Applying Value-Based Insurance Design To High-Cost Health Services

By James C. Robinson
Health Affairs, November 2010

Value-based insurance design programs have focused on reducing consumer cost sharing in health insurance for preventive tests and medications for chronic diseases. But for value-based design principles to have a stronger clinical and economic impact, they should be extended to expensive services and to those for which the evidence is limited or controversial. This paper proposes applying value-based insurance design principles to self-administered and office-administered specialty drugs, implantable medical devices, advanced imaging modalities, and major surgical procedures.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/29/11/2009

And…

Applying Value-Based Insurance Design To Low-Value Health Services

By A. Mark Fendrick, Dean G. Smith and Michael E. Chernew
Health Affairs, November 2010

Value-based insurance design improves health care quality and efficiency by reducing cost sharing for services that have strong evidence of clinical benefit. The same goals can also be accomplished by increasing cost sharing for low-value services, which would ensure more effective care and achieve net cost savings. However, there are challenges in defining what is meant by “low-value services” and implementing programs to restrict such services’ use. This paper argues that investments in processes to define low-value care, comparative effectiveness research to identify services that produce harm or marginal clinical benefit, and information technology to implement findings can facilitate applying value-based insurance design to the low-value realm.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/29/11/2017

And…

Assessing The Evidence For Value-Based Insurance Design

By Niteesh K. Choudhry1, Meredith B. Rosenthal and Arnold Milstein
Health Affairs, November 2010

High copayments for medical services can cause patients to underuse essential therapies. Value-based health insurance design attempts to address this problem by explicitly linking cost sharing and value. Copayments are set at low levels for high-value services. The Mercer National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans demonstrates that value-based insurance design use is increasing and that 81 percent of large employers plan to offer it in the near future. Despite this increase, few studies have adequately evaluated its ability to improve quality and reduce health spending. Maximizing the benefits of value-based insurance design will require mechanisms to target appropriate copayment reductions, offset short-run cost outlays, and expand its use to other health services.

Impact Of Health Care Fragmentation

Payers have the greatest incentive to adopt plans using value-based insurance design when they stand to benefit from reductions in spending on medical care that is averted from the use of highly effective therapies. However, the fragmented nature of the US health care system may reduce the likelihood of this scenario. Payers often carve out certain types of benefits, most notably for prescription drugs. Similarly, pharmacy benefit managers often have little incentive to reduce cost sharing for fully insured people unless such terms are specifically negotiated. In addition, patients frequently switch insurers, such as when they change jobs. Thus, with the exception of very high-risk conditions where improved quality may be achieved quickly, payers face the possibility that they will bear the cost of therapy while other payers reap the savings from averted clinical events.

The implications of insurance “churn” — the switching and dropping out of plans as employment changes — are less relevant in systems with a single payer that provides comprehensive coverage over a longer period of time.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/29/11/1988

Value-based insurance design generally refers to the drafting of insurance benefits in a way that would improve health care value. Under this concept, financial disincentives such as deductibles, copayments and coinsurance should be reduced or eliminated for health care that has been proven to be beneficial, whereas these cost-sharing measures should be increased for “expensive services and those for which the evidence is limited or controversial.” Is this a good idea?

There is already considerable evidence that reducing cost sharing for proven drugs and for preventive services is of benefit for the health of the individual. Patients taking effective maintenance medications are more likely to fill their prescriptions, and patients are more likely to access preventive screening services. However, the evidence that this saves money is quite spotty and weak. Nevertheless, eliminating barriers to beneficial care is desirable, and our health care policies should be designed to encourage such improved access.

What about increasing financial barriers to expensive care, such as specialty drugs, implantable medical devices, advanced imaging modalities, and major surgical procedures? If these expensive services are beneficial, then higher cost sharing explicitly creates rationing based on the ability to pay. Those who can afford the high out-of-pocket expenses receive the care, and those who can’t afford the cost sharing don’t. Those of us who are passionate advocates of health care justice would find this to be totally unacceptable. We would support more equitable policies to address the cost issues.

