GAO
January 2012

We found that diagnostic coding differences exist between MA plans and Medicare FFS and that these differences had a substantial effect on payment to MA plans. We estimated that risk score growth due to coding differences over the previous 3 years was equivalent to $3.9 billion to $5.8 billion in payments to MA plans in 2010 before CMS’s adjustment for coding differences. Before CMS reduced 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores, we found that these scores were at least 4.8 percent, and perhaps as much as 7.1 percent, higher than the risk scores likely would have been as a result of diagnostic coding differences, that is, if the same beneficiaries had been continuously enrolled in FFS. Our estimates suggest that, after accounting for CMS’s 3.4 percent reduction to MA risk scores in 2010, MA risk scores were too high by at least 1.4 percent, and perhaps as much as 3.7 percent, equivalent to $1.2 billion and $3.1 billion in payments to MA plans.

http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/112/gao_macodesfinal.pdf

Comment: 

By Don McCanne, MD

One of the greatest abuses of the private insurance industry is taking advantage of favorable selection. Through deceptive practices such as selective marketing, they enroll healthier individuals while receiving higher premiums appropriate for a less healthy population.

To correct for this, payment is modified through risk adjustment (RA) – reducing payments for healthier populations and increasing payments for less healthy populations. If health care spending is to be equitable, risk adjustment is mandatory in a multi-payer system such as that of the Affordable Care Act.

We now have considerable experience with risk adjustment between the private Medicare Advantage plans and the public fee-for-service Medicare program. The experience is not good. As Medicare has refined the risk adjustment tools, the private Medicare Advantage plans have found new ways to game the system which have resulted in even greater overpayments for their patients who are healthier than the data submitted by the insurers would indicate.

This GAO report recommends that Medicare needs to increase its data collection and revise its application of risk adjustment in an attempt to recover some of the overpayments that would be made in the future. However, the experience to date indicates that the private insurers will use the greater complexity to further game the system to their own advantage.

PNHP co-founders Steffie Woolhandler and David Himmelstein state it well in this comment on risk adjustment:

“RA (risk adjustment) folks have been making this claim for decades; great improvement is just around the corner. To us, the most interesting part of the 2004 enhancement of Medicare Advantage RA is not that plans beat it, but that the gaming was actually much more lucrative AFTER the enhancement than before. Static analyses of RA schemes can virtually always come up with schemes that explain far more of the variance than existing schemes – ie. they’re better. But once incentives are based on a particular RA scheme, the gaming is on. There is absolutely no evidence that RA works or can work in the dynamic reality of profit-seeking health care insurers/providers.”

Private insurers operate on market principles. They will always place business interests first. They chase the money.

A universal public insurance program operates in the interests of patients. Gaming risk adjustment is a totally foreign concept to administrators of a single payer system.

Why would we ever want to have private plans involved at all? Dump them and we’ll get rid of the problems of adverse selection and favorable selection. Keep them and they’ll always game the system. They win, and we lose.

Medicare Advantage: CMS Should Improve the Accuracy of Risk Score Adjustments for Diagnostic Coding Practices

GAO
January 2012
We found that diagnostic coding differences exist between MA plans and Medicare FFS and that these differences had a substantial effect on payment to MA plans. We estimated that risk score growth due to coding differences over the previous 3 years was equivalent to $3.9 billion to $5.8 billion in payments to MA plans in 2010 before CMS’s adjustment for coding differences. Before CMS reduced 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores, we found that these scores were at least 4.8 percent, and perhaps as much as 7.1 percent, higher than the risk scores likely would have been as a result of diagnostic coding differences, that is, if the same beneficiaries had been continuously enrolled in FFS. Our estimates suggest that, after accounting for CMS’s 3.4 percent reduction to MA risk scores in 2010, MA risk scores were too high by at least 1.4 percent, and perhaps as much as 3.7 percent, equivalent to $1.2 billion and $3.1 billion in payments to MA plans.
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/112/gao_macodesfinal.pdf

