NBER Working Paper 22440
Demand Heterogeneity in Insurance Markets: Implications for Equity and Efficiency

By Michael Geruso
National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2016

Abstract

In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination on consumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. By themselves, such restrictions are known to exacerbate adverse selection problems. But the conventional wisdom — widely reflected in policy — is that with regulatory tools like premium subsidies, it is possible to address selection and induce efficient plan choices without price-discriminating. In this paper, I show why this conventional wisdom is wrong: As long as different sets of consumers (men and women, rich and poor, young and old) differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the losses they generate, then price discrimination across such groups is welfare-improving. The conventional wisdom is wrong because it implicitly assumes a one-to-one mapping from insurable risk to insurance valuation. I show that demand heterogeneity that breaks this one-to-one relationship is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices in order to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a previously unexplored, but fundamental, tradeoff between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets.

http://www.nber.org/papers/w22440

Individuals vary in their preference for insurance and willingness to pay for it. Michael Geruso explains that insurance pricing that takes preference into consideration is welfare-improving and thus efficient. Yet efforts to improve equity by compensating for price discrimination result in a tradeoff between equity and efficiency. Do we care?

What the majority of us want is a health care system that is accessible to all and funded equitably based on ability to pay. Using the analogy of the tradeoff between equity and efficiency, a system funded by progressive taxes would be highly equitable but might be terribly inefficient because wealthier individuals might not have a preference to pay higher taxes.

The efficiency that we actually want to see is greater value in our health care purchasing through eliminating much of the administrative waste that occurs in our dysfunctional financing system. The economist’s construct of efficiency as representing a measure of individual preference should be a negligible consideration when we have the ability to create a health care financing system that is equitable – fair – for everyone regardless of ideological preference.

Exploring Single-Payer Alternatives for Health Care Reform

By Jodi L. Liu
Pardee RAND Graduate School Dissertation, May 2016

Abstract

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has reduced the number of uninsured and established new cost containment initiatives. However, interest in more comprehensive health care reform such as a single-payer system has persisted. Definitions of single-payer systems are heterogeneous, and estimates of the effects on spending vary. The objectives of this dissertation were to understand single-payer proposals and to estimate health care spending under single-payer alternatives in the United States.

Single-payer proposals are wide-ranging reform efforts spanning financing and delivery, but vary in the provisions. I modeled two sets of national scenarios – one labeled comprehensive and the other catastrophic – and compared insurance coverage and spending relative to the ACA in 2017. First, I estimated the effects of utilization and financing changes, and then I added the effects of “other savings and costs” relating to administration, drug and provider prices, and implementation.

Due to coverage of all legal residents and low cost sharing and prior to adjusting for other savings and costs, the comprehensive scenario increased national health care expenditures by $435 billion and federal expenditures by $1 trillion relative to the ACA. The range of the net effect of the other savings and costs in the literature was $1.5 trillion in savings to $140 billion in costs, with a mean estimate of $556 billion in savings. If this mean estimate was applied to the comprehensive scenario, national expenditures would be $121 billion lower but federal expenditures would still be $446 billion higher relative to the ACA. The catastrophic scenario also covered all legal residents but increased overall cost sharing, resulting in a reduction in national expenditures by $211 billion and federal expenditures by $40 billion even before adjusting for other savings and costs. Average household spending on health care in both sets of scenarios could be more progressive by income than spending under the ACA.

I also developed an interactive, web-based cost tool that allows the savings and cost assumptions to be adjusted by any user. As the debate on how to finance health care for all Americans continues, this study provides increased transparency about economic evaluations of health care reform.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD375.html

Full Dissertation (Free download – 157 pages):
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD300/RGSD375/RAND_RGSD375.pdf

***

Comment:

By Don McCanne, M.D.

For her doctorate dissertation at Pardee RAND Graduate School, Jodi Liu has produced a superb paper on single payer reform. Single payer supporters will want to download this paper, and I’ll explain why.

There remains some confusion as to the precise definition of single payer, and she shows us why by presenting the variations in twenty-five specific proposals, including, of course, the Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance – the 2003 version by Woolhandler, Himmelstein, et.al. Since PNHP supports a relatively precise, comprehensive model of single payer, many of the models she discusses we would not label as single payer, though we can see why others would (Vermont H 202 as an example). Because of this variation in design, it is difficult to state precisely what impact a generic single payer program would have. Each one is different.

She selects two sharply contrasting versions for specific analyses of health care spending: a comprehensive single payer proposal, the American Health Security Act (S 1782) of Sen Bernie Sanders and Rep Jim McDermott, and the Health-Insurance Solution, a “single payer” plan of catastrophic health insurance as proposed by Kip Hagopian and Dana Goldman. Although you can learn much on how not to design a single payer system from her analysis of the Hagopian/Goldman model, here we’ll mention only her findings on the Sanders/McDermott model since it is fairly similar to the PNHP proposal.