What about increasing financial barriers to expensive care for which the evidence of benefit is marginal or controversial? Do we want to have a system in which the wealthy can spend whatever they want for try-it-and-see health care, while those of more modest income are not allowed that option? First of all, there is a lot of high-cost care that falls into this marginal category, much of which should probably be made accessible to everyone. So financial barriers would still be inappropriate from a policy perspective.

But what about the care that crosses the threshold of clearly being too expensive while likely of no value or perhaps even detrimental? Should that care still be available, if only for the wealthy? Should we even care? The problem is that the health care delivery infrastructure is a limited resource; it is expensive; and we all pay for it. Diverting our health care resources, at the whim of the wealthy and those who would profit from them, places stresses on our capacity that can have undesirable consequences such as unnecessarily expanding queues.

Value-based insurance design is a bad idea for three reasons: 1) we should not have financial barriers to beneficial health care services; 2) we should not use financial barriers that establish two-tiered or multi-tiered systems which favor the wealthy while neglecting our workforce; and 3) we shouldn’t continue with the creation of administratively burdensome policies made necessary merely because our Congressional leaders value our private insurers more than they value patients.

One statement pulled out of this special issue of Health Affairs carries a very pregnant message that the authors likely didn’t intend:

“The implications of insurance ‘churn’ — the switching and dropping out of plans as employment changes — are less relevant in systems with a single payer that provides comprehensive coverage over a longer period of time.”

By John Hsu, et al
Health Affairs
October 28, 2010

Abstract

Since 2006 numerous insurers have stopped serving the low-income segment of the Medicare Part D program, forcing millions of beneficiaries to change prescription drug plans. Using data from participating plans, we found that Medicare payments do not sufficiently reimburse insurers for the relatively high medication use among this population, creating perverse incentives for plans to avoid this part of the Part D market. Plans can accomplish this by increasing their premiums for all beneficiaries to an amount above regional benchmarks. We demonstrate that improving the accuracy of Medicare’s risk and subsidy adjustments could mitigate these perverse incentives.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.2009.0323v1

Comment: 

By Don McCanne, MD

Under the Medicare Part D program for prescription drugs, private insurers are paid more for lower-income subsidized patients with greater health care needs. Since the insurers find that the higher payments are still below what they find to be acceptable, they are setting their premiums at rates above the benchmark levels. This results in an automated transfer of these higher-cost beneficiaries to competitors’ programs.

As long as Congress continues to insist on using private plans for Medicare Part D, we will always see efforts by the insurers to enroll healthier patients while avoiding the sick – gaming by private insurers sometimes referred to as cherry picking and lemon dropping. (Of course, this is also true of private insurers throughout the individual, small group, and large group markets.)

The authors of this study recommend yet more administrative complexity by introducing additional modifications of the calculations in an effort to reduce these perverse incentives, but such changes certainly would not prevent the insurers from seeking other forms of gamesmanship. They owe it to their investors to game the system as much as possible.

How is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act addressing this problem? It isn’t. We could have had reform that would increase efficiency and equity while eliminating the private insurers, but Congress rejected that. It’s still not too late to change.

Fixing Flaws In Medicare Drug Coverage That Prompt Insurers To Avoid Low-Income Patients

By John Hsu, et al
Health Affairs
October 28, 2010

Abstract

Since 2006 numerous insurers have stopped serving the low-income segment of the Medicare Part D program, forcing millions of beneficiaries to change prescription drug plans. Using data from participating plans, we found that Medicare payments do not sufficiently reimburse insurers for the relatively high medication use among this population, creating perverse incentives for plans to avoid this part of the Part D market. Plans can accomplish this by increasing their premiums for all beneficiaries to an amount above regional benchmarks. We demonstrate that improving the accuracy of Medicare’s risk and subsidy adjustments could mitigate these perverse incentives.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.2009.0323v1

Under the Medicare Part D program for prescription drugs, private insurers are paid more for lower-income subsidized patients with greater health care needs. Since the insurers find that the higher payments are still below what they find to be acceptable, they are setting their premiums at rates above the benchmark levels. This results in an automated transfer of these higher-cost beneficiaries to competitors’ programs.