One of the greatest abuses of the private insurance industry is taking advantage of favorable selection. Through deceptive practices such as selective marketing, they enroll healthier individuals while receiving higher premiums appropriate for a less healthy population.
To correct for this, payment is modified through risk adjustment (RA) – reducing payments for healthier populations and increasing payments for less healthy populations. If health care spending is to be equitable, risk adjustment is mandatory in a multi-payer system such as that of the Affordable Care Act.
We now have considerable experience with risk adjustment between the private Medicare Advantage plans and the public fee-for-service Medicare program. The experience is not good. As Medicare has refined the risk adjustment tools, the private Medicare Advantage plans have found new ways to game the system which have resulted in even greater overpayments for their patients who are healthier than the data submitted by the insurers would indicate.
This GAO report recommends that Medicare needs to increase its data collection and revise its application of risk adjustment in an attempt to recover some of the overpayments that would be made in the future. However, the experience to date indicates that the private insurers will use the greater complexity to further game the system to their own advantage.
PNHP co-founders Steffie Woolhandler and David Himmelstein state it well in this comment on risk adjustment:
“RA (risk adjustment) folks have been making this claim for decades; great improvement is just around the corner. To us, the most interesting part of the 2004 enhancement of Medicare Advantage RA is not that plans beat it, but that the gaming was actually much more lucrative AFTER the enhancement than before. Static analyses of RA schemes can virtually always come up with schemes that explain far more of the variance than existing schemes – ie. they’re better. But once incentives are based on a particular RA scheme, the gaming is on. There is absolutely no evidence that RA works or can work in the dynamic reality of profit-seeking health care insurers/providers.”
Private insurers operate on market principles. They will always place business interests first. They chase the money.
A universal public insurance program operates in the interests of patients. Gaming risk adjustment is a totally foreign concept to administrators of a single payer system.
Why would we ever want to have private plans involved at all? Dump them and we’ll get rid of the problems of adverse selection and favorable selection. Keep them and they’ll always game the system. They win, and we lose.

By Allyson M Pollock, David Price, Peter Roderick, Tim Treuherz, David McCoy, Martin McKee, Lucy Reynolds
The Lancet, January 26, 2012

(Excerpts)

The National Health Service (NHS) in England has been a leading international model of tax-financed, universal health care. Legal analysis shows that the Health and Social Care Bill currently making its way through the UK Parliament would abolish that model and pave the way for the introduction of a US-style health system by eroding entitlement to equality of health-care provision. The Bill severs the duty of the Secretary of State for Health to secure comprehensive health care throughout England and introduces competitive markets and structures consistent with greater inequality of provision, mixed funding, and widespread provision by private health corporations. The Bill has had a turbulent passage. Unusually, the legislative process was suspended for more than 2 months in 2011 because of the weight of public concern. It was recommitted to Parliament largely unaltered after a “listening exercise”. These and more recent amendments to the Bill do not sufficiently address major concerns that continue to be raised by Peers and a Constitution Committee of the House of Lords, where the Bill now faces one of its last parliamentary hurdles before becoming law.

Fundamental to the Bill are provisions that transform a mandatory system into a discretionary one with structures that permit the introduction of charging for services that are currently free under the NHS, as well as a system in which much delivery would be privatised. Under the current statutory framework the Government has a legal duty to secure comprehensive health care, whereas, under the new system, substantial discretionary powers will instead be extended to commissioners and providers of care. These measures will increase inequalities of provision.

The whole system has been publicly administered and funded on the basis of contiguous geographical areas by bodies, now called primary care trusts (PCTs), that act on behalf of the Secretary of State and have responsibility for the health-care needs of everyone in their area.

The Bill creates two new bodies with responsibility for managing care: an NHS Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), the number of which remain unclear. PCTs will be abolished and not replaced.

Clause 12 of the Health and Social Care Bill repeals the Secretary of State’s “duty to provide” specific services. Instead, a “duty to arrange” provision is imposed on each of the many CCGs that will also have transferred to them the power to determine what care is necessary to meet all reasonable requirements. However, CCGs will not have the duty to promote a comprehensive free health service.

As well as transferring powers from the Secretary of State to other bodies, the Bill leaves each CCG free to choose the patients for whom they have responsibility. Unlike PCTs, CCGs will not be responsible for all residents within contiguous geographical areas. CCGs select patients, initially assembling their patient populations on the basis of general practitioners’ (GPs) lists; they will not have to cover everyone in a geographical area but only “persons for whom it [the CCG] has responsibility”. Nor will they be required to arrange for the provision of all the services that are currently part of the comprehensive health system.