She first determines the increased spending that would occur by covering everyone with comprehensive benefits (actuarial value 98 percent). She then determines the effect of other savings and costs that are supported by published policy studies, such as the reduction in administrative waste and the greater value obtained through monopsonistic health care purchasing.

It will come as no surprise that her estimate of the mean net savings in national health expenditures would be about $121 billion under this proposal. The federal portion of spending would be about $446 billion higher than under ACA, but that is actually desirable because the proposed federal taxes would be more equitable that the fragmented funding system we have under ACA. She points out that the mean estimate of savings resulting from the other savings and costs according to the policy literature would be about $550 billion, but the range of the estimate would be between a savings of $1.5 trillion to increased costs of $114 billion. The wide variation in the interpretation of the policy literature explains to some extent the reason why various analysts have come up with very different results when analyzing single payer models.

People frequently ask what it would cost them if we had a single payer system, and they want to compare that to their current insurance premium. There are far too many variables to answer that without having a final markup of single payer legislation, plus most people do not realize how much they are paying for health care besides their insurance premiums and cost sharing, especially considering that over 60 percent of health care spending is paid through our tax system.

But people can get a good idea of average percent in personal savings by checking Figure C.2 in the Appendix of this paper. It shows that both the comprehensive base proposal (Sanders/McDermott) and the comprehensive alternative proposal (John Conyers HR 676) would provide significant savings for everyone except those over 1000 percent of the federal poverty level ($253,000 for a family of four).

Another great feature of this study is that the author has created an interactive Cost Tool which is “to improve the transparency of the estimates by disaggregating the effects and allow users to view, in real time, the results of adjusting the assumptions underlying the effects.” Although there still may be differences in opinions about the impact given to the various adjustments, it does bring us closer to understanding the overall financial impact of single payer reform. Although the Tool is not yet up on the Internet, in a personal communication Jodi Liu says that she hopes to have it available soon.

At any rate, this study shows once again that a well designed, comprehensive single payer system really would provide health care for everyone without increasing health care spending over the current level under ACA, based on the mean estimate of the financial impact of single payer.

So, again, download this paper now. It will be very helpful in your future advocacy for single payer.

Exploring Single-Payer Alternatives for Health Care Reform

By Jodi L. Liu
Pardee RAND Graduate School Dissertation, May 2016

Abstract

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has reduced the number of uninsured and established new cost containment initiatives. However, interest in more comprehensive health care reform such as a single-payer system has persisted. Definitions of single-payer systems are heterogeneous, and estimates of the effects on spending vary. The objectives of this dissertation were to understand single-payer proposals and to estimate health care spending under single-payer alternatives in the United States.

Single-payer proposals are wide-ranging reform efforts spanning financing and delivery, but vary in the provisions. I modeled two sets of national scenarios – one labeled comprehensive and the other catastrophic – and compared insurance coverage and spending relative to the ACA in 2017. First, I estimated the effects of utilization and financing changes, and then I added the effects of “other savings and costs” relating to administration, drug and provider prices, and implementation.

Due to coverage of all legal residents and low cost sharing and prior to adjusting for other savings and costs, the comprehensive scenario increased national health care expenditures by $435 billion and federal expenditures by $1 trillion relative to the ACA. The range of the net effect of the other savings and costs in the literature was $1.5 trillion in savings to $140 billion in costs, with a mean estimate of $556 billion in savings. If this mean estimate was applied to the comprehensive scenario, national expenditures would be $121 billion lower but federal expenditures would still be $446 billion higher relative to the ACA. The catastrophic scenario also covered all legal residents but increased overall cost sharing, resulting in a reduction in national expenditures by $211 billion and federal expenditures by $40 billion even before adjusting for other savings and costs. Average household spending on health care in both sets of scenarios could be more progressive by income than spending under the ACA.

I also developed an interactive, web-based cost tool that allows the savings and cost assumptions to be adjusted by any user. As the debate on how to finance health care for all Americans continues, this study provides increased transparency about economic evaluations of health care reform.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD375.html

Full Dissertation (Free download – 157 pages):
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD300/RGSD375/RAND_RGSD375.pdf

For her doctorate dissertation at Pardee RAND Graduate School, Jodi Liu has produced a superb paper on single payer reform. Single payer supporters will want to download this paper, and I’ll explain why.