As long as Congress continues to insist on using private plans for Medicare Part D, we will always see efforts by the insurers to enroll healthier patients while avoiding the sick – gaming by private insurers sometimes referred to as cherry picking and lemon dropping. (Of course, this is also true of private insurers throughout the individual, small group, and large group markets.)

The authors of this study recommend yet more administrative complexity by introducing additional modifications of the calculations in an effort to reduce these perverse incentives, but such changes certainly would not prevent the insurers from seeking other forms of gamesmanship. They owe it to their investors to game the system as much as possible.

How is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act addressing this problem? It isn’t. We could have had reform that would increase efficiency and equity while eliminating the private insurers, but Congress rejected that. It’s still not too late to change.

Profiling California’s Health Plan Enrollees: Large Enrollment in High-Deductible Health Plans

By Dylan H. Roby, Gina L. Nicholson, and Gerald F. Kominski
UCLA Center for Health Policy Research
October 2010

Three million commercially insured Californians were enrolled in high-deductible health plans in 2007. High-deductible health plans (HDHPs) have been gaining momentum in the health insurance market as a way to encourage more rational use of health care services. However, HDHPs come with risks.  While the plans offer lower monthly premiums than typical health insurance coverage, they carry much higher deductibles for health care services. For these plans, the average annual deductible for individuals with employer-based insurance is more than $1,800. Studies have shown that significant cost sharing may create disincentives for both necessary and unnecessary care. While individuals with high-deductible plans may be less likely to utilize the emergency room for care, they may also delay necessary treatment or doctor visits.

Another mechanism for improving the affordability of health insurance is the Health Savings Account (HSA), which allows individuals with high-deductible health plans to set aside tax-deductible funds for medical expenses. However, only 23% of commercial HMO and 20% of commercial Kaiser HMO enrollees with HDHPs reported having HSAs as well. Thirty-one percent of commercial PPO enrollees reported having a Health Savings Account in addition to their HDHP.

With the recent passage of health reform, individuals and families will be mandated to have health insurance beginning in 2014. To comply with the mandate and attempt to save money, consumers may purchase plans with lower premiums. However, they could still face high deductibles and cost-sharing requirements, which would harm their ability to access health care.

http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/health-plans-fact-sheet_102110.pdf

Full UCLA report (35 pages):
http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/hmo-enrollee-report_102710.pdf

This large study from the UCLA Center for Health Policy Research provides yet one more confirmation that the use of high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) continues to expand because of the very high cost of private health insurance, yet these high-deductible plans are causing patients to delay or decline necessary health care.

The supporters of HDHPs claim that health consumers can be protected by health savings accounts. Yet this study confirms that two-thirds to four-fifths of Californians with HDHPs do not have health saving accounts. They remain exposed to the full brunt of the deductible.

These findings are particularly applicable to the insurance exchanges which will be established in 2014. The subsidies to purchase plans within the exchanges will be targeted to the bronze and silver plans. These are plans with lower actuarial values – paying a lower percentage of the health care costs – but they will be the plans that most individuals will have to select because the more generous gold and platinum plans will be unaffordable.

How do the bronze and silver plans maintain a lower actuarial value? Primarily by requiring large deductibles. (Also they may apply greater coinsurance rates – a percentage of the health care costs for which the patient is responsible – and they may strip benefits down to the minimum permitted by government regulations.) Thus high-deductible health plans that reduce access to care will become the norm.

We can do better than that. We can improve Medicare by providing first-dollar coverage – eliminating deductibles and coinsurance – and expanding benefits to include all essential services, and then make it universal so everyone is covered. The near nominal cost of first-dollar coverage is well worth having the assurance that financial barriers to all necessary health care would be removed for everyone.