These changes will have substantial legal consequences. First, the duty to provide a national health service throughout England would be lost if the Bill became law. It would be replaced by a duty on an unknown number of CCGs, not GPs, to arrange provision as they see fit for various sections of the population for which they are separately responsible. Second, CCGs would not be bound by the “duty to continue to promote a comprehensive free health service” when exercising their functions. Under present law, according to a judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State “has the duty to continue to promote a comprehensive free health service and he must never, in making a decision [about services provided], disregard that duty”. Third, the Secretary of State’s accountability to Parliament for the provision of services to patients in the new NHS will be diminished.

The Government has not disclosed the radical nature of this reform.

In the USA, opposition to health reforms under both the Clinton and Obama administrations is articulated as erosion of personal freedom by increasing government powers. Conversely, pro-market reforms of universal health systems in Europe are often justified on the grounds that they increase personal freedom by transferring powers from government to non-governmental or commercial bodies and by increasing choice. Citizens’ rights in democracies are underpinned not just by limitations on government powers but also by legal duties imposed on governments, such as those that guarantee citizens access to health care. The Bill would withdraw this legal underpinning. As the Bill enters its final critical stages it is crucial that Peers observe three red lines for the NHS (below) and are fully aware of the key parts of the legislation that would abolish core NHS functions, if they are to safeguard the NHS for future generations.

****

Red lines to protect the NHS

# The Secretary of State must have the duty to secure provision of comprehensive and equitable health care for the whole of the population of England, taking action whenever there are problems.

# CCGs (Clinical Commissioning Groups), operating on behalf of the Secretary of State, must make sure that comprehensive and equitable health care is available for everyone and be responsible for all residents living in single geographically defined areas that are contiguous, without being able to pick and choose patients.

# Nothing must be done that undermines the ability of the Secretary of State to fulfil the duty to secure provision of comprehensive and equitable health care, by bringing more of the NHS within the scope of EU competition law so that, in particular:

* There must be no increase in the commercial contracting of health services;
* The current authorisation system for central regulation of Foundation Trusts must be retained;
* Statutory functions of CCGs must be carried out by NHS staff, with CCG finances being used solely for the benefit of patients;
* Statutory and enforceable codes of conduct must be laid down for all NHS bodies, underpinned by sanctions that are rigorously policed;
* Information about commercial contracting, including the planning, procurement, financing, and monitoring, must be available as a matter of course.

http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)60119-6/fulltext (The Lancet is offering access to this important article for free, but they do require registration.)

Comment:

By Don McCanne, MD

The Conservative government of David Cameron is about to destroy England’s National Health Service, as we know it. While we are struggling in our attempt to ensure health care for everyone (and are still not receiving it under the Affordable Care Act), the British government is severing its responsibility to secure comprehensive health care throughout England.

Health care justice is an international cause. We should partner with our colleagues in England to support their cause in this moment of crisis, as they later partner with us to see that health care justice becomes a reality in the United States… and throughout the world.

How the Health and Social Care Bill 2011 would end entitlement to comprehensive health care in England

By Allyson M Pollock, David Price, Peter Roderick, Tim Treuherz, David McCoy, Martin McKee, Lucy Reynolds
The Lancet, January 26, 2012

(Excerpts)

The National Health Service (NHS) in England has been a leading international model of tax-financed, universal health care. Legal analysis shows that the Health and Social Care Bill currently making its way through the UK Parliament would abolish that model and pave the way for the introduction of a US-style health system by eroding entitlement to equality of health-care provision. The Bill severs the duty of the Secretary of State for Health to secure comprehensive health care throughout England and introduces competitive markets and structures consistent with greater inequality of provision, mixed funding, and widespread provision by private health corporations. The Bill has had a turbulent passage. Unusually, the legislative process was suspended for more than 2 months in 2011 because of the weight of public concern. It was recommitted to Parliament largely unaltered after a “listening exercise”. These and more recent amendments to the Bill do not sufficiently address major concerns that continue to be raised by Peers and a Constitution Committee of the House of Lords, where the Bill now faces one of its last parliamentary hurdles before becoming law.