There remains some confusion as to the precise definition of single payer, and she shows us why by presenting the variations in twenty-five specific proposals, including, of course, the Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance – the 2003 version by Woolhandler, Himmelstein, et.al. Since PNHP supports a relatively precise, comprehensive model of single payer, many of the models she discusses we would not label as single payer, though we can see why others would (Vermont H 202 as an example). Because of this variation in design, it is difficult to state precisely what impact a generic single payer program would have. Each one is different.

She selects two sharply contrasting versions for specific analyses of health care spending: a comprehensive single payer proposal, the American Health Security Act (S 1782) of Sen Bernie Sanders and Rep Jim McDermott, and the Health-Insurance Solution, a “single payer” plan of catastrophic health insurance as proposed by Kip Hagopian and Dana Goldman. Although you can learn much on how not to design a single payer system from her analysis of the Hagopian/Goldman model, here we’ll mention only her findings on the Sanders/McDermott model since it is fairly similar to the PNHP proposal.

She first determines the increased spending that would occur by covering everyone with comprehensive benefits (actuarial value 98 percent). She then determines the effect of other savings and costs that are supported by published policy studies, such as the reduction in administrative waste and the greater value obtained through monopsonistic health care purchasing.

It will come as no surprise that her estimate of the mean net savings in national health expenditures would be about $121 billion under this proposal. The federal portion of spending would be about $446 billion higher than under ACA, but that is actually desirable because the proposed federal taxes would be more equitable that the fragmented funding system we have under ACA. She points out that the mean estimate of savings resulting from the other savings and costs according to the policy literature would be about $550 billion, but the range of the estimate would be between a savings of $1.5 trillion to increased costs of $114 billion. The wide variation in the interpretation of the policy literature explains to some extent the reason why various analysts have come up with very different results when analyzing single payer models.

People frequently ask what it would cost them if we had a single payer system, and they want to compare that to their current insurance premium. There are far too many variables to answer that without having a final markup of single payer legislation, plus most people do not realize how much they are paying for health care besides their insurance premiums and cost sharing, especially considering that over 60 percent of health care spending is paid through our tax system.

But people can get a good idea of average percent in personal savings by checking Figure C.2 in the Appendix of this paper. It shows that both the comprehensive base proposal (Sanders/McDermott) and the comprehensive alternative proposal (John Conyers HR 676) would provide significant savings for everyone except those over 1000 percent of the federal poverty level ($253,000 for a family of four).

Another great feature of this study is that the author has created an interactive Cost Tool which is “to improve the transparency of the estimates by disaggregating the effects and allow users to view, in real time, the results of adjusting the assumptions underlying the effects.” Although there still may be differences in opinions about the impact given to the various adjustments, it does bring us closer to understanding the overall financial impact of single payer reform. Although the Tool is not yet up on the Internet, in a personal communication Jodi Liu says that she hopes to have it available soon.

At any rate, this study shows once again that a well designed, comprehensive single payer system really would provide health care for everyone without increasing health care spending over the current level under ACA, based on the mean estimate of the financial impact of single payer.

So, again, download this paper now. It will be very helpful in your future advocacy for single payer.

Some Seniors Surprised To Be Automatically Enrolled In Medicare Advantage Plans

By Susan Jaffe
Kaiser Health News, July 27, 2016

Only days after Judy Hanttula came home from the hospital after surgery last November, her doctor’s office called with bad news: Records showed that instead of traditional Medicare, she had a private Medicare Advantage plan, and her doctor and hospital were not in its network.

Neither the plan nor Medicare now would cover her medical costs. She owed $16,622.

After more than five hours making phone calls, she learned that because she’d had individual coverage through Blue Cross Blue Shield when she became eligible for Medicare, the company automatically signed her up for its own Medicare Advantage plan after notifying her in a letter. Hanttula said she ignored all mail from insurers because she had chosen traditional Medicare.

With Medicare’s specific approval, a health insurance company can enroll a member of its marketplace or other commercial plan into its Medicare Advantage coverage when that individual becomes eligible for Medicare. Called “seamless conversion,” the process requires the insurer to send a letter explaining the new coverage, which takes effect unless the member opts out within 60 days.

Medicare officials refused recently to name the companies that have sought or received such approval or even to say how long the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has allowed the practice. Numerous insurers, including Cigna, Anthem and other Blue Cross Blue Shield subsidiaries, also declined to discuss whether they are automatically enrolling beneficiaries as they turn 65.

(David Lipschutz, a senior attorney at the Center for Medicare Advocacy) said giving beneficiaries the chance to opt out doesn’t adequately safeguard consumers. An insurer’s notification letter can easily be mistaken or overlooked in the deluge of marketing materials seniors receive.

“The right to opt out doesn’t exist if they didn’t get the notice or if they did get the notice but didn’t understand it,” he said.

http://khn.org/news/some-seniors-surprised-to-be-automatically-enrolled-in-medicare-advantage-plans/

***

Comment:

By Don McCanne, M.D.