Shared Savings Program – New Section 1899 of Title XVIII

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
Office of Legislation

Preliminary Questions & Answers

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) improves the health care delivery system through incentives to enhance quality, improve beneficiary outcomes and increase value of care. One of these key delivery system reforms is the encouragement of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). ACOs facilitate coordination and cooperation among providers to improve the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries and reduce unnecessary costs. This document provides an overview of ACOs and the Medicare Shared Savings Program.

Q: What is an “accountable care organization”?

A: An Accountable Care Organization, also called an “ACO” for short, is an organization of health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service program who are assigned to it.

For ACO purposes, “assigned” means those beneficiaries for whom the professionals in the ACO provide the bulk of primary care services. Assignment will be invisible to the beneficiary, and will not affect their guaranteed benefits or choice of doctor. A beneficiary may continue to seek services from the physicians and other providers of their choice, whether or not the physician or provider is a part of an ACO.

Q: What forms of organizations may become an ACO?

A: The statute specifies the following:
1) Physicians and other professionals in group practices
2) Physicians and other professionals in networks of practices
3) Partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and physicians/professionals
4) Hospitals employing physicians/professionals
5) Other forms that the Secretary of Health and Human Services may determine appropriate.

Q: What are the types of requirements that such an organization will have to meet to participate?

A: The statute specifies the following:
1) Have a formal legal structure to receive and distribute shared savings
2) Have a sufficient number of primary care professionals for the number of assigned beneficiaries (to be 5,000 at a minimum)
3) Agree to participate in the program for not less than a 3-year period
4) Have sufficient information regarding participating ACO health care professionals as the Secretary determines necessary to support beneficiary assignment and for the determination of payments for shared savings.
5) Have a leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative systems
6) Have defined processes to (a) promote evidenced-based medicine, (b) report the necessary data to evaluate quality and cost measures (this could incorporate requirements of other programs, such as the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI), Electronic Prescribing (eRx), and Electronic Health Records (EHR), and (c) coordinate care
7) Demonstrate it meets patient-centeredness criteria, as determined by the Secretary.

Additional details will be included in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that CMS expects to publish this fall.

Q: How would such an organization qualify for shared savings?

A: For each 12-month period, participating ACOs that meet specified quality performance standards will be eligible to receive a share (a percentage, and any limits to be determined by the Secretary) of any savings if the actual per capita expenditures of their assigned Medicare beneficiaries are a sufficient percentage below their specified benchmark amount. The benchmark for each ACO will be based on the most recent available three years of per-beneficiary expenditures for Parts A and B services for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the ACO. The benchmark for each ACO will be adjusted for beneficiary characteristics and other factors determined appropriate by the Secretary, and updated by the projected absolute amount of growth in national per capita expenditures for Part A and B.

Q: What are the quality performance standards?

A: While the specifics will be determined by the HHS Secretary and will be promulgated with the program’s regulations, they will include measures in such categories as clinical processes and outcomes of care, patient experience, and utilization (amounts and rates) of services.

Q: Will beneficiaries that receive services from a health care professional or provider that is a part of an ACO be required to receive all his/her services from the ACO?

A: No. Medicare beneficiaries will continue to be able to choose their health care professionals and other providers.

Q: Will participating ACOs be subject to payment penalties if their savings targets are not achieved?

A: No. An ACO will share in savings if program criteria are met but will not incur a payment penalty if savings targets are not achieved.

Q: When will this program begin?

A: We plan to establish the program by January 1, 2012. Agreements will begin for performance periods, to be at least three years, on or after that date.

Further details for the shared savings program will be provided in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which CMS expects to publish this fall.

https://www.cms.gov/OfficeofLegislation/Downloads/AccountableCareOrganization.pdf

Link to text of Sec. 1899 (under Sec. 3022) with a brief summary (plus text and summary of Sec. 2706 – Pediatric ACO Demonstration Project):
http://www.iha.org/pdfs_documents/home/IHA_PPACAACOSummary.pdf

Comment: 

By Don McCanne, MD

Since enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) there has been considerable enthusiasm and hype over the provisions establishing accountable care organizations (ACOs). The purpose of today’s message is to look past the hype to see precisely what PPACA says about ACOs.