Fundamental to the Bill are provisions that transform a mandatory system into a discretionary one with structures that permit the introduction of charging for services that are currently free under the NHS, as well as a system in which much delivery would be privatised. Under the current statutory framework the Government has a legal duty to secure comprehensive health care, whereas, under the new system, substantial discretionary powers will instead be extended to commissioners and providers of care. These measures will increase inequalities of provision.

The whole system has been publicly administered and funded on the basis of contiguous geographical areas by bodies, now called primary care trusts (PCTs), that act on behalf of the Secretary of State and have responsibility for the health-care needs of everyone in their area.

The Bill creates two new bodies with responsibility for managing care: an NHS Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), the number of which remain unclear. PCTs will be abolished and not replaced.

Clause 12 of the Health and Social Care Bill repeals the Secretary of State’s “duty to provide” specific services. Instead, a “duty to arrange” provision is imposed on each of the many CCGs that will also have transferred to them the power to determine what care is necessary to meet all reasonable requirements. However, CCGs will not have the duty to promote a comprehensive free health service.

As well as transferring powers from the Secretary of State to other bodies, the Bill leaves each CCG free to choose the patients for whom they have responsibility. Unlike PCTs, CCGs will not be responsible for all residents within contiguous geographical areas. CCGs select patients, initially assembling their patient populations on the basis of general practitioners’ (GPs) lists; they will not have to cover everyone in a geographical area but only “persons for whom it [the CCG] has responsibility”. Nor will they be required to arrange for the provision of all the services that are currently part of the comprehensive health system.

These changes will have substantial legal consequences. First, the duty to provide a national health service throughout England would be lost if the Bill became law. It would be replaced by a duty on an unknown number of CCGs, not GPs, to arrange provision as they see fit for various sections of the population for which they are separately responsible. Second, CCGs would not be bound by the “duty to continue to promote a comprehensive free health service” when exercising their functions. Under present law, according to a judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State “has the duty to continue to promote a comprehensive free health service and he must never, in making a decision [about services provided], disregard that duty”. Third, the Secretary of State’s accountability to Parliament for the provision of services to patients in the new NHS will be diminished.

The Government has not disclosed the radical nature of this reform.

In the USA, opposition to health reforms under both the Clinton and Obama administrations is articulated as erosion of personal freedom by increasing government powers. Conversely, pro-market reforms of universal health systems in Europe are often justified on the grounds that they increase personal freedom by transferring powers from government to non-governmental or commercial bodies and by increasing choice. Citizens’ rights in democracies are underpinned not just by limitations on government powers but also by legal duties imposed on governments, such as those that guarantee citizens access to health care. The Bill would withdraw this legal underpinning. As the Bill enters its final critical stages it is crucial that Peers observe three red lines for the NHS (below) and are fully aware of the key parts of the legislation that would abolish core NHS functions, if they are to safeguard the NHS for future generations.

****

Red lines to protect the NHS

# The Secretary of State must have the duty to secure provision of comprehensive and equitable health care for the whole of the population of England, taking action whenever there are problems.

# CCGs (Clinical Commissioning Groups), operating on behalf of the Secretary of State, must make sure that comprehensive and equitable health care is available for everyone and be responsible for all residents living in single geographically defined areas that are contiguous, without being able to pick and choose patients.

# Nothing must be done that undermines the ability of the Secretary of State to fulfil the duty to secure provision of comprehensive and equitable health care, by bringing more of the NHS within the scope of EU competition law so that, in particular:

* There must be no increase in the commercial contracting of health services;
* The current authorisation system for central regulation of Foundation Trusts must be retained;
* Statutory functions of CCGs must be carried out by NHS staff, with CCG finances being used solely for the benefit of patients;
* Statutory and enforceable codes of conduct must be laid down for all NHS bodies, underpinned by sanctions that are rigorously policed;
* Information about commercial contracting, including the planning, procurement, financing, and monitoring, must be available as a matter of course.

http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)60119-6/fulltext (The Lancet is offering access to this important article for free, but they do require registration.)

Comment:

By Don McCanne, MD

The Conservative government of David Cameron is about to destroy England’s National Health Service, as we know it. While we are struggling in our attempt to ensure health care for everyone (and are still not receiving it under the Affordable Care Act), the British government is severing its responsibility to secure comprehensive health care throughout England.

