payment, would that really stop her from obtaining care? Highly unlikely.

Then is the co-payment for the purpose of raising revenues to help fund health care? The administrative hassle of processing co-payments offsets much of the gain that the co-payment revenues would bring.

Yet co-payments for low-income individuals clearly impair access to beneficial health care services. Thus co-payments provide little good and cause real harm.

Deductibles and coinsurance are another matter. For the very wealthy, they have no impact on health care access. But for middle-income individuals they are enough of a financial burden that they do cause patients to forego beneficial health care – obviously an undesirable policy.

How effective are deductibles and coinsurance in raising revenues to pay for health care? About 80 percent of health care is consumed by individuals who are no longer sensitive to the costs because they have already met their cost-sharing requirements. Thus they play a negligible role in funding our total national health expenditures.

The primary role that cost sharing plays in reducing health care spending is to prevent individuals from receiving care that they should have. (The value of reductions in non-essential services that result from cost sharing has been overstated since consultations with reassurance are still very beneficial health care services.)

So how much does foregoing beneficial care really save? Estimates based on the RAND HIE have suggested that the amount saved is about 30 percent. But 30 percent of what? It is 30 percent of the care consumed by healthy workers and their young healthy families, most of whom do not have major health expenses. Once you factor in the entire population, including all major medical disorders, the percentage of care that would be avoided is negligible.

Many other countries that spend far less while covering everyone do not have deductibles, co-payments, nor coinsurance. They have found them to be unnecessary in controlling costs. They are an insignificant revenue source, and they can cause harm, especially in vulnerable groups such as Arizona’s adult Medicaid population, and now in middle-income Americans who must live with the new standard of under-insurance.

It didn’t have to be this way.

By Larry Levitt and Gary Claxton
Kaiser Family Foundation, August 24, 2011

A recent draft regulation issued by the Treasury Department describes who is eligible for premium tax credits to help them afford coverage offered through health insurance exchanges beginning in 2014. The approach that the regulation proposes for measuring the affordability of employer coverage could have significant financial consequences for a modest number of lower- and middle-income families.

Starting in 2014, the health reform law generally requires people to have health insurance and provides tax credits to help them afford it. Those who are offered health insurance through a job, however, are expected to take that coverage and generally are not eligible for premium tax credits. This includes both the worker and any family members who are eligible to enroll in the job-based coverage. There is an exception to this rule, though: if people are offered coverage by an employer that has patient cost-sharing above a certain level or is unaffordable, they are permitted to forgo the employer plan and apply for a tax credit that can be used for coverage in an exchange. Job-based coverage is considered unaffordable if the amount of the out-of-pocket premium for the employer coverage exceeds 9.5% of that person’s income.

While it’s clear how this applies to a single worker without any dependents, determining a family’s eligibility for premium tax credits is far less clear in the law. One way would be to look at what the family would have to pay for coverage based on its size and compare that to its income. A second way, which the Treasury Department has proposed, would judge affordability for the entire family based solely on whether the employee’s contribution for single coverage would exceed 9.5% of family income, regardless how much it would cost the entire family to enroll in job-based coverage. A third hybrid approach is also possible: affordability for the worker could be determined based on the required contribution for single coverage while affordability for the remaining family members would be based on the required contribution for family coverage.

What would this mean for families? We estimated the effect based on coverage in 2008 using demographic and insurance data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and employee premium contribution information from the Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Benefits Survey. The analysis – which assumes no behavior changes by employers in response to the health reform law – suggests that there are about 3.9 million non-working dependents in families (technically, “health insurance units”) in which the worker has access to affordable employer-sponsored coverage but the family does not. Under the draft regulation, these family members would be excluded from getting federal tax credits to help them buy coverage in health insurance exchanges. On average they’d have to pay 14% of their income to opt into the employer coverage, substantially more than what they would pay in an exchange.

In the draft regulation, the Treasury Department indicated that it expects to exempt these family members from the requirement to buy insurance, so they won’t be penalized if they choose to forego coverage. Some of these families would probably still decide to enroll in their employer coverage even though they would have to pay a large percentage of income for it; that would likely be the case even if they were permitted to buy subsidized insurance in an exchange. People value insurance, and they particularly value employer-provided benefits. But, some of these family members would undoubtedly remain uninsured.

http://healthreform.kff.org/notes-on-health-insurance-and-reform/2011/august/measuring-the-affordability-of-employer-health-coverage.aspx

Comment: 

By Don McCanne, MD

Although this policy failure of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was touched on briefly in a recent message, it is elaborated on here because of its great importance to families.

To avoid being assessed a penalty for being uninsured, most employees will be required to obtain their health insurance through their employment. They will not be allowed the option of obtaining coverage through the state insurance exchanges and will have to forego the tax credits available for exchange plans, unless their premium is unaffordable (over 9.5% of income).