Today’s quote is the explanation of the applicable section of PPACA as provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). A link to the precise language of the section is also provided.

Sec. 3022 Of PPACA amends Title XVIII of the Social Security Act by adding Sec. 1899, the Shared Savings Program. The title alone provides a hint of what this really is about since it is not named Accountable Care Organizations.

Many entities already exist that can be called accountable care organizations. These include group practices, networks of individual practices, partnerships or joint ventures between hospitals and health care professionals, and hospitals employing health care professionals. Under PPACA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) can include as ACOs any other group of providers and suppliers deemed appropriate.

What the law does is to add another administrative layer that is designed to reduce costs and promote quality. The existing entities plus any new ones formed have to meet certain requirements to qualify as an ACO, and then that allows them to participate in the shared savings program.

The specific requirements:

* Willing to become accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of
the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to it

* A legal structure to receive and distribute shared savings

* A leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative systems

* A minimum participation of 5000 patients

* A sufficient number of primary care professionals

* Agree to participate for a minimum of three years

* Define processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care, such as through the use of telehealth, remote patient monitoring, and other such enabling technologies

* Demonstrate patient-centerness criteria specified by the Secretary

* Measure quality of clinical processes and outcomes, patient experience of care, and utilization

This program applies to patients in the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program. Patients do not enroll in the ACOs. They are assigned by the Secretary based on utilization of primary care services. The patients may not even know that they have been assigned, as they are free to go to any providers of their choice, in or out of the ACO.

The ACOs are still paid fee-for-service by Medicare just as they always have been. That doesn’t change (though an amendment authorizes the option of a partial capitation model).

So how do ACOs achieve higher quality and lower cost?

The ACOs are not rewarded monetarily for meeting the quality standards. Their motivation to comply is to avoid being suspended from the program.

Costs are reduced by the shared savings program. A benchmark is established for each ACO “using the most recent available 3 years of per-beneficiary expenditures for parts A and B services for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the ACO.” If the ACO can provide care for costs below the benchmark, the ACO then shares those savings with HHS. The benchmark is reset at the beginning of each 3 year agreement.

If the costs are above the benchmark, then the fees are still paid as usual, with no adjustments.

Think about this. The incentives continue to promote greater volume. There is no penalty for running the charges up. Is the reward for reducing the volume and intensity of services enough? Since fixed costs for the ACO are relatively unchanged, the reductions in marginal overhead expenses due to reduced volume must be greater than the amount of savings that HHS shares with the ACO in order to come out ahead. Since this is the opposite of “making it up in volume,” it is more likely that net income will be reduced. Further, since the benchmarks are reset every 3 years based on lower utilization, it is very unlikely that that the ACO could continue to ratchet down services to qualify for shared savings.

Some models of integrated health systems function well and should be encouraged as long as the goal is higher quality and greater value, while shunning policies that provide perverse incentives for greater profits by reducing beneficial health care services. But why would a well-functioning integrated health care system want to add an additional administrative layer, with additional quality-reporting requirements, just to be designated as an ACO, especially when the net result likely reduces the bottom line?

It is truly unfortunate that the fervor and hype over ACOs have provided yet one more distraction from the important task at hand. We need to replace our flawed health care financing system with one that works – a single payer national health program. That would include everyone of us in a quality system that we could pay for.

Medicare “Accountable Care Organizations”

Shared Savings Program – New Section 1899 of Title XVIII

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
Office of Legislation

Preliminary Questions & Answers

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) improves the health care delivery system through incentives to enhance quality, improve beneficiary outcomes and increase value of care. One of these key delivery system reforms is the encouragement of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). ACOs facilitate coordination and cooperation among providers to improve the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries and reduce unnecessary costs. This document provides an overview of ACOs and the Medicare Shared Savings Program.