We have provided numerous examples wherein CMS has provided the private Medicare Advantage plans with an unfair advantage over the traditional Medicare program, at a considerable cost to taxpayers. This is yet one more example. In a secretive process, CMS is allowing private insurers to automatically enroll their current clients in their Medicare Advantage plans without requiring them to opt in. Patients must understand what is happening and then take specific action to opt out if they would prefer to be enrolled in the traditional Medicare program.

The is one more step towards privatization of Medicare and the transition to a premium support program (voucher equivalent, with declining purchasing value over time). This is supported by anti-government conservatives and many neoliberals, but, worse, it is with the complicity of CMS.

Once we have a dominant market of competing private Medicare plans, the egalitarian nature of the Medicare program will have been irreparably damaged, and with it our hopes for an improved Medicare for all will have been dashed. The more complex the privatization of Medicare becomes, the greater the resistance to single payer since it “will not be feasible” to dismantle the administratively complex, expensive private health care financing system. So why is it now feasible for us to dismantle our efficient and less costly public Medicare program?

The feasibility argument of the privatizers is a con job. The longer we wait to move to single payer, the worse will be the transition.

Some Seniors Surprised To Be Automatically Enrolled In Medicare Advantage Plans

By Susan Jaffe
Kaiser Health News, July 27, 2016

Only days after Judy Hanttula came home from the hospital after surgery last November, her doctor’s office called with bad news: Records showed that instead of traditional Medicare, she had a private Medicare Advantage plan, and her doctor and hospital were not in its network.

Neither the plan nor Medicare now would cover her medical costs. She owed $16,622.

After more than five hours making phone calls, she learned that because she’d had individual coverage through Blue Cross Blue Shield when she became eligible for Medicare, the company automatically signed her up for its own Medicare Advantage plan after notifying her in a letter. Hanttula said she ignored all mail from insurers because she had chosen traditional Medicare.

With Medicare’s specific approval, a health insurance company can enroll a member of its marketplace or other commercial plan into its Medicare Advantage coverage when that individual becomes eligible for Medicare. Called “seamless conversion,” the process requires the insurer to send a letter explaining the new coverage, which takes effect unless the member opts out within 60 days.

Medicare officials refused recently to name the companies that have sought or received such approval or even to say how long the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has allowed the practice. Numerous insurers, including Cigna, Anthem and other Blue Cross Blue Shield subsidiaries, also declined to discuss whether they are automatically enrolling beneficiaries as they turn 65.

(David Lipschutz, a senior attorney at the Center for Medicare Advocacy) said giving beneficiaries the chance to opt out doesn’t adequately safeguard consumers. An insurer’s notification letter can easily be mistaken or overlooked in the deluge of marketing materials seniors receive.

“The right to opt out doesn’t exist if they didn’t get the notice or if they did get the notice but didn’t understand it,” he said.

http://khn.org/news/some-seniors-surprised-to-be-automatically-enrolled-in-medicare-advantage-plans/

We have provided numerous examples wherein CMS has provided the private Medicare Advantage plans with an unfair advantage over the traditional Medicare program, at a considerable cost to taxpayers. This is yet one more example. In a secretive process, CMS is allowing private insurers to automatically enroll their current clients in their Medicare Advantage plans without requiring them to opt in. Patients must understand what is happening and then take specific action to opt out if they would prefer to be enrolled in the traditional Medicare program.

The is one more step towards privatization of Medicare and the transition to a premium support program (voucher equivalent, with declining purchasing value over time). This is supported by anti-government conservatives and many neoliberals, but, worse, it is with the complicity of CMS.

Once we have a dominant market of competing private Medicare plans, the egalitarian nature of the Medicare program will have been irreparably damaged, and with it our hopes for an improved Medicare for all will have been dashed. The more complex the privatization of Medicare becomes, the greater the resistance to single payer since it “will not be feasible” to dismantle the administratively complex, expensive private health care financing system. So why is it now feasible for us to dismantle our efficient and less costly public Medicare program?

The feasibility argument of the privatizers is a con job. The longer we wait to move to single payer, the worse will be the transition.

Saving Money on Cardiac Care

By Peter R. Orszag
Bloomberg View, July 25, 2016

The federal government’s own actuaries are once again pessimistic that America’s health-care costs will continue their slow growth. Thankfully, their boss, Sylvia Burwell, the secretary of Health and Human Services, is working hard to prove them wrong.

A key driver of this Medicare spending deceleration has been the health-care market’s expectation that the payment system is shifting toward value-based payments — that is, paying doctors, hospitals and other providers based on how well they treat medical problems rather than on how many services they provide.