Health care justice is an international cause. We should partner with our colleagues in England to support their cause in this moment of crisis, as they later partner with us to see that health care justice becomes a reality in the United States… and throughout the world.

How the Health and Social Care Bill 2011 would end entitlement to comprehensive health care in England

By Allyson M Pollock, David Price, Peter Roderick, Tim Treuherz, David McCoy, Martin McKee, Lucy Reynolds
The Lancet, January 26, 2012
(Excerpts)
The National Health Service (NHS) in England has been a leading international model of tax-financed, universal health care. Legal analysis shows that the Health and Social Care Bill currently making its way through the UK Parliament would abolish that model and pave the way for the introduction of a US-style health system by eroding entitlement to equality of health-care provision. The Bill severs the duty of the Secretary of State for Health to secure comprehensive health care throughout England and introduces competitive markets and structures consistent with greater inequality of provision, mixed funding, and widespread provision by private health corporations. The Bill has had a turbulent passage. Unusually, the legislative process was suspended for more than 2 months in 2011 because of the weight of public concern. It was recommitted to Parliament largely unaltered after a “listening exercise”. These and more recent amendments to the Bill do not sufficiently address major concerns that continue to be raised by Peers and a Constitution Committee of the House of Lords, where the Bill now faces one of its last parliamentary hurdles before becoming law.
Fundamental to the Bill are provisions that transform a mandatory system into a discretionary one with structures that permit the introduction of charging for services that are currently free under the NHS, as well as a system in which much delivery would be privatised. Under the current statutory framework the Government has a legal duty to secure comprehensive health care, whereas, under the new system, substantial discretionary powers will instead be extended to commissioners and providers of care. These measures will increase inequalities of provision.
The whole system has been publicly administered and funded on the basis of contiguous geographical areas by bodies, now called primary care trusts (PCTs), that act on behalf of the Secretary of State and have responsibility for the health-care needs of everyone in their area.
The Bill creates two new bodies with responsibility for managing care: an NHS Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), the number of which remain unclear. PCTs will be abolished and not replaced.
Clause 12 of the Health and Social Care Bill repeals the Secretary of State’s “duty to provide” specific services. Instead, a “duty to arrange” provision is imposed on each of the many CCGs that will also have transferred to them the power to determine what care is necessary to meet all reasonable requirements. However, CCGs will not have the duty to promote a comprehensive free health service.
As well as transferring powers from the Secretary of State to other bodies, the Bill leaves each CCG free to choose the patients for whom they have responsibility. Unlike PCTs, CCGs will not be responsible for all residents within contiguous geographical areas. CCGs select patients, initially assembling their patient populations on the basis of general practitioners’ (GPs) lists; they will not have to cover everyone in a geographical area but only “persons for whom it [the CCG] has responsibility”. Nor will they be required to arrange for the provision of all the services that are currently part of the comprehensive health system.
These changes will have substantial legal consequences. First, the duty to provide a national health service throughout England would be lost if the Bill became law. It would be replaced by a duty on an unknown number of CCGs, not GPs, to arrange provision as they see fit for various sections of the population for which they are separately responsible. Second, CCGs would not be bound by the “duty to continue to promote a comprehensive free health service” when exercising their functions. Under present law, according to a judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State “has the duty to continue to promote a comprehensive free health service and he must never, in making a decision [about services provided], disregard that duty”. Third, the Secretary of State’s accountability to Parliament for the provision of services to patients in the new NHS will be diminished.
The Government has not disclosed the radical nature of this reform.
In the USA, opposition to health reforms under both the Clinton and Obama administrations is articulated as erosion of personal freedom by increasing government powers. Conversely, pro-market reforms of universal health systems in Europe are often justified on the grounds that they increase personal freedom by transferring powers from government to non-governmental or commercial bodies and by increasing choice. Citizens’ rights in democracies are underpinned not just by limitations on government powers but also by legal duties imposed on governments, such as those that guarantee citizens access to health care. The Bill would withdraw this legal underpinning. As the Bill enters its final critical stages it is crucial that Peers observe three red lines for the NHS (below) and are fully aware of the key parts of the legislation that would abolish core NHS functions, if they are to safeguard the NHS for future generations.
****
Red lines to protect the NHS
# The Secretary of State must have the duty to secure provision of comprehensive and equitable health care for the whole of the population of England, taking action whenever there are problems.
# CCGs (Clinical Commissioning Groups), operating on behalf of the Secretary of State, must make sure that comprehensive and equitable health care is available for everyone and be responsible for all residents living in single geographically defined areas that are contiguous, without being able to pick and choose patients.
# Nothing must be done that undermines the ability of the Secretary of State to fulfil the duty to secure provision of comprehensive and equitable health care, by bringing more of the NHS within the scope of EU competition law so that, in particular:
* There must be no increase in the commercial contracting of health services;
* The current authorisation system for central regulation of Foundation Trusts must be retained;
* Statutory functions of CCGs must be carried out by NHS staff, with CCG finances being used solely for the benefit of patients;
* Statutory and enforceable codes of conduct must be laid down for all NHS bodies, underpinned by sanctions that are rigorously policed;
* Information about commercial contracting, including the planning, procurement, financing, and monitoring, must be available as a matter of course.
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)60119-6/fulltext (The Lancet is offering access to this important article for free, but they do require registration.)