Q: What is an “accountable care organization”?

A: An Accountable Care Organization, also called an “ACO” for short, is an organization of health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service program who are assigned to it.

For ACO purposes, “assigned” means those beneficiaries for whom the professionals in the ACO provide the bulk of primary care services. Assignment will be invisible to the beneficiary, and will not affect their guaranteed benefits or choice of doctor. A beneficiary may continue to seek services from the physicians and other providers of their choice, whether or not the physician or provider is a part of an ACO.

Q: What forms of organizations may become an ACO?

A: The statute specifies the following:
1) Physicians and other professionals in group practices
2) Physicians and other professionals in networks of practices
3) Partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and physicians/professionals
4) Hospitals employing physicians/professionals
5) Other forms that the Secretary of Health and Human Services may determine appropriate.

Q: What are the types of requirements that such an organization will have to meet to participate?

A: The statute specifies the following:
1) Have a formal legal structure to receive and distribute shared savings
2) Have a sufficient number of primary care professionals for the number of assigned beneficiaries (to be 5,000 at a minimum)
3) Agree to participate in the program for not less than a 3-year period
4) Have sufficient information regarding participating ACO health care professionals as the Secretary determines necessary to support beneficiary assignment and for the determination of payments for shared savings.
5) Have a leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative systems
6) Have defined processes to (a) promote evidenced-based medicine, (b) report the necessary data to evaluate quality and cost measures (this could incorporate requirements of other programs, such as the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI), Electronic Prescribing (eRx), and Electronic Health Records (EHR), and (c) coordinate care
7) Demonstrate it meets patient-centeredness criteria, as determined by the Secretary.

Additional details will be included in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that CMS expects to publish this fall.

Q: How would such an organization qualify for shared savings?

A: For each 12-month period, participating ACOs that meet specified quality performance standards will be eligible to receive a share (a percentage, and any limits to be determined by the Secretary) of any savings if the actual per capita expenditures of their assigned Medicare beneficiaries are a sufficient percentage below their specified benchmark amount. The benchmark for each ACO will be based on the most recent available three years of per-beneficiary expenditures for Parts A and B services for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the ACO. The benchmark for each ACO will be adjusted for beneficiary characteristics and other factors determined appropriate by the Secretary, and updated by the projected absolute amount of growth in national per capita expenditures for Part A and B.

Q: What are the quality performance standards?

A: While the specifics will be determined by the HHS Secretary and will be promulgated with the program’s regulations, they will include measures in such categories as clinical processes and outcomes of care, patient experience, and utilization (amounts and rates) of services.

Q: Will beneficiaries that receive services from a health care professional or provider that is a part of an ACO be required to receive all his/her services from the ACO?

A: No. Medicare beneficiaries will continue to be able to choose their health care professionals and other providers.

Q: Will participating ACOs be subject to payment penalties if their savings targets are not achieved?

A: No. An ACO will share in savings if program criteria are met but will not incur a payment penalty if savings targets are not achieved.

Q: When will this program begin?

A: We plan to establish the program by January 1, 2012. Agreements will begin for performance periods, to be at least three years, on or after that date.

Further details for the shared savings program will be provided in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which CMS expects to publish this fall.

https://www.cms.gov/OfficeofLegislation/Downloads/AccountableCareOrganization.pdf

Link to text of Sec. 1899 (under Sec. 3022) with a brief summary (plus text and summary of Sec. 2706 – Pediatric ACO Demonstration Project):
http://www.iha.org/pdfs_documents/home/IHA_PPACAACOSummary.pdf

Since enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) there has been considerable enthusiasm and hype over the provisions establishing accountable care organizations (ACOs). The purpose of today’s message is to look past the hype to see precisely what PPACA says about ACOs.

Today’s quote is the explanation of the applicable section of PPACA as provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). A link to the precise language of the section is also provided.

Sec. 3022 Of PPACA amends Title XVIII of the Social Security Act by adding Sec. 1899, the Shared Savings Program. The title alone provides a hint of what this really is about since it is not named Accountable Care Organizations.