At this point, it’s crucial to fulfill the market’s expectations. If the system now fails to move quickly away from fee-for-service payments, many recent efficiency efforts are likely to be dropped.

A big question is how. The most promising, and practical, path forward is to set up a cascading array of “bundled payments” — that is, all-inclusive reimbursement for specific episodes of care.

The bundled payments must be mandatory, as is Medicare’s bundle for hip and knee surgery — itself an historic step. Making the shift voluntary for hospitals and doctors leads to watered-down incentives, in an attempt to encourage participation. And weak incentives lead to disappointing outcomes.

Which brings us to Secretary Burwell’s important announcement Monday. She is building on the hip and knee bundle, not only by expanding into other forms of orthopedics but, importantly, by introducing mandatory bundles in cardiac care.

Medicare will pay a set fee for coronary artery bypass grafts, a form of surgery that improves blood flow to the heart. The agency will also pay a set fee for the care involved in responding to a heart attack.

The Medicare actuaries may question whether these new bundles can save much money, but that’s not too surprising; they’ve been missing the boat on the changing dynamic in health-care payments for years.

The bundled payments illustrate how the system is changing for the good. Secretary Burwell has just made it vividly clear to everyone in health care that the days of paying for volume are ending.

http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-25/saving-money-on-cardiac-care-ir2iwfit

***

Medicare doubles down on bundled payments

By Dan Diamond
Politico Pulse, July 26, 2016

With all eyes on the Democratic convention, CMS on Monday made a key move to secure the party’s signature health reform: It introduced its second bundled mandatory payment program, this one focused on cardiac care.

The bundled payment program is the latest big initiative in the Obamacare effort to bend the health cost curve. It’s also positioned to play a crucial role as the White House tries to tie 50 percent of Medicare payments to alternative care models by 2018. Liberal experts say they can’t get there with accountable care organizations and voluntary models alone, and that mandatory bundled payment programs are proven successes.

The decision to make both mandatory programs eligible as Advanced APMs under MACRA is intended to entice physicians to participate.

For veterans of the White House fight over Obamacare, Monday’s news felt like a valedictory. “Finally,” said Zeke Emanuel, who served as a White House aide and pushed for mandatory bundled payments to be included in the Affordable Care Act. (Cost controls like bundled payments were left out, in part, to minimize the law’s effect on the health care industry.) “I’m glad they drank my Kool-Aid.”

http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/politico-pulse#ixzz4FXIuha3F

***

Comment:

By Don McCanne, M.D.

The bureaucrats are fixated on the meme that we can reduce spending by paying for the value of health care rather than the volume. They have been disappointed with models such as accountable care organizations, and they are now turning to MACRA and its alternative payment models (APMs), with a renewed surge of interest in bundled payments.

The concept behind bundled payments is that, by assigning a single fee to a given intervention such as a joint replacement, you will motivate physicians to not spend money on portions of the care that are not really necessary. Medicare, as the payer, gets the advantage of a discounted price, and the physicians and hospitals get to keep whatever they save beyond the discount.

Does this really reduce volume? The joint replacement will be done regardless, so what volume will be reduced? Doing only a cursory pre-op exam, missing the ejection murmur and omitting the pre-op cardiac consult? Send a patient home earlier when it is possible that the post-op status might not be fully stabilized? Cut back on rehabilitation, risking a less favorable long term outcome? These might reduce volume, but they certain bring into question quality and thus value.

Now they want to pay a set bundled payment for a heart attack. The clinical course of a heart attack is highly variable and could involve only a few or a great many interventions. Under a bundled payment, the physicians and hospital are bearing the risk of the high costs of a potentially complicated, protracted course. Isn’t it the role of the insurer, in this case Medicare, to pool risk? Shifting that risk to the health care delivery system creates the potential for either a reduction in important beneficial health care services, or exposing the delivery system to potential monetary losses and the risk of insolvency – neither of which are desirable.

Perhaps an even more important issue is the fallacy that you can bundle most care and thus make strides in bending the cost curve. Think of the  current proposals to bundle coronary artery bypass grafts and to bundle care for a heart attack – one might work some of the time, but the other has outcomes that are too variable. Now think of other hospital admissions – such as workup of a protracted fever, diagnosis and management of an HIV positive patient who has symptoms of a potentially serious but undiagnosed complication, or perhaps a child with fatigue and weight loss. The costs and outcomes are highly variable. How can you bundle those? Or think of the multitude of patients presenting in a ten minute office visit with a set of complex clinical symptoms that would require extensive workups. How do you bundle those?