The Conservative government of David Cameron is about to destroy England’s National Health Service, as we know it. While we are struggling in our attempt to ensure health care for everyone (and are still not receiving it under the Affordable Care Act), the British government is severing its responsibility to secure comprehensive health care throughout England.
Health care justice is an international cause. We should partner with our colleagues in England to support their cause in this moment of crisis, as they later partner with us to see that health care justice becomes a reality in the United States… and throughout the world.

Children’s, Blue Cross deal curbs payments

The Boston Globe
January 24, 2012

Children’s Hospital Boston has agreed to a three-year contract with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts…

Perhaps most important, Children’s and its doctors groups will accept global payments for the first time, meaning they will be given a budget for patients’ care rather than billing for each visit and procedure.

“The contract is completely aligned with our aggressive and comprehensive efforts to take costs out of the system, while also improving quality,” said Children’s president Sandra Fenwick.

Until recently, it was thought unlikely that specialty providers such as Children’s, a 395-bed teaching hospital that is a national leader in pediatric research and training, would join the new global payment plans being offered by insurers.

Fenwick said the deal makes Children’s the first pediatric hospital in the nation to take global payments instead of traditional fee-for-service reimbursements. The contract also covers the Children’s Physicians Organization, made up of 959 specialists, and the Pediatric Physician Organization at Children’s, which includes 279 primary care doctors.

http://articles.boston.com/2012-01-24/business/30655411_1_pediatric-care-health-care-providers-specialty-hospitals

Comment: 

By Don McCanne, MD

Under a well designed single payer system, hospitals would be funded through global budgets, much like police and fire departments, libraries and other civic institutions. Single payer eliminates the need to provide complex, itemized billings for each and every patient to any of hundreds of third party payers. The hospitals are simply paid a global fee that covers all of their costs for the year. As Canada and other nations have shown, global budgeting dramatically reduces the high costs of the administrative excesses that U.S. hospitals face.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts has now negotiated the first contract with a pediatric hospital that they say uses global budgeting. So can we use this as an experiment to prove that global budgeting will work in the United States? Unfortunately, no.

This contract has almost nothing in common with global budgeting under a single payer system. A global budget limited to one insurer does not place the entire hospital under a single global budget. Far from it. They still have to interact with all other payers in our fragmented financing system. Further, the products and services provided to Blue Cross Blue Shield patients must be segregated and itemized separately to know the amount of the budget to be negotiated. The uncertainties on how to allocate various hospital costs also can result in inequities amongst the various payers, likely making Blue Cross Blue Shield a winner while other payers lose.

When we are told later on that we do not want hospitals globally budgeted under a single payer system because it did not work for Children’s Hospital Boston, be prepared to answer that this was not global budgeting. This was merely another individual contract between one hospital with its physicians’ organizations and one insurer, under a fragmented financing system in which it was impossible to achieve the efficiencies of globally budgeting of the hospital’s entire costs.

We can even invent a term based on what this process is. It is “segregated budgeting.” We can make that a pejorative term by demonstrating that it is merely another insurer gimmick in our dysfunctional system of financing health care. Let’s keep the definition of “global” clean, and not let the insurers steal it from us.