Many entities already exist that can be called accountable care organizations. These include group practices, networks of individual practices, partnerships or joint ventures between hospitals and health care professionals, and hospitals employing health care professionals. Under PPACA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) can include as ACOs any other group of providers and suppliers deemed appropriate.

What the law does is to add another administrative layer that is designed to reduce costs and promote quality. The existing entities plus any new ones formed have to meet certain requirements to qualify as an ACO, and then that allows them to participate in the shared savings program.

The specific requirements:

* Willing to become accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to it

* A legal structure to receive and distribute shared savings

* A leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative systems

* A minimum participation of 5000 patients

* A sufficient number of primary care professionals

* Agree to participate for a minimum of three years

* Define processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care, such as through the use of telehealth, remote patient monitoring, and other such enabling technologies

* Demonstrate patient-centerness criteria specified by the Secretary

* Measure quality of clinical processes and outcomes, patient experience of care, and utilization

This program applies to patients in the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program. Patients do not enroll in the ACOs. They are assigned by the Secretary based on utilization of primary care services. The patients may not even know that they have been assigned, as they are free to go to any providers of their choice, in or out of the ACO.

The ACOs are still paid fee-for-service by Medicare just as they always have been. That doesn’t change (though an amendment authorizes the option of a partial capitation model).

So how do ACOs achieve higher quality and lower cost?

The ACOs are not rewarded monetarily for meeting the quality standards. Their motivation to comply is to avoid being suspended from the program.

Costs are reduced by the shared savings program. A benchmark is established for each ACO “using the most recent available 3 years of per-beneficiary expenditures for parts A and B services for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the ACO.” If the ACO can provide care for costs below the benchmark, the ACO then shares those savings with HHS. The benchmark is reset at the beginning of each 3 year agreement.

If the costs are above the benchmark, then the fees are still paid as usual, with no adjustments.

Think about this. The incentives continue to promote greater volume. There is no penalty for running the charges up. Is the reward for reducing the volume and intensity of services enough? Since fixed costs for the ACO are relatively unchanged, the reductions in marginal overhead expenses due to reduced volume must be greater than the amount of savings that HHS shares with the ACO in order to come out ahead. Since this is the opposite of “making it up in volume,” it is more likely that net income will be reduced. Further, since the benchmarks are reset every 3 years based on lower utilization, it is very unlikely that that the ACO could continue to ratchet down services to qualify for shared savings.

Some models of integrated health systems function well and should be encouraged as long as the goal is higher quality and greater value, while shunning policies that provide perverse incentives for greater profits by reducing beneficial health care services. But why would a well-functioning integrated health care system want to add an additional administrative layer, with additional quality-reporting requirements, just to be designated as an ACO, especially when the net result likely reduces the bottom line?

It is truly unfortunate that the fervor and hype over ACOs have provided yet one more distraction from the important task at hand. We need to replace our flawed health care financing system with one that works – a single payer national health program. That would include everyone of us in a quality system that we could pay for.

A Roadmap for America’s Future, Version 2.0

A plan to solve America’s long-term economic and fiscal crisis

By Representative Paul D. Ryan, Ranking Member, Committee on the Budget
January 2010

A Medicare Program for the 21st Century.

The entire methodology of the program must be converted away from a program that shelters providers and consumers from prices – and is therefore inefficient in restraining rising costs – into one in which beneficiaries choose the most affordable coverage that best suits their needs.

For future Medicare beneficiaries who are now under 55 or younger, the proposal creates a standard Medicare payment to be used for the purchase of private health coverage. The payment will be made directly to the health plan designated by the beneficiary (similar to the administration of the refundable health care tax credit), with the beneficiary receiving any leftover amount as a payment from the health plan, or assuming financial responsibility for any difference in the payment and the total cost of the premium.