To get to the goal of fifty percent of Medicare payments being tied to APMs, you are going to have to figure how how to bundle the large numbers of common clinical presentations, like the sore throat that turns out to be due to acute leukemia, or the routine family planning visit in a patient who feels ill that day and turns out to have diabetic ketoacidosis, or the chronic headache patient who has a focal motor seizure in front of you during the visit. What would otherwise be routine medical visits are often not bundable but are better handled on a fee-for-service basis. That makes the point that most health care is provided in a relatively fixed volume. It is really difficult to reduce the volume for patients who actually need care, and that’s almost all patients. Besides, in most instances we really don’t know how to measure value and convert that into a fixed fee. Volume is relatively fixed, and value is what we all strive for anyway.

Peter Orzag and Ezekiel Emanuel don’t listen to others, not even the Medicare actuaries, but they should be able to figure out these obvious fundamentals. Since they haven’t, maybe it’s them who have been drinking Zeke’s Kool-Aid.

Since it’s really cost that they are concerned about we should move forward with reform that has been proven repeatedly to slow the rate of health care inflation – a single payer national health program. Peter and Zeke need to abandon their false meme that single payer is “not feasible.” What isn’t feasible is expecting to fix our dysfunctional health care financing system with “bundled payments.”

Saving Money on Cardiac Care

By Peter R. Orszag
Bloomberg View, July 25, 2016

The federal government’s own actuaries are once again pessimistic that America’s health-care costs will continue their slow growth. Thankfully, their boss, Sylvia Burwell, the secretary of Health and Human Services, is working hard to prove them wrong.

A key driver of this Medicare spending deceleration has been the health-care market’s expectation that the payment system is shifting toward value-based payments — that is, paying doctors, hospitals and other providers based on how well they treat medical problems rather than on how many services they provide.

At this point, it’s crucial to fulfill the market’s expectations. If the system now fails to move quickly away from fee-for-service payments, many recent efficiency efforts are likely to be dropped.

A big question is how. The most promising, and practical, path forward is to set up a cascading array of “bundled payments” — that is, all-inclusive reimbursement for specific episodes of care.

The bundled payments must be mandatory, as is Medicare’s bundle for hip and knee surgery — itself an historic step. Making the shift voluntary for hospitals and doctors leads to watered-down incentives, in an attempt to encourage participation. And weak incentives lead to disappointing outcomes.

Which brings us to Secretary Burwell’s important announcement Monday. She is building on the hip and knee bundle, not only by expanding into other forms of orthopedics but, importantly, by introducing mandatory bundles in cardiac care.

Medicare will pay a set fee for coronary artery bypass grafts, a form of surgery that improves blood flow to the heart. The agency will also pay a set fee for the care involved in responding to a heart attack.

The Medicare actuaries may question whether these new bundles can save much money, but that’s not too surprising; they’ve been missing the boat on the changing dynamic in health-care payments for years.

The bundled payments illustrate how the system is changing for the good. Secretary Burwell has just made it vividly clear to everyone in health care that the days of paying for volume are ending.

http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-25/saving-money-on-cardiac-care-ir2iwfit

***

Medicare doubles down on bundled payments

By Dan Diamond
Politico Pulse, July 26, 2016

With all eyes on the Democratic convention, CMS on Monday made a key move to secure the party’s signature health reform: It introduced its second bundled mandatory payment program, this one focused on cardiac care.

The bundled payment program is the latest big initiative in the Obamacare effort to bend the health cost curve. It’s also positioned to play a crucial role as the White House tries to tie 50 percent of Medicare payments to alternative care models by 2018. Liberal experts say they can’t get there with accountable care organizations and voluntary models alone, and that mandatory bundled payment programs are proven successes.

The decision to make both mandatory programs eligible as Advanced APMs under MACRA is intended to entice physicians to participate.

For veterans of the White House fight over Obamacare, Monday’s news felt like a valedictory. “Finally,” said Zeke Emanuel, who served as a White House aide and pushed for mandatory bundled payments to be included in the Affordable Care Act. (Cost controls like bundled payments were left out, in part, to minimize the law’s effect on the health care industry.) “I’m glad they drank my Kool-Aid.”

http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/politico-pulse#ixzz4FXIuha3F

The bureaucrats are fixated on the meme that we can reduce spending by paying for the value of health care rather than the volume. They have been disappointed with models such as accountable care organizations, and they are now turning to MACRA and its alternative payment models (APMs), with a renewed surge of interest in bundled payments.

The concept behind bundled payments is that, by assigning a single fee to a given intervention such as a joint replacement, you will motivate physicians to not spend money on portions of the care that are not really necessary. Medicare, as the payer, gets the advantage of a discounted price, and the physicians and hospitals get to keep whatever they save beyond the discount.