But what about their families? The Treasury Department (IRS) has tentatively ruled that ACA prohibits them from using the insurance premium for the family to determine whether it meets the threshold of affordability. Only the individual employee’s premium can be used. Even though the premium for family members may be unaffordable, they are not allowed the option of using tax credits to purchase plans in the exchanges.

What are they to do? The IRS agrees that these family premiums are unaffordable so they are ruling that the family members have a right to remain uninsured without having to pay the penalty required by the individual mandate. Our government in action – protecting the right to remain uninsured!

This is not a Catch 22, but rather a Catch 4,000,000 since it is estimated that close to four million dependents will fall into this trap in which the worker has access to “affordable” employer-sponsored coverage but the family members do not. This will impact most heavily middle-income families since those with low incomes may be eligible for Medicaid, and those with very high incomes will likely be able to afford family coverage.

What happened to the American dream? The dream wherein hard working, middle income families could be assured of shelter, food, education, and health care? It seems that all they can be guaranteed today is the right to participate in a tea party, that is if they bring their own tea.

Measuring the Affordability of Employer Health Coverage

By Larry Levitt and Gary Claxton
Kaiser Family Foundation, August 24, 2011

A recent draft regulation issued by the Treasury Department describes who is eligible for premium tax credits to help them afford coverage offered through health insurance exchanges beginning in 2014. The approach that the regulation proposes for measuring the affordability of employer coverage could have significant financial consequences for a modest number of lower- and middle-income families.

Starting in 2014, the health reform law generally requires people to have health insurance and provides tax credits to help them afford it. Those who are offered health insurance through a job, however, are expected to take that coverage and generally are not eligible for premium tax credits. This includes both the worker and any family members who are eligible to enroll in the job-based coverage. There is an exception to this rule, though: if people are offered coverage by an employer that has patient cost-sharing above a certain level or is unaffordable, they are permitted to forgo the employer plan and apply for a tax credit that can be used for coverage in an exchange. Job-based coverage is considered unaffordable if the amount of the out-of-pocket premium for the employer coverage exceeds 9.5% of that person’s income.

While it’s clear how this applies to a single worker without any dependents, determining a family’s eligibility for premium tax credits is far less clear in the law. One way would be to look at what the family would have to pay for coverage based on its size and compare that to its income. A second way, which the Treasury Department has proposed, would judge affordability for the entire family based solely on whether the employee’s contribution for single coverage would exceed 9.5% of family income, regardless how much it would cost the entire family to enroll in job-based coverage. A third hybrid approach is also possible: affordability for the worker could be determined based on the required contribution for single coverage while affordability for the remaining family members would be based on the required contribution for family coverage.

What would this mean for families? We estimated the effect based on coverage in 2008 using demographic and insurance data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and employee premium contribution information from the Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Benefits Survey. The analysis – which assumes no behavior changes by employers in response to the health reform law – suggests that there are about 3.9 million non-working dependents in families (technically, “health insurance units”) in which the worker has access to affordable employer-sponsored coverage but the family does not. Under the draft regulation, these family members would be excluded from getting federal tax credits to help them buy coverage in health insurance exchanges. On average they’d have to pay 14% of their income to opt into the employer coverage, substantially more than what they would pay in an exchange.

In the draft regulation, the Treasury Department indicated that it expects to exempt these family members from the requirement to buy insurance, so they won’t be penalized if they choose to forego coverage. Some of these families would probably still decide to enroll in their employer coverage even though they would have to pay a large percentage of income for it; that would likely be the case even if they were permitted to buy subsidized insurance in an exchange. People value insurance, and they particularly value employer-provided benefits. But, some of these family members would undoubtedly remain uninsured.

http://healthreform.kff.org/notes-on-health-insurance-and-reform/2011/august/measuring-the-affordability-of-employer-health-coverage.aspx

Although this policy failure of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was touched on briefly in a recent message, it is elaborated on here because of its great importance to families.

To avoid being assessed a penalty for being uninsured, most employees will be required to obtain their health insurance through their employment. They will not be allowed the option of obtaining coverage through the state insurance exchanges and will have to forego the tax credits available for exchange plans, unless their premium is unaffordable (over 9.5% of income).

But what about their families? The Treasury Department (IRS) has tentatively ruled that ACA prohibits them from using the insurance premium for the family to determine whether it meets the threshold of affordability. Only the individual employee’s premium can be used. Even though the premium for family members may be unaffordable, they are not allowed the option of using tax credits to purchase plans in the exchanges.

What are they to do? The IRS agrees that these family premiums are unaffordable so they are ruling that the family members have a right to remain uninsured without having to pay the penalty required by the individual mandate. Our government in action – protecting the right to remain uninsured!