Each Medicare beneficiary becomes eligible for the payment by enrolling in a health insurance plan. Medicare will publish an annual list of plans that are “Medicare certified.” Medicare enrollees are able to use their payment to pay for one of the Medicare certified plans, or any other plan, such as those offered by former employers or available from the private market.

For affected beneficiaries, the payment replaces all components of the current Medicare Program (Medicare fee-for-service, Medicare Part B, Medicare Advantage, and Medicare Part D). Payment amounts are income-related and risk-adjusted.

For individuals now younger than 55 only, the proposal adapts Medicare’s eligibility age to reflect Americans’ improving lifespans, raising in gradually, and in modest steps, from the current 65 to 69 years and 6 months.

The proposal would establish a mechanism that would be activated if the Medicare trustees determined that the percentage of funding from general revenues exceeded 45 percent in the prior fiscal year. …the mechanism would apply an automatic 1-percent reduction in payments for services provided in Medicare’s fee-for-service sector.

http://www.roadmap.republicans.budget.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Roadmap2Final2.pdf

And…

Statement to the Commission on Deficit Reduction

By James K. Galbraith, Lloyd M. Bentsen, jr. Chair in Governnment/Business Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin
June 30, 2010

You are plainly not equipped by disposition or resources to take on the true cause of deficits now and in the future: the financial crisis. Recommendations based on CBO’s unrealistic budget and economic outlooks are destined to collapse in failure. Specifically, if cuts are proposed and enacted in Social Security and Medicare, they will hurt millions, weaken the economy, and the deficits will not decline. It’s a lose-lose proposition, with no gainers except a few predatory funds, insurance companies and such who would profit, for some time, from a chaotic private marketplace.

http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/meetings/public-forum/additional/James_Galbraith.pdf

Comment:

By Don McCanne, MD

If the Republicans regain control of the House of Representatives in the election next week, as some experts predict, Rep. Paul Ryan will likely become Chairman of the Committee on the Budget. This will coincide with the release of the report from the Commission on Deficit Reduction – a report that many fear will recommend changes that would make significant cuts in the Medicare program. Clearly, Medicare is under threat.

Rep. Ryan is being touted as a brilliant wonder boy who has crafted a budget proposal, “A Roadmap for America’s Future,” that would return the government to solvency. Not only is the fundamental premise incorrect, he has introduced no new concepts, but rather a rehash of old proposals to privatize programs which the government is better suited to deliver.

His proposal for Medicare is to eliminate the government program as a defined benefit and substitute vouchers for private health plans as a defined contribution that shifts more risks to Medicare beneficiaries. He would also postpone eligibility until age 69 and a half (even he choked on 70).

He claims that the problem is that Medicare “shelters consumers from prices,” but that isn’t true. Medicare has deductibles and coinsurance that can result in considerable out-of-pocket expenses. It is the private sector plans – Medigap, retirement plans, Medicare Advantage plans – that tend to reduce the out-of-pocket spending. Most Medicare beneficiaries have such coverage, especially the Medigap plans.

Rep. Ryan is not calling for more sensitivity to health care prices; he is calling for more sensitivity to insurance premiums. By holding down the government contribution, most Medicare beneficiaries will be forced to buy plans with fewer benefits because that is all that they can afford. What a cruel and inhumane approach to financing health care. As Prof. James Galbraith says, cuts in Medicare “will hurt millions.”

Almost everyone recognizes that Medicare benefits are insufficient, and that is why so many purchase Medigap plans. But are Medigap plans a reasonable approach to expand coverage? They provide one of the worst values in private insurance coverage. They are terribly overpriced considering the benefits provided. It would be far better and overall less expensive to roll over the Medigap and Part D drug benefits into the traditional Medicare program, and then eliminate Medigap, Part D, and the Medicare Advantage plans.

We need to change the national dialogue. The current discussion is about pulling back on Medicare – the wrong discussion. We need to get the word out about what a rip-off the private sector plans are. We need to get rid of them by improving Medicare and making them unnecessary. Once we’ve done that then we need to get the word out about how our improved Medicare would be a better program for everyone.