Does this really reduce volume? The joint replacement will be done regardless, so what volume will be reduced? Doing only a cursory pre-op exam, missing the ejection murmur and omitting the pre-op cardiac consult? Send a patient home earlier when it is possible that the post-op status might not be fully stabilized? Cut back on rehabilitation, risking a less favorable long term outcome? These might reduce volume, but they certain bring into question quality and thus value.

Now they want to pay a set bundled payment for a heart attack. The clinical course of a heart attack is highly variable and could involve only a few or a great many interventions. Under a bundled payment, the physicians and hospital are bearing the risk of the high costs of a potentially complicated, protracted course. Isn’t it the role of the insurer, in this case Medicare, to pool risk? Shifting that risk to the health care delivery system creates the potential for either a reduction in important beneficial health care services, or exposing the delivery system to potential monetary losses and the risk of insolvency – neither of which are desirable.

Perhaps an even more important issue is the fallacy that you can bundle most care and thus make strides in bending the cost curve. Think of the  current proposals to bundle coronary artery bypass grafts and to bundle care for a heart attack – one might work some of the time, but the other has outcomes that are too variable. Now think of other hospital admissions – such as workup of a protracted fever, diagnosis and management of an HIV positive patient who has symptoms of a potentially serious but undiagnosed complication, or perhaps a child with fatigue and weight loss. The costs and outcomes are highly variable. How can you bundle those? Or think of the multitude of patients presenting in a ten minute office visit with a set of complex clinical symptoms that would require extensive workups. How do you bundle those?

To get to the goal of fifty percent of Medicare payments being tied to APMs, you are going to have to figure how how to bundle the large numbers of common clinical presentations, like the sore throat that turns out to be due to acute leukemia, or the routine family planning visit in a patient who feels ill that day and turns out to have diabetic ketoacidosis, or the chronic headache patient who has a focal motor seizure in front of you during the visit. What would otherwise be routine medical visits are often not bundable but are better handled on a fee-for-service basis. That makes the point that most health care is provided in a relatively fixed volume. It is really difficult to reduce the volume for patients who actually need care, and that’s almost all patients. Besides, in most instances we really don’t know how to measure value and convert that into a fixed fee. Volume is relatively fixed, and value is what we all strive for anyway.

Peter Orzag and Ezekiel Emanuel don’t listen to others, not even the Medicare actuaries, but they should be able to figure out these obvious fundamentals. Since they haven’t, maybe it’s them who have been drinking Zeke’s Kool-Aid.

Since it’s really cost that they are concerned about we should move forward with reform that has been proven repeatedly to slow the rate of health care inflation – a single payer national health program. Peter and Zeke need to abandon their false meme that single payer is “not feasible.” What isn’t feasible is expecting to fix our dysfunctional health care financing system with “bundled payments.”

Pricey Drugs Overwhelm Medicare Safeguard

By Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar
Associated Press, July 25, 2016

A safeguard for Medicare beneficiaries has become a way for drugmakers to get paid billions of dollars for pricey medications at taxpayer expense, government numbers show.

The cost of Medicare’s “catastrophic” prescription coverage jumped by 85 percent in three years, from $27.7 billion in 2013 to $51.3 billion in 2015, according to the program’s number-crunching Office of the Actuary.

Medicare’s catastrophic coverage was originally designed to protect seniors with multiple chronic conditions from the cumulatively high costs of taking many different pills. Beneficiaries pay 5 percent after they have spent $4,850 of their own money. With some drugs now costing more than $1,000 per pill, that threshold can be crossed quickly.

Lawmakers who created Part D in 2003 also hoped added protection would entice insurers to participate in the program. Medicare pays 80 percent of the cost of drugs above a catastrophic threshold that combines spending by the beneficiary and the insurer. That means taxpayers, not insurers, bear the exposure for the most expensive patients.

Concerns about catastrophic costs undercut the image of Medicare’s prescription program as a competitive marketplace in which private insurers bargain with drugmakers to drive down prices.

“The incentive is to price it as high as they can,” said Jim Yocum, senior vice president of Connecture, Inc., a company that tracks drug prices. Medicare is barred from negotiating prices, “so you max out your pricing and most of that risk is covered by the federal government.”

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ap-exclusive-medicare-safeguard-overwhelmed-115221318.html

***

Comment:

By Don McCanne, M.D.

When the Medicare Part D program covering drugs was designed, conservatives were in control of the government. As a result it was decided that the ideology of competition in the marketplace should be used to improve value rather than using government administered pricing. Today’s message demonstrates once again that markets do not work in health care.