This is not a Catch 22, but rather a Catch 4,000,000 since it is estimated that close to four million dependents will fall into this trap in which the worker has access to “affordable” employer-sponsored coverage but the family members do not. This will impact most heavily middle-income families since those with low incomes may be eligible for Medicaid, and those with very high incomes will likely be able to afford family coverage.

What happened to the American dream? The dream wherein hard working, middle income families could be assured of shelter, food, education, and health care? It seems that all they can be guaranteed today is the right to participate in a tea party, that is if they bring their own tea.

By Michelle M. Doty, Sara R. Collins, Ruth Robertson, and Tracy Garber
The Commonwealth Fund, August 2011

Chronically high unemployment has left millions of Americans without health insurance, which disappeared along with their wages and other job benefits. Although continuing health coverage through COBRA is an option for some workers, the often prohibitively high cost means that relatively few elect to purchase it. When fully implemented in 2014, the Affordable Care Act will dramatically increase health insurance options for people who lose their jobs. Even so, gaps in coverage will remain a risk for many workers who become unemployed or are transitioning to a new job. To help bridge coverage gaps until 2014, policymakers should consider reestablishing the COBRA premium subsidies that helped millions of people who lost their jobs in 2008–2010.

http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Aug/1540_Doty_when_unemployed_means_uninsured_COBRA_reform%20brief.pdf

And…

Maintaining Coverage, Affordability, and Shared Responsibility When Income and Employment Change

By Pamela Farley Short, Katherine Swartz, Namrata Uberoi, and Deborah Graefe
The Commonwealth Fund, May 2011

The Affordable Care Act builds on existing sources of public and private health insurance, while creating new health insurance exchanges and subsidies. A potential disadvantage of preserving many sources of health insurance is the likelihood of abrupt changes in coverage or financial responsibility when individual circumstances change. This brief describes four policy challenges related to such changes: adjusting premium and cost-sharing subsidies when incomes change; coordinating eligibility for premium credits, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program; encouraging and facilitating continuous coverage; and minimizing transitions between individual and small-business exchanges. Policy recommendations to reduce uncertainty, simplify coverage decisions, and minimize insurance transitions include extending coverage to the open enrollment period at the end of the year, generous treatment of income gains in correcting premium tax credits, and unifying the small-business and individual exchanges.

http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/May/1503_Short_maintaining_coverage_affordability_reform_brief.pdf

Comment: 

By Don McCanne, MD

How many individuals continue in the same employment for their entire careers, with the same employer-sponsored health plan, with the same network of health care providers, with the same…? Well, we can stop there. Nobody does.

Generally, individuals in well-paid occupations in high demand who change their employment may face some transitional issues with health plans and provider networks, but usually they fare quite well, even if annoyed at the prospect of perhaps having to change their primary health care professionals, or whatever.

But what about low and moderate income individuals? Job instability is the norm. Income levels can fluctuate considerably. Periods of prolonged unemployment are now more common, and, based on economic projections, will likely persist into the foreseeable future.

The Affordable Care Act has so many slippery variables that it is almost impossible to predict what one’s coverage will be beyond a couple of years, if that. Eligibility can change sometimes on a monthly basis (exchange plans) or yearly basis (Medicaid) for various programs including employer-sponsored plans, Medicaid, CHIP, state exchange plans, or state Basic Health Plans. Eligibility for tax credits for premiums in the exchange plans and for cost sharing reductions can be very unstable because of fluctuations in income. Even waiver of the penalty for failure to purchase private insurance can trigger in or out quite abruptly.

The newest Commonwealth Fund report addresses specifically the problem of coverage during intervals of unemployment. COBRA plans allow newly unemployed workers to continue with coverage under their former employer-sponsored plans but with the out-of-work former employees having to pay the full premiums. COBRA plans have had an unacceptably low participation simply because a person out of work cannot pay the premiums.

To address the problem of unaffordable COBRA premiums that became even more prevalent during the Great Recession, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) authorized premium subsidies for the purchase of COBRA plans, but that program has expired.

To provide coverage during transitions of unemployment in the future, the authors of this report suggest that the subsidies be permanently resuscitated. The problem with this approach is, even with these temporary subsidies, the COBRA take-up rate was still well less than half of eligible former employees. Policies that don’t work shouldn’t take precedence over policies that do.

You can apply all of the patches that you can devise to the leaking ship of the Affordable Care Act, but it is still going to leak. As more patches are applied, it is further weighted down with greater expenses and with even more administrative burdens – enough to sink any ship.

You want something that floats? Try enrolling everyone at birth, permanently. The solid ship of Medicare for All would have no leaks to patch.