Congress knew that they would have to protect the private insurers from adverse selection – that patients with multiple chronic conditions could place an extra burden on the insurers with whom they enrolled. Thus they established catastrophic coverage with the government (taxpayers) paying 80 percent of the costs over a given threshold. This was not to protect the patients, but rather it was to protect the insurers. That is, it was not to protect the taxpayers who finance much of the program, but rather it was to protect the participants in the marketplace – the drug manufacturers, insurers, and pharmacy benefit managers – using our taxpayer funds.

Under the catastrophic coverage, insurers pay 15 percent, patients pay 5 percent, and the taxpayers pay 80 percent. This allows the drug companies to drive their prices sky high. The 15 percent paid by the insurers is closer to the reasonable price of drugs and so they have less incentive to negotiate better prices, since most of it is being paid by the government anyway. The 5 percent paid by the patient is accepted as a necessary “skin in the game” contribution so patients will not fill prescriptions that they allegedly “do not really need” (a flawed policy concept). The 80 percent paid by taxpayers perpetuates the highly dysfunctional, fragmented financing system in the U.S. – using government money for private solutions – that has driven our health care spending up to levels much higher than all other nations.

The magic of the marketplace in health care is a fraud. Taxpayers pay far less for drugs purchased by the government for Medicaid and the VA system. Other nations with greater government oversight of their health care systems also pay much less.

With a well designed single payer national health program, our nation’s pharmacy bill would be fair, and everyone would get the drugs they need. With the price of many drugs now exceeding median household income, you would think there would be a demand to fix our health care financing system. You would think so, but where’s the action?

Pricey Drugs Overwhelm Medicare Safeguard

By Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar
Associated Press, July 25, 2016

A safeguard for Medicare beneficiaries has become a way for drugmakers to get paid billions of dollars for pricey medications at taxpayer expense, government numbers show.

The cost of Medicare’s “catastrophic” prescription coverage jumped by 85 percent in three years, from $27.7 billion in 2013 to $51.3 billion in 2015, according to the program’s number-crunching Office of the Actuary.

Medicare’s catastrophic coverage was originally designed to protect seniors with multiple chronic conditions from the cumulatively high costs of taking many different pills. Beneficiaries pay 5 percent after they have spent $4,850 of their own money. With some drugs now costing more than $1,000 per pill, that threshold can be crossed quickly.

Lawmakers who created Part D in 2003 also hoped added protection would entice insurers to participate in the program. Medicare pays 80 percent of the cost of drugs above a catastrophic threshold that combines spending by the beneficiary and the insurer. That means taxpayers, not insurers, bear the exposure for the most expensive patients.

Concerns about catastrophic costs undercut the image of Medicare’s prescription program as a competitive marketplace in which private insurers bargain with drugmakers to drive down prices.

“The incentive is to price it as high as they can,” said Jim Yocum, senior vice president of Connecture, Inc., a company that tracks drug prices. Medicare is barred from negotiating prices, “so you max out your pricing and most of that risk is covered by the federal government.”

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ap-exclusive-medicare-safeguard-overwhelmed-115221318.html

When the Medicare Part D program covering drugs was designed, conservatives were in control of the government. As a result it was decided that the ideology of competition in the marketplace should be used to improve value rather than using government administered pricing. Today’s message demonstrates once again that markets do not work in health care.

Congress knew that they would have to protect the private insurers from adverse selection – that patients with multiple chronic conditions could place an extra burden on the insurers with whom they enrolled. Thus they established catastrophic coverage with the government (taxpayers) paying 80 percent of the costs over a given threshold. This was not to protect the patients, but rather it was to protect the insurers. That is, it was not to protect the taxpayers who finance much of the program, but rather it was to protect the participants in the marketplace – the drug manufacturers, insurers, and pharmacy benefit managers – using our taxpayer funds.

Under the catastrophic coverage, insurers pay 15 percent, patients pay 5 percent, and the taxpayers pay 80 percent. This allows the drug companies to drive their prices sky high. The 15 percent paid by the insurers is closer to the reasonable price of drugs and so they have less incentive to negotiate better prices, since most of it is being paid by the government anyway. The 5 percent paid by the patient is accepted as a necessary “skin in the game” contribution so patients will not fill prescriptions that they allegedly “do not really need” (a flawed policy concept). The 80 percent paid by taxpayers perpetuates the highly dysfunctional, fragmented financing system in the U.S. – using government money for private solutions – that has driven our health care spending up to levels much higher than all other nations.

The magic of the marketplace in health care is a fraud. Taxpayers pay far less for drugs purchased by the government for Medicaid and the VA system. Other nations with greater government oversight of their health care systems also pay much less.

With a well designed single payer national health program, our nation’s pharmacy bill would be fair, and everyone would get the drugs they need. With the price of many drugs now exceeding median household income, you would think there would be a demand to fix our health care financing system. You would think so, but where’s